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Abstract
Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) account for around half of private sector 
output and employment in Britain. Peripheral region economies, such as Wales, are 
even more focussed on SMEs. This thesis uses a new data set (BSD) of nearly all 
British firms that allows the study of small businesses in a spatial context, with 
particular attention to the market for SME control. The aim is to understand whether 
this market contributes to the productivity gap between core (London and the South 
East) and peripheral regions in Britain. It might do so if larger firms attempted to 
compensate for a lack of internally generated innovation by acquiring and absorbing 
productive small enterprises. Regular culling of top performing small firms in the 
periphery by ‘outside’ businesses could then stunt a region’s capacity for indigenous 
development. On the other hand, acquisition by larger firms (perhaps from the core) 
may enable SMEs to improve their performance and thereby enhance a region’s 
economy. In fact contrary to the experience of large firms, more productive small 
businesses have a higher likelihood of being acquired - although there is a lower rate 
of takeovers more generally in peripheral regions than in London and the South East. 
Takeovers also increase the chances of SMEs exiting, but this effect is stronger for the 
core region as well. Takeovers raise productivity after acquisition but by less, or even 
with deleterious effects, for the most productive SMEs. Combining the rate of 
takeovers with their effect on exits and performance, the overall, net beneficial impact 
on regional productivity from the targets of SME acquisitions is slightly larger in the 
core than in the periphery. This is due to the differential rate of takeovers between 
locations. Rather than regarding the effects on SMEs from acquisitions as harmful to 
periphery regions, policy makers should attempt to understand why takeovers are less 
frequent there, and should consider ways of improving the operation of the market for 
small businesses, especially in the periphery.
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction
Do takeovers of small and medium sized businesses (SMEs) strip peripheral regions 
and economies of their income and employment generation potential? Former Welsh 
MP Adam Price believed this was happening in Wales. Companies from outside 
Wales supposedly were buying successful indigenous enterprises and then shutting 
them down (The Western Mail 31st July 2002). Adam Price’s anxiety may be 
warranted because SMEs are the basis for regional development, the seed com for 
future large firms -  if they grow rapidly and survive. The creation and growth of 
SMEs are important for raising the productivity of the economy, both by entry of 
more productive firms, and through the competitive process, the ‘productive chum’ of 
the economy, where the more productive firms increase their market share at the 
expense of the less productive (Disney et al. 2003). So regular culling of top 
performing small firms could stunt a region’s capacity for indigenous development.
Why might such takeovers be a real possibility? Larger firms often seek to renew their 
vitality by absorbing the ideas and entrepreneurship of high performing small 
enterprises -  hunting for ‘intrapreneurship’ (Baumol 2004). Large pharmaceutical 
companies sometimes absorb small biotech enterprises that have made technical 
breakthroughs that eluded their own more rigid organisations (Allansdottir et al.
2002). Outside pharmaceuticals an example is Smith & Nephew, a FTSE 100 
company formerly known for growth by acquisition of products such as Nivea, Dove 
soap, intraocular lenses, and hip replacements. This business used to search for small 
firms to buy up and absorb (Foreman-Peck 1995, pp. 136-7 pp. 212-3).
How could there be regional asymmetries in such a takeover process? The New 
Economic Geography has formalised possible spatial consequences of agglomeration 
economies, based on models of imperfect competition and economies of scale. Under 
plausible conditions more heavily populated regions attract larger more productive 
firms, creating and sustaining regional divergences in income and productivity. A 
takeover process, where acquiring firms are located or headquartered in the higher 
income core region, and targets are innovative, high productivity SMEs based in the 
lower productivity periphery could well be part of such a process.
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On the other hand, competition for SME assets could boost performance, and the 
more intense the competition, the stronger the performance of surviving SMEs. For 
example, Molecular Light Technology Research of Cardiff employs 41 people, having 
registered 15 patents and published over 80 research papers. The business was 
incorporated in 1991 as a ‘spin out’ from what is now Cardiff University Medical 
School. In 2003, the business was bought by its largest customer, the US firm Gen- 
Probe, who are investing £2.9m with a view to doubling turnover to £9m over the 
next 5 years (Molecular Light Technology 2008; PR Newswire 2003). This SME 
(vertical) takeover story was a happy one for the company, which could operate with 
more resources, and for Wales. At first sight it counts against the adverse view of 
takeovers. The experience is consistent with a benevolent market for SME corporate 
control, rather than one that creates underdevelopment of peripheral regions. A 
proviso however is that MLT eventually lost its research function to the Californian 
buyer.
If the competition for SME assets is helpful for resource allocation, peripheral 
economies with lower densities of firms in often spatially limited markets could be at 
a disadvantage simply because the competition for ownership and control of SMEs is 
relatively weaker. Information is likely to be both relatively scarce and costly to 
obtain for younger, smaller firms. This can result in market failure (via adverse 
selection) and a reduced rate of market activity, similar to that described by Akerloff 
(1970). Within the market for small firms there are likely to be both ‘cherries’ and 
‘lemons’. With limited information, buyers are unlikely to be sure whether they are 
acquiring a ‘lemon’ or a ‘cherry’ and so may offer an average price of the two. For the 
owners of ‘cherries’ this price is not acceptable and so they do not sell. In peripheral 
areas this could be particularly acute due to information flows there and relatively 
fewer formal or informal networks in these areas (Allinson et al. 2007).
This thesis looks at the possible regional element of SME takeovers, comparing core 
and peripheral regions. In the introduction the background to the ‘regional problem’ is
outlined, the spatial differences in productivity are described, as is the regional
)
distribution of large and small firms. Then the steps necessary to create a coherent
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theory capable of testing the regional takeover hypotheses are described, before the 
process of testing and quantifying them are summarised.
1.1 Productivity differences in the UK
In 2001, Wales, Northern Ireland and the North East were recognised by the Treasury 
as being the UK’s poorest regions, according to regional GDP per capita figures for 
1999 (HM Treasury 2001). These regions all registered levels that were around 40 per 
cent below that of London1. More recent evidence with aggregate productivity shows 
these regions still have relatively low levels of productivity according to two 
measures; aggregate productivity with gross value added (GVA) per filled job and 
GVA per hour worked (see figure 1.1). For the measures of GVA per filled job and 
GVA per hour worked, Wales (around 90 percent for both) is second lowest to 
Northern Ireland (around 85 percent and 80 percent, respectively)2. These measures 
also show similarly low performance for Yorkshire and the Humber, the North East 
and North West of England.
1 The aggregate statistics do not include the effects o f regional prices. UK regional differences of 
consumer prices, using national weights, shows that London (around 110 percent o f UK average) has 
the highest consumer prices and that Wales has one o f the lowest (around 95 percent o f UK average) 
(Wingfield et al. 2005). However, this alone does not explain the entire gap in GVA per head between 
Wales and London.
2 The difference between GVA per filled job or per hour worked and the per head measure suggests 
that the factors of unemployment and labour market inactivity can make quite a difference to the level 
o f productivity for Wales. For other regions such as London, the South East and East, the inter-region 
commuting is perhaps more important; GVA is generated in a given region but employees reside in 
another.
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F igure 1.1 - P roductiv ity  by region
Productivity by UK Region 2004 (UK = 100)
130 -
■  GVA per filled job
■  GVA per hour worked 
□  GVA per headUK Region
Source: ONS (2006b)
Figure 1.1 shows that wide regional productivity differences exist across the UK. The 
core regions - London and the South East - have much higher levels o f  output worker 
compared to more peripheral ones such as Wales, Northern Ireland, the North East 
and Yorkshire and the Humber.
1.2 The business context of the UK
Nearly all businesses in the UK are SMEs (BIS 2006). SMEs are also an important 
source o f employment and output for each UK region. For the UK as a whole, SMEs 
account for nearly 59 percent (or 43 percent for SMEs with employees) of total 
employment (BIS 2006). Regionally, a lot o f variation exists; SMEs only account for 
46.8 percent o f employment in London -  a core region. For Wales, a region of 
particular interest to this thesis and more importantly a peripheral one, SMEs account 
for over three-quarters of employment (77 percent), this is only second to another 
peripheral region; Northern Ireland (81 percent) (BIS 2006). The regional 
contribution o f  output by SMEs is similar to employment. Wales (62 percent) is again 
only second to Northern Ireland (80 percent) (BIS 2006).
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Peripheral regions, such as Wales, are sparsely headquartered with very large firms. 
Core regions; London (and to a lesser degree the South East) is the most likely 
location of company headquarters for firms with 500 plus employees in the UK. Table
1.1 shows that London has around 15.6 percent of all businesses registered there 
within the UK but around 21.1 percent of all very large firms3 . Combined with the 
South East, nearly 40 percent of very large firms in the UK are registered there. By 
contrast, a peripheral region such as Wales has around 4 percent of all businesses 
registered there but only 2.4 percent of firms with 500 plus employees.
Table 1.1 -  Large firms in selected UK regions, 2005
Region
Number of 
firms
Percentage of 
firms in UK
Number of firms 
with 500+ 
employees*
Percentage of 
firms with 500+ 
employees in UK
London 675,795 15.6 620 21.1
South East 729,545 16.8 500 17.0
Wales 175,460 4.0 70 2.4
UK 4,342,045 100 2,940 100
Source: Adapted from BIS (2006)
*Numbers are approximate due to the aggregation of rounded numbers
Another indication of a firm’s size is whether it is listed on the stock exchange. In 
doing so may also enable companies to access capital cheaply for business 
acquisitions. A regional dominance of listed firms may also indicate the likely 
location of SME acquirers. Wales, in particular, has relatively few firms listed on the 
stock exchange. London dominates the number of listed firms on the stock exchange. 
Around half of firms registered on the London Stock Exchange in November 2003 
from Great Britain were in London4. This rises to nearly 60 percent when the South 
East is included. By contrast, Wales has around 1 percent, the lowest out of all British 
regions. Other peripheral regions, such as the North East, Yorkshire and the Humber, 
North West all have around 6 percent (Klagge and Martin 2005). In relation to the 
stock of VAT registered businesses, London and Scotland are both over-represented 
on the financial markets. The peripheral regions of Wales and the North West have 
the lowest percentages out of all the British regions of their VAT-registered
3 BIS (2006) define enterprises (used interchangeably here with businesses or firms) as;
‘a legal unit, person or group o f  people producing goods or services under their own control and with 
their own legal identity. A branch or office o f  a  larger organisation is not in itself a  business'.
4 These figures are now a little dated but it is unlikely that the regionally distribution o f firms has 
changed much over time.
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businesses listed (Klagge and Martin 2005). An alternative method of measuring size 
for listed companies is market capitalisation. The average market capitalization of 
businesses registered in London and the South East, the core location in the UK, in 
late-2003 was £0.9 billion but only around £0.1 billion in the North West and Wales 
(Klagge and Martin 2005)5.
It is apparent therefore that peripheral regions’ economies, with lower productivity, 
are relatively more dependent on SMEs than core regions. The number and proportion 
of listed firms on stock exchanges, the size of these firms and the number of large 
firms altogether are all higher in core regions. For Wales, a peripheral region, further 
evidence suggests the productivity differential between SMEs and larger enterprises is 
greater than the UK average (Foreman-Peck et al. 2006, p. 309 Table 2). This 
suggests that at least some of productivity gap between core and peripheral regions is 
within the SME sector.
1.3 Overview
There are three theoretical elements in the regional SME takeover model of this 
thesis that must be distinguished. The first is the market for ownership and control of 
enterprises, the second is how the operation of this market might differ between SMEs 
and large firms and the third is the spatial dimension of the market.
The market for ownership and control determines takeover chances and the likely 
characteristics of acquired firms. The next set of relationships determines what 
happens to the target enterprise after acquisition. This element involves the chances of 
acquired businesses being stripped of assets and closed down, and the effects of 
takeover on survivors’ productivity and therefore profitability.
Q-theory (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002) predicts a inverse relationship between the 
chances of takeover and productivity. The relationship with regards to takeovers and 
exit chances is potentially ambiguous. In the case of a ‘white knight’ acquisition, a 
target short of liquidity may be saved from bankruptcy; reducing the chances of exit.
5 These data are before the more recent falls in the stock market, so all firms are now likely to be 
valued far lower. More recent estimates show that Wales, out o f all the GB regions, has the least 
number o f  firms listed on the stock exchange with a value o f over £1 billion (David 2008).
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But more likely the predator merges the targets assets with its own group and the 
independent existence of the acquired firm is ended, producing a positive relationship; 
takeover boosts exit chances. If the market works well, acquired firms that remain 
open achieve higher productivity and profitability under the new regime. However, 
acquirer ignorance and incompetence could accomplish the opposite, discussed 
below.
SMEs differ from large firms. Information, the costs of funds and general resource 
availability, coupled sometimes with family ownership, may mean the market for 
ownership and control of SME could work rather differently. On the supply side, 
SMEs are typically not publicly quoted or have shares that are not widely held so they 
cannot be sold against the wishes of management. On the demand side, a higher cost 
of finance for small firms, caused by information problems due to their size and the 
higher chance of failure, increases their discount rate (Cowling 2007). This reduces 
their valuation of future profits relative to that of a large firm with a lower cost of 
capital. Consequently this thesis contends that productivity would positively predict 
takeover for SMEs, the opposite of Q-theory.
As far as the other relationships are concerned there might be more questions about 
the acquirer’s decisions, given that they are unable to stimulate innovation 
themselves. So they may lower productivity and profitability after acquiring the SME 
target, assuming they have not closed it. On the other hand the acquirer will certainly 
boost its own productivity and profitability so that the sum for the two firms is greater 
than the parts - assuming the market works.
Turning now to the spatial dimension of the market for SME ownership and control, 
peripheral regions differ in a number of ways from the core. The New Economic 
Geography (NEG) provides a framework to explain spatial differences in income 
levels and core-periphery outcomes (see for example Krugman 1991b; Krugman and 
Venables 1995). Thicker markets and agglomeration enhance the profitability of core 
locations in NEG models so that relocation to such regions is attractive for many
17
enterprises (Baldwin and Okubo 2006)6. Therefore after takeovers, there are 
incentives to move and employ the assets of a newly acquired, productive firm in the 
core. Financial and political power and information also may be stronger in the core 
and this might have spatial economic implications. Large companies, more probably 
interested in acquisitions, are likely to be headquartered in the core.
The impact of the SME market on regional development not only depends on the type 
of firms that are acquired but also on the effects of takeover. NEG suggests probable 
adverse distributional consequences for periphery regions, even though the overall 
impact on the national economy is beneficial. After takeover, an enterprise may be 
stripped of its assets and closed, or its headquarters functions may be integrated with 
the acquiring firm, and the target operated as a branch plant, or investment may be 
pumped in to improve performance.
The above theory of the regional market for SME ownership may alter the described 
relationships above. Unlike large publicly quoted firms, more productive small 
businesses are more likely to be acquired. Whether the acquisition targets 
subsequently improve in productivity relative to what they would have done, or 
whether they cease trading after takeover when they would not otherwise, could have 
an impact on regional economic development, and productivity differentials, harmful 
or beneficial. The effects interact with the process of selecting targets. Low 
productivity selection and subsequent closure would boost productivity. High
*7productivity selection in the first relationship and closure could lower productivity . 
The overall effect depends also on the benefits of the takeover to the acquirer. In order 
to favour the NEG centripetal hypothesis (and perhaps not unreasonably) acquirers 
are assumed to be located outside the periphery, in the core.
6 This also is consistent with a sorting effect, where highest productivity firms move to the core and 
lowest move to the periphery.
7 This ignores the dynamic that acquisition may generate capital that may enable an entrepreneur to 
generate a further start-up. For this to have any effects on the welfare or productivity o f the region 
would imply that start-up occur in the same region where the acquired firm operated. To incorporate 
this requires data that contains businesses and takeovers that can be linked to entrepreneurs and their 
activity following a departure from a firm. This is not available in the UK.
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1.4 Structure
I begin with the first the literature survey (chapter 2) that explains why firms, 
especially small ones, are acquired. The theory addresses both the profitability of 
acquirers (the demand side) and the incentives for owners to sell (the supply side).
The second literature chapter (3) concerns the effects of acquisition. This involves 
how takeovers both affect the likelihood of a firm closing - exiting - and impact on 
performance.
Chapter four is a review of the relevant theory and literature that explains spatial 
productivity within new economic geography models and how core-periphery 
equilibrium may occur, consistent with regional productivity data in Great Britain. 
Within this context, takeovers - especially those involving small firms - are explored 
in terms of the types of firms involved, where they are located and what their effects 
are likely to be.
Chapter 5 introduces the framework and model which are used to estimate both the 
determinants of SME takeovers and the impact of these acquisitions on the regions in 
which the targets are located. A number of hypotheses are then formed which relate to 
the acquisition of SMEs and their regional productivity effects. These are then tested 
in the subsequent empirical chapters.
The sixth chapter discusses the data used in the thesis. It defines the variables and 
provides some summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. The 
dataset, the Business Structure Database (BSD), is newly complied by the ONS and 
can only be accessed via their Virtual Microdata Laboratory8. It allows takeovers to 
be identified using a similar definition to that of Singh’s (1971) seminal work.
8 The data enables analysis to be conducted at a regional or sector level. However, it uses the standard 
industry classification (in this instance the 1992 SIC version) which emerging industries, by definition, 
are usually not yet defined suitably in. This is not a problem here as I am most interested in the 
aggregate effects o f takeovers and not their processes within certain sub-sectors.
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The seventh chapter is the first of four empirical analyses that use the BSD. It 
estimates equation 1, above, concerning the productivity and other characteristics of 
acquired small firms.
The second empirical chapter (8) looks at some of the consequences of takeover: exit 
and relocation; equation 2. If acquisitions of small firms have differential effects 
depending on the location, then the rate of takeover-exits (and -relocations) is likely 
to vary by area. This is explored by considering the effects of acquisitions on the 
chances of exit and relocation one year after takeover.
The third empirical chapter (9) concerns the last equation (3); the productivity 
performance effect of SME acquisitions. This looks at what, if any, effect acquisitions 
have on small firm employment and productivity and if this varies by regional 
location.
The last empirical chapter (10) estimates the total effect of SME takeover targets on 
regional productivity. This brings together the three equations; using the estimates 
from the previous chapters of takeover effects on chances of exit and productivity to 
produce an aggregate impact, weighting firms so that the relative importance of larger 
SMEs on regional economies is accounted for.
The final chapter (11) brings all the findings together and suggests appropriate policy 
responses. I begin by discussing the theory and literature relating to takeovers and 
why small firms are acquired.
20
Chapter 2 - The Motivation for SME Takeovers
2.1 Introduction
Why takeovers may occur at the micro-economic level is discussed in this chapter. It 
involves both the sources of demand, especially for productive small firms, and also 
the supply side - why these firms might accept takeover. Traditional theory of 
takeovers focuses on the effects on market power of profit-seeking acquiring 
businesses. Given their size - and hence generally small market shares - it is likely 
that SMEs are bought mainly for other reasons. Grounds for small business takeovers 
are explored, developing established models that look at M&As more generally.
Almost all firms are likely to start off small, perhaps as micros (with employment of 
between 1 and 9), growing into larger firms if they survive. Some medium9 sized 
firms are believed to fail to grow into larger firms because of takeover by larger 
companies (Dunne and Hughes 1994). Small firm constraints such as finance and 
management are also suggested reasons why high-tech UK SMEs fail to become 
‘international players’ and instead sell out to larger firms (Cosh and Hughes 1994, p. 
285).
Merger or acquisition are possible solutions to financial and other growth barriers for 
firms (Mason and Harrison 2006). Larger businesses may provide smaller firms 
resources to aid their development or enable owners to cash-in on their equity. 
Therefore any form of M&A might be attractive for SME owners.
Small firms are particularly vulnerable to problems caused by asymmetries of 
information. The available information about a firm is likely to be a function of size 
and perhaps also age. Akerloff (1970) illustrates how markets can fail due to a paucity 
of information. In the context of businesses, this means that agents trying to find out 
more about a firm are unlikely to be able to assess a business adequately. This has 
implications for takeover and finance separately, the latter also potentially affecting 
the former. If potential acquirers know very little about young, small firms, it is likely
9 Medium here is considered to be a lot larger than the definition used within own study but the premise 
remains the same.
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this will be reflected by a limited demand for these firms. Also finance might be 
restricted, offered at a higher rate or both.
The section begins by establishing that SMEs are unlikely to be publicly quoted and 
that takeovers in the main will be ‘friendly’. The types and determinants of M&As are 
then discussed. The types of takeover include horizontal and vertical. Determinants 
include complementarities, R&D and the relationship with productivity. The demand 
effect of finance is also discussed. The review then turns to the supply of SMEs in the 
market of their corporate control. This includes issues of small firm management 
succession, converting personal stock, capital gains and entrepreneurial recycling and 
access to finance.
The empirical evidence discussed in this review is mainly qualitative in nature, 
similar to the other issues discussed (e.g. whether targets are more productive and 
whether takeovers are beneficial -  see next chapter for the latter). It is more 
appropriate to discuss the direction of any relationship between studies rather than 
their size as there is no consensus in the literature on many of the issues discussed.
The scale of the effects between studies is also expected to vary because of the 
different time periods, types of firms and countries examined. As the review focuses 
on studies of all sizes of firms and plants, any important differences in findings across 
the studies will be highlighted, especially those that may suggest differences between 
the large and small firm sectors. This should help to illuminate the market for SME 
ownership.
Important differences exist between large firms and SMEs that must be highlighted 
from the outset.
2.2 SMEs, non-public quotation and ‘friendly’ takeovers
This review concerns SMEs and does not address any of the issues that directly relates 
to large firms. Very little is known about the acquisition activity in the small firm 
sector (Small Business Research Centre 1992). Most studies of the causes and effects 
of M&As tend to look at larger, listed firms. Cosh and Hughes (1994) found that,
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because of data and methodological problems, smaller businesses are neglected in the 
M&A literature. Since they wrote fifteen years ago, the situation has changed little.
Most small firms are assumed to be the target of takeovers and not the acquirer. This 
does not mean that small firms never engage in buying other firms but this thesis, 
along with much of the literature (discussed below), assumes smaller firms are the 
targets, being acquired by (relatively) larger ones. This is also the definition that 
Singh (1971) uses in his seminal work. Some theory does not allow acquirers and the 
acquired to be disentangled, for example, Cournot models (discussed below) look at 
the sum of profits from the two newly merged firms. Therefore, generally the 
literature on acquirer's performance is primarily about large firms and so is considered 
beyond the scope of the thesis. However, it can be assumed that on average acquirers 
gain from takeovers, or are at least made no worse-off by them, otherwise they would 
have no incentive to engage in such activity. This is discussed more below with the 
effects of mergers on market power.
The takeover literature contains much research that looks at the impact of takeovers 
on large firms uses event studies to measure the effects, or more specifically stock 
returns (for a review see Caves 1989). This literature is also not relevant as it can be 
safely assumed that almost all SMEs are not publicly quoted; most are likely to be 
very small -  micros. Also, the main interest of this thesis is the effects that takeovers 
may have on regional economies, particularly productivity and, to a lesser degree, 
employment (see next chapter).
Acquirers may also have incentives to purchase privately held businesses relative to 
publicly listed ones. Evidence finds that acquirers of private firms perform better than 
if they purchase a public one (Capron and Shen 2007). This is because of a discount 
in the acquisition price. Relative to a public firm, the market for a private firm is 
likely to have few potential acquirers and so the price may not be driven-up in such a 
way as acquisitions within public markets10. This is caused by the lesser availability 
of information of potential targets, information asymmetry can also induce a private 
firm discount, similar to that described by Akerloff (1970). The uncertainty of returns
10 The cost o f capital might also be higher for non-quoted firms, this may also reduce the selling price.
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from a potential target may drive the price down within the market for privately held 
firms. This could lead to the breakdown of the market. However, acquirer’s might be 
enticed into the market if they have private information, reflected in their valuation of 
the target11.
Another implication of SMEs not being publicly listed companies is that takeovers 
can be considered to be mostly voluntary rather than hostile. With publicly listed 
firms, differences are identified between the targets of voluntary and involuntary 
takeovers (Singh 1971) and also between ‘friendly’ and ‘hostile’ acquisitions (Powell 
1997). If the manager generally owns the equity, or at least is the majority 
shareholder of the firm, buyouts need to be agreed with the owner-manager or require 
their permission to contact shareholders.
A final implication o f assuming the vast majority of SMEs are not publicly quoted is a 
restricted supply of equity-based finance - a potentially important source of finance 
for large firms. This and other financial implications for SMEs are discussed later in 
the review. To understand why SMEs are acquired and why other firms may want to 
engage in such activity, I next discuss the determinants and types of M&As.
2.3 Types and Determinants of Takeovers
Acquisitions are motivated by a potential acquirer expecting to gain a higher rate of 
return or valuing differently a (discounted) future profit stream than the present 
owners. The former could occur from the new owners believing they can run the firm 
more successfully, improving its performance after acquisition. The latter may occur 
if expectations differ between the present owners and potential acquirer, similar to 
what occurs in publicly quoted firms and stockholder’s expectations12. This 
divergence of expectations between buyers and sellers may result in takeover (Hughes 
et al. 1980). This may stem from differing present valuations of the same future profit 
stream. This can occur from differing access to finance between firms. A lower 
discount rate may result from accessing cheaper credit at a lower interest rate; this
11 Conditions exist when acquiring a publicly quoted firm might be more profitable otherwise all 
transactions o f this kind would only involve privately owned firms (see Capron and Shen 2007, p. 897).
12 It is also possible that with voluntary takeovers, both parties are o f the same opinion that new owners 
can generate higher returns.
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would allow for two different valuations of the same expected future profit stream. If  
evidence shows that finance is cheaper, or more available, for larger firms, this may 
create demand for smaller firms. Larger firms may then find bargains among highly 
productive small firms, but not among the productive large (Caves 1998). Perhaps 
with larger firms it is the relatively poor performers that are more likely to be 
acquired, allowing better management to utilise their capital more productively 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002). This could also result in asset stripping; removing or 
absorbing the assets of the acquired firm and putting them to a more productive use.
The growth potential of a firm may also help to match firms with an acquirer. Firms 
with the potential for growth but lacking the ability due to inadequate resources or 
liquidity constraints may be matched in the market with a larger firm that can offer 
the resources for the firm to expand and grow. This is sometimes referred to as 
growth-resource imbalance and has been investigated in quite a few studies (Alcalde 
and Espitia 2003; Barnes 1999; Palepu 1986; Powell 1997).
Market power and costs will have an impact upon profits, depending upon the type of 
M&A. The three broad categories of M&As are horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. 
The first two are most relevant to the market for control of SMEs13. However, it is 
likely that market power is much less of a consideration in the acquisition of SMEs. 
There is likely to be a degree of market power that exists between different sized 
firms and it is possible that some small firms have some degree of market power, 
especially if they operate in specialist or local markets. However, the extent of this 
and the incentive for larger firms to acquire SME due to market power are likely to be 
limited. It is more likely that the acquisition is undertaken because the target could be 
a serious rival once it has grown more or due to the technology or assets (including 
intangibles) it possesses (Gilbert and Newbery 1982). Therefore looking at horizontal
13 Conglomerate M&As are when two firms merge, or a firm is taken-over, but they operate within 
unrelated markets. This is not likely to affect either the market power or efficiency o f the firms. 
Therefore sales, price, output and profits are likely to be unchanged. There is little incentive, 
particularly with SME, for acquisition. Therefore there is less reason to expect market power or cost 
efficiencies to change a result o f mergers with firms in unrelated markets. Diversification is perhaps 
one o f the most compelling reasons for such takeovers. However, it is not clear how much protection 
from industry or cyclical risk an acquirer may receive by investing in a small firm that is in an 
unrelated market.
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and vertical M&As, next I consider the incentives for firms to acquire small firms and 
concentrate on their effects on costs and complementarities.
2.3.1 Horizontal M&As 
Quantity setting competition models
Horizontal M&As involve the coming together of two firms in the same industry. 
These can be modelled with Cournot and Stackelberg models. As acquisitions involve 
small firms it is highly likely that they are not wholly concerned with market power. 
SMEs are unlikely to have any significant market share and acquisitions on this 
premise are more likely to involve targeting those firms that may have the potential to 
become competitors. Also, if the concern with takeovers is within the context of New 
Economic Geography (NEG) models (introduced in chapter 4), the assumptions of 
perfect competition may not apply. However, either way, analysis that only concerns 
the incentives for firms to merge solely due to the effects on market power, such as 
Cournot models (for example, see Salant et al. 1983), do not apply here. It is more 
likely that they will affect costs and so this section concentrates on only the relevant 
application of horizontal M&As in Cournot-type models. As the market power of 
small firms is assumed to be minimal, it is likely that the potential profits that the 
following models suggest will only be strengthened as most assume a degree of 
market power which tends to reduce the profitability of mergers and takeovers.
Another key trait to this area of literature is that mergers and takeovers can display 
losses to the firms involved but yet be profitable to those that are not engaged in the 
activity. This is not a satisfactory result. First, it provides a disincentive to acquire 
others firms. Second, it is in the firm’s interests for its competitors to merge. These 
two outcomes are not desirable with the classical assumptions that firms merge to 
increase their profits and this, at least weakly, may cause losses to other firms. 
Therefore any model that is tractable for the SME market should not also have these 
side-effects.
Mergers are more likely to be profitable (for merging firms) if they also result in some 
form of cost advantage. In an extension to the literature concerning Cournot models 
(and therefore the effects on market power), Fauli-Oller (2002) uses constant 
marginal costs but allows them to vary between firms. With this specification,
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mergers are profitable if the relative size of merging firms is quite different and the 
possibility of cost savings is high. This is because the model allows production to be 
transferred away from the high cost producer. An extreme case is when the high cost 
producer is shutdown post-merger.
Extending the ideas of Fauli-Oller (2002), it is possible that large and small firms may 
have differing costs, where small dynamic firms are efficient and low cost. Firms with 
lower marginal costs in a standard Cournot set-up produce a larger proportion of total 
output. It is not possible to model low cost firms as the small entity simultaneously 
within a standard Cournot model14. Therefore this particular set-up -  a horizontal 
merger with quantity-setting - is not consistent with small, efficient businesses being 
taken-over; the premise of this thesis. This last extension by Fauli-Oller is also not 
very applicable as it implies that high cost firms are ultimately shut to the benefit of 
the larger, acquiring firms. The line of enquiry for this thesis is more concerned with 
whether smaller, more productive firms, and hence low cost producers, are targeted 
and then perhaps shut. Therefore it is perhaps more likely that SMEs are acquired 
because they have assets that lower the costs of production for large firms. I return to 
this later when I look at vertical mergers.
Horizontal mergers are unlikely to be symmetrical. Acquired firms are small and, 
concentrating on takeovers, then implicitly the acquiring firm is likely to be larger. A 
way this can be modelled is by postulating a leader (large firm) and follower (small 
firm), as in a Stackelberg leadership model of quantity setting (not simultaneously as 
in Cournot models).
The Stackelberg approach is perhaps a more realistic setting for the SME hypothesis. 
Within the model it can be shown that mergers are profitable if leaders are assumed 
to be the acquirers and SMEs are the followers (Huck et al. 2001). The hew merged 
firm produces the same quantity as the leading firm prior to the acquisition and the 
follower effectively disappears. The benefit from a merger occurs from a sufficient 
price increase, resulting in the (integrated) follower’s value exceeding that if it was 
not acquired. Mergers are profitable despite the acquisition not resulting in an
14 This model, assuming that smaller firms are more efficient, does not assume economies o f scale exist 
-  inconsistent with models o f  New Economic Geography, introduced later in this thesis.
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increase in the size of the dominant firm (measured by quantity). The new composite 
firm produces the same quantity as before but the price increases, compensating for 
the losses from the decrease in the joint quantity of production15. Mergers between 
two leaders or two followers (perhaps small firms) can also be profitable if the cost 
schedules are sufficiently convex - they display diseconomies of scale (Hey wood and 
McGinty 2007).
However, in Stackelberg leadership without diseconomies of scale (convex costs), a 
free-rider type problem occurs (as it does in most other horizontal merger models) -  
firms not merging experience a positive effect in their profits. Although it is still 
profitable to engage in acquisitions, it is also advantageous not to, as profits still 
increase. This free-riding result is removed if both diseconomies of scale and 
leadership industrial structure are included (Heywood and McGinty 2008). This is 
because one possible outcome of the merger is for the post-merger price to fall, 
penalising outsiders (Heywood and McGinty 2008).
Perhaps more relevant for SMEs is when the acquired firm does not ‘disappear’ or 
become fully integrated to the firms but acts as a subsidiary of the acquirer. This is 
demonstrated within a Cournot type set-up with linear costs (Huck et al. 2004). This 
turns the set-up into a partial Stackelberg, with effectively a ‘partial Stackelberg 
leader’ and a ‘partial Stackelberg follower’. The new headquarters of the integrated 
firm dictates the timing of decisions. This occurs as the information within the newly 
merged firm is assumed to travel more swiftly, without barriers and act as a 
commitment device on the acquired’s output level, unlike when they are competitors. 
Firms pre-merger act according to a Cournot set-up but subsequently act according to 
Stackelberg agents post-merger. More generally, the results of this model are also 
relevant and consistent with the general assumptions of M&A activity in that mergers 
are only profitable for those engaged in the acquisition and not all other firms. This is 
important as it is an outcome that is observed to occur for both the firms involved and 
those outside of the acquisition or merger.
15 The incentives for two dominant firms or two subordinate firms to merge are limited unless the 
former join to create a single dominant firm (similar to a Cournot set-up result).
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Another relevant extension of the quantity setting models for the acquisition of SMEs 
is a two-game set-up, where firms first compete on R&D and then on quantity in the 
product market (Davidson and Ferrett 2007). Investment in R&D is assumed to help 
in the private process of production, reducing the marginal cost of production without 
any spill-overs. The incentives for mergers result from R&D complementarities that 
can ultimately aid production. Large synergies in R&D increase the incentive to 
merge. The gains from R&D can overcome any potential losses from the merger, as 
found in the original quantity setting models (e.g. Salant et al. 1983). Two stages are 
assumed: first firms choose how much to invest in process R&D, and second, 
compete in product markets by choosing how much output to produce. In Cournot 
competition, R&D and the market power result have the opposite effects for the gains 
and losses to insiders and outsiders. For merging firms, the more R&D 
complementarities, the larger are the gains to insiders and therefore the losses to 
outsiders. An important and attractive feature of this model is that profitable mergers 
are not the result of market power or reliant on a leader-follower structure. In a 
quantity setting model, this outcome of profitable mergers; driven by R&D 
complementarities, is an attractive one for the acquisition of SMEs.
Price setting models and Bertrand competition
All of the models introduced so far have analysed the effects of horizontal mergers 
based around quantity setting competition. Quantity-setting models could be 
considered more of a long term decision and perhaps of more relevance, especially in 
the short-run, are models that allow for price-setting competition instead.
When price is used as the strategic variable mergers are profitable for insiders 
(Deneckere and Davidson 1985). However, this model does not remove all of the 
unusual features of horizontal mergers with quantity setting models. If outsiders still 
gain the most from mergers, this does not explain why mergers occur. Firms are better 
off being an outsider, even with price setting models.
Bertrand competition has also been applied to the Davidson and Ferrett (2007) model 
where firms compete on both R&D and product markets. In this model it is uncertain 
whether outsiders lose out from a merger with this form of competition as it depends 
on the degree of R&D complementarity within the merger. However, competition in
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both R&D and product markets do result in outsiders not benefiting more than 
insiders, unlike other Bertrand set-ups. With this model it is optimal to be involved in 
a merger, providing a motivation for them to occur rather than a firm opting to be an 
outsider where formerly the profits were higher.
In summary, models with more complex set-ups than the standard Cournot quantity 
setting models are more relevant to the acquisitions of SMEs. These show that 
mergers are profitable for those firms directly involved; a more plausible 
representation of reality. An example of such a model is one that has a dominant and 
follower set-up. However, some of the assumptions of these models are sometimes 
questionable such as diseconomies of scale. These may not apply, at least at the SME 
scale16. They also result in profits for those that do not merge; an undesirable 
outcome. Non-merging firms are not found to benefit if mergers yield R&D 
complementarities. This suggests that acquirers and small firms that are acquired may 
be made better-off by takeover. This is possibly the most realistic and plausible result 
for small firms that arises from this area of literature. It suggests that small firms are 
involved in horizontal acquisition as they are able to offer their acquirer assets, 
perhaps intangible ones, such as R&D.
Next I look at an alternative form of acquisition -  vertical M&As.
2.3.2 Vertical M&As
When a large firm acquires an upstream firm (backward integration), the latter’s sales 
disappear. If no effects on market power occur or costs are obtained by the upstream 
acquisition, this will not affect the final product’s price, or the sales and profits of the 
acquirer. Profits are simply the sum of the two firms prior to the acquisition.
However, if the acquisition improves the efficiency of the downstream firm, it may 
result in a lower price and an increase in output (Hughes et al. 1980). This could result 
in an increase in profits, providing an incentive to engage in such activity and 
therefore a realistic scenario for explaining M&A activity.
16 Also, they are not fully consistent with NEG models -  see chapter 4.
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Vertical M&As involving SMEs may provide a useful way for larger companies to 
reduce their costs. Perhaps the SME is of some use to the acquirer if they have a 
complementarity such as R&D, as observed in the quantity setting models (where 
acquiring firms is a profitable activity even above their effects on market power). 
Improving the efficiency of the acquirer as a result of the acquisition may increase the 
profitability of a merger for acquirers thereby providing a rationale for M&As to be 
initiated, removing the incentive for other firms not to engage in such activity. For 
vertical M&As, it can be shown that acquirers and the acquired can be made better off 
by takeover.
2.4 Intangibles and Complementarities
The previous theory has suggested that most of the benefits from merger are likely to 
occur from enhancements to the supply side of the firm (as opposed to effects on 
demand due to market power). The benefits from M&As may stem from R&D 
complementarities (as modelled in Davidson and Ferrett 2007) or reductions in the 
marginal costs of production (used in Heywood and McGinty 2007, 2008; Perry and 
Porter 1985) through other intangible assets.
Intangibles are increasingly being seen in economics as key to both regional (see
chapter 4’s NEG review) and business level performance:
'The use o f intangible assets (which can be defined as knowledge embodied in 
intellectual assets, such as R&D and proprietary know-how, intellectual property, 
workforce skills, world-class supply networks and brands) is recognized as a key 
(some say the key) driver o f  enterprise performance and thus ultimately aggregate 
productivity and growth.’ (Harris 2008, p. 16)
There are two main ways such assets can be accumulated in firms. The first is by 
internal investment and the second is to obtain it from an external source such as firm 
acquisition (Hall 1988). There is a recent growing literature that view M&As as a 
means to transfer and obtain new technology or assets such as management, (Ahuja 
and Katila 2001; Cassiman et al. 2005; Cloodt et al. 2006; Colombo et al. 2006; 
Hussinger 2010; Lehto and Lehtoranta 2004). This is pertinent for the acquisition of 
SMEs, as takeovers are a means to allow externals (this can be external to the market 
the region, or even the country e.g. FDI) to acquire assets, technology, human capital 
or R&D from firms (Howells 1990). Takeovers can also improve the technological
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performance of the acquiring firm (Ahuja and Katila 2001). Thus multinationals (or 
other external firms to the region perhaps) are on the lookout for such suitable small 
purchases (Dahlstrand 2000, p. 176).
Complementarities between the acquired and acquirer may yield economies of scope 
and scale. Efficiencies from joint production with other goods or services or synergy- 
combined production can result in a reduction in average costs, increasing profits. 
Corporate level synergies creating value are said to include technology, capital, R&D, 
competing manufacturing, after sales support and marketing (Cassiman et al. 2005; 
Chapman and Edmond 2000; Tecce, 1986 in Colombo et al. 2006, p. 1166;
Granstrand and Sjolander 1990; Yavitz and Newman, 1982 in Harrison et al. 1991, p. 
175). These can all help to produce synergies via ‘specialized complementary assets' 
(Colombo et al. 2006, p. 1166).
For example, with vertical M&As, a large company with the marketing expertise for a 
small enterprise’s output would involve the downstream acquiring the upstream firm. 
However, for this to be a profitable action it requires the acquisition to improve the
1 7efficiency of the downstream firm . Conversely, national firms with marketing 
outlets already established, and perhaps selling some foreign MNE products, might be 
bought by the larger upstream business.
The degree of ‘relatedness’ matters between the acquirer and acquired (e.g. Singh and 
Montgomery 1987). Relatedness in technology increases R&D efficiency (and the 
opposite is also true), which is likely to result in an improvement in overall 
performance. The degree of technological relatedness is especially important with the 
acquisitions of SMEs (Hussinger 2010). This is due to the advantage of insiders. 
Acquirers inside the technology’s industry or product market of the target are likely to 
be more aware or have access to more information on the (potential) value of a target 
(Capron and Shen 2007; Shen and Reuer 2005), especially SMEs (Howells 1990). 
This helps to overcome the standard (lack of) information problems associated with 
acquiring SMEs. However, moderate levels of relatedness are found to be most 
optimum (Ahuja and Katila 2001; Cloodt et al. 2006), as competing firms are judged
17 Alternatively, the upstream firm may have market power. However, given that the upstream firm is 
assumed to be an SME in this example, the firm is small and likely to have limited market power.
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to accrue too few technology gains from mergers (Cassiman et al. 2005). M&As not 
related to technology can be harmful on the innovativeness as they are considered to 
be ‘disruptive’ (Cloodt et al. 2006).
Differences between firms may also be attractive, especially for low R&D intensity 
acquirers (Harrison et al. 1991). A reduction of internal R&D by acquirers might 
result in high R&D firms being targeted by firms that lack ‘intrapreneurship’ (Baumol 
2004). Firms may seek more dynamic, entrepreneurial and smaller firms for 
acquisition. Acquisitions may serve as a substitute for in-house innovation and R&D 
(Blonigen and Taylor, 2000, in Dessyllas and Hughes 2005, p. 1; Hitt et al in Harrison 
et al. 1991, p. 179). More inventive capabilities of SMEs relative to larger firms mean 
that the former often become attractive to larger firms (Alvarez and Barney 2001). 
Empirical evidence also suggests that innovative, fast-growing businesses are more 
likely to be bid targets (Cosh and Hughes, 2003 in Cosh et al. 1996; Mason and 
Harrison 2006) and for small privately owned firms, patents increase the chance of 
foreign M&A (Ali-Yrkko et al. 2005)18 19.
Therefore intangibles (such as R&D expertise) are likely to be what acquirers seek. 
This may improve the profitability of takeover for the acquirer, target, or both. For 
example, most technology-intensive SMEs in Sweden have been found to be 
eventually acquired (Dahlstrand 2000, p. 176). But these intangibles are also likely to 
make a difference to firm performance (hence their ultimate desirability). Therefore 
targets under such a motivation are also likely to be highly productive.
2.5 Implications for Productivity
The previous sections have indicated that for acquisitions to be profitable, they are 
likely to involve firms that can offer a cost advantage or R&D complementarity.
These are likely to be a type of synergistic merger and imply that targets are likely to 
be better performing and provide additional value to the acquiring firm. This may
18 This might be due to the disclosure o f information being made available to the wider market that 
exposes the firm to an increased chance o f foreign takeover, as domestic M&As are not found to be 
associated with patents. However, this finding may still apply for larger distances or cross-region 
M&As. This suggests that there might be different processes between cross-border and intra-national 
takeovers. This is not explored in this review.
191 discuss in more detail the characteristics o f firms that actually are engaged in takeovers later.
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imply that suitors target the relatively more productive firm or plants to complement 
the acquirers existing assets. Acquiring, larger, firms might then be better positioned 
to exploit these assets, perhaps with the aid of its own resources such as finance. 
Therefore for smaller firms, more productive ones are targeted where acquirers can 
offer resources, such as finance described above, to aid the development of an already 
successful, perhaps innovative rich or R&D intensive, firm (Caves 1998).
The theory that productive small firms are the target of acquisitions, due to their R&D 
or other attractive assets, suggests that the motivations for acquisitions of large and 
small businesses may vary, similar to that documented for plants20 (McGuckin and 
Nguyen 1995). For larger firms, takeovers may target poor performing units with a 
view to improving performance. Consistent with this is the theory o f ‘disciplinary 
mergers’ (Nguyen and Ollinger 2002). This can be also referred to as the neoclassical 
view of M&As. The return to acquiring a relatively poor performing firm is making 
more efficient and profitable use of the target’s assets, rectifying present performance 
for an expected future profit. Poor performance may also lead to a lower price 
compared to what an acquirer values the target once operating more efficiently, 
stimulating demand for the under-performing firm. A firm that is believed by 
acquirers not to have its productivity and future returns rectifiable will not be 
demanded or ultimately acquired. This market mechanism is disciplinary because the 
threat of it may provide an added incentive for managers to maximise the returns of 
the business or they could be replaced by others that will. This theory assumes a 
divergence of ownership and management that is less prevalent in the small firm 
sector.
An extension to this, the Q-theory of takeovers (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002) 
implies that acquisitions can act as a means of transferring capital to better 
management or projects. When the stock market value of the firm exceeds the 
replacement costs of assets, expansion by acquisition, as well as by organic growth, is 
profitable. High-Q firms are assumed to then acquire low-Q firms. Smaller firms are 
typically not quoted on stock markets. Their equity is less liquid and information
20 Many theories come from areas o f industrial economics that are not just concerned with firms but 
also differences in the performance o f plants within firms. These are still relevant to SMEs as the 
mechanisms within the market for corporate control are considered to be similar.
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about assets and prospects typically less readily available. Consequently they are 
unlikely to be targets if performing poorly.
A further extension to this is ‘matching’ in a more general sense. This is when a target 
firm’s productivity is low, or at a level below the suitor’s judgement of its potential, a 
takeover is more likely to occur. Acquirers seek to buy a firm if it believes that the 
present owner is causing the target to under-perform. Efficiency can be improved 
post-acquisition with new owners installed, yielding a higher return on the investment 
(Lichtenberg et al. 1987). This is similar to the matching models used in some areas 
of Labour Economics. Matching is random, so a ‘bad match’ can occur between a 
firm or plant and its management, generating a low productivity outcome. The 
assumption here is the independence between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes -  in reality 
it is possible for some owners to always have inefficient outcomes. Therefore 
acquisitions are assumed to be a market mechanism that helps produce a more 
efficient outcome, where firms are ultimately matched with appropriate managers. 
Takeovers here are assumed to be an important process of an efficient market given
9 1managers and firms are more able to match with them .
A development of this model that applies more directly to small businesses takeovers 
is described by Holmes and Schmitz (1995, 1996). They introduce a quality of match 
characteristic between the business and manager. Successes not only depend on the 
match but also on the quality of the business. The quality of the match and business 
are important for business turnover; low quality matches end in failure but businesses 
that are sold tend to be of a high quality -  perhaps exhibiting high productivity.
Alternatively, productivity may act as a signal to potential acquirers. Low 
productivity may be a sign of inherent problems within the target firm (Wheelock and 
Wilson 2000). If productivity acts as a signal, acquirers will seek more productive 
firms and takeovers involving firms with low productivity would not be observed. 
This theory would apply to both large and small firms alike. However, it is perhaps 
particularly relevant for small firms, where information might be opaque and any
21 Despite the role that takeovers may have in matching managers and firms, equilibrium can exist with 
firms that have similar technology to other firms but have productivity below the average level o f the 
industry. This is because there are (transaction) costs in purchasing firms. In this market there is also 
incomplete information on the true level o f productivity of plants.
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signs or signals of a small firm’s quality, potential or assets it posses might be acted 
on by acquisition22.
2.5.1 Takeover-Productivity Relationship: Empirical Evidence
The above theory suggests that there are a few reasons why a negative relationship 
between productivity and chances of takeover are found in the empirical literature. 
However, most of these apply more to large firms and for smaller firms it might be 
the case that this relationship is positive. This section reviews studies that report on 
the relationship of ex ante productivity and M&As, highlighting any variation by 
size23.
Productivity has a positive effect upon the probability of being acquired according to 
many studies (Harris and Li 2007; Harris and Robinson 2002; McGuckin and Nguyen 
1995; Nguyen and Ollinger 2002; Tsagkanos et al. 2006). This relationship is also 
found to be robust across (relative) labour productivity, with both value added and 
turnover output measures, and total factor productivity (TFP) all using a sample of 
plants that are mostly less than 250 employees (McGuckin and Nguyen 1995).
A negative relationship with productivity and the probability of domestic takeover is 
also found in a few studies (Lichtenberg et al. 1987; Maksimovic and Phillips 2001; 
Siegel and Simons 2006). However, a couple of these studies (Lichtenberg et al. 1987; 
Siegel and Simons 2006) both use datasets that contain a high proportion of large 
plants or firms. This is suggestive of the differing effects larger firms or plants may 
have on the relationship of productivity and takeover.
A productivity-takeover relationship that varies with size is reported in the literature 
but this does appear to vary between studies. The inclusion of a size-productivity
22 As well as varying by size, the productivity-takeover relationship may alter across different sectors. 
Harris and Robinson (2002, p. 563) provide a theory why this might be the case. They cite Vernon’s 
(1966) Product Life Cycle theory to imply firms in more mature industries, with lower growth rates and 
less competition, are more likely to exhibit the acquisition-productivity relationship suggested by 
neoclassical theory -  lower productivity yields a higher probability of acquisition. The purpose o f the 
acquisition is to improve the management and technology, increasing productivity and also 
profitability, similar to the scenario laid out for larger firms above. For newer industries, the reverse is 
assumed to be true -  more efficient firms are targeted as they may have better prospects for future 
growth and a higher expected future profit stream.
231 include studies that look at establishments or plant acquisition.
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interaction, with a sample dominated with plants of less than 250 employees, finds the 
productivity-takeover relationship increases with size (Nguyen and Ollinger 2002). 
However, the reverse has also been found. Takeovers are associated with plants with 
above average productivity but reversed for large, 250 plus employees, plants 
(McGuckin and Nguyen 1995). These findings suggest the productivity-takeover 
relationship might be different for the SME sector (firms with less than 250 
employees) and large firms. If so, this would suggest that different processes are at 
work for large and small firm acquisitions.
Productivity (when measured as TFP) can also act as a proxy for profits24. Small but 
profitable companies are typically found to be takeover targets (Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1987b, 1989). The smaller the firm targeted, the more profitable it is relative 
to its industry. In another study looking at both privately and publicly traded firms, 
acquired firms are found to have profits above their industry average (Matsusaka 
1993). Private firm targets are also found to be even more profitable than their public 
counterparts, even accounting for size differences. For small private companies at 
least, it is found that acquirers appear to purchase the ‘stars’.
2.5.2 Takeover threat and the ‘Ashenfelter dip’
An issue for takeover analysis, as identified by Lichtenberg (1992), is that the mere 
threat may lead to a change in productivity. This effect could bias (upwards or 
downwards) estimates of the impact of takeovers. Firms that anticipate takeover may 
alter their performance. If takeover is a form of ‘treatment’ for the acquired firm, then 
any ex ante effect of takeover is the same as the ‘Ashenfelter dip’ (Ashenfelter 1978). 
The ‘Ashenfelter dip’ was observed when training programmes were assessed in 
terms of their affect of earnings. It was observed that people’s earnings fell prior to 
enrolling on a training course. As the extra human capital was assumed to add to 
future earnings, estimates were over-estimated due to the negative effect of the course 
on earnings prior to the actual event. Therefore an observation of prior performance 
might be affected by a takeover in the future.
24 A positive relationship between profits and productivity is found in theoretical models such as those 
in Bailey and Schultz (1990) and Allen, Faulhaber and MacKinlay (1989) both in McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995, p. 273). Profitability might be due to a monopoly position but the ability to charge a 
‘high’ price would still come out as a high measure o f productivity assuming revenue product is used 
as output.
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Perhaps for larger firms, where acquisitions require a lot of resources and 
organisation, takeovers are likely to be drawn out affairs that have effects on the 
acquired firm prior to the actual formality of the acquisition. For SMEs, acquisitions 
are unlikely to be so drawn-out and an ex ante effect of takeovers on performance is 
much less likely.
The threat of takeover may perhaps have the reverse effect of a ‘dip’ in performance; 
instead rising just prior to being acquired. No effect such as the ‘Ashenfelter dip’ or 
alternatively a rise in performance is found in any of the existing literature. Perhaps 
the only evidence that may pertain to this is by Siegel and Simons (2006). They 
estimate a plant’s productivity both prior and following an M&A for 7 years. No 
effect like the ‘Ashenfelter dip’ is found. However, they do find that lower 
productivity plants are more likely to be subject to M&A and that the productivity of 
these plants falls in each of the 7 years until the year of acquisition.
2.6 Other SME characteristics that determine demand for acquisition
The market for small firms is particularly vulnerable to problems caused by 
asymmetries of information (Akerlof 1970), which may affect the demand side of the 
market . Potential acquirers might not be aware or be able to access small firms if 
little information exists or is costly to obtain. Less information is likely to be available 
of relatively smaller and newer or younger firms. Therefore it is likely that relatively 
smaller and younger firms will be demanded less and exhibit lower chances of 
acquisition. Also, the smallest firms, if known about, may be unwanted because they 
are perhaps least likely to make any impact on the acquirer’s business.
However, as firms size increase, it is likely the assets and their value do too. This 
would increase the transaction costs to the acquirer. Absorption or disruption costs 
might also be a factor if a firm is acquiring to add to their existing business (Alcalde 
and Espitia 2003; Barnes 1999; Cloodt et al. 2006; Powell 1997). The ability to 
assimilate a relatively smaller target is likely to be easier for an acquirer. Therefore
25 Information asymmetry may also affect the supply side, as small firms might not be aware or have 
knowledge o f potential acquirers.
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the transaction and absorptions costs involved in acquiring another firm suggest a 
possible negative relationship between the target’s size and the probability of 
takeover. The larger the firm, the larger the resources or bid is required to complete 
the transaction. Therefore the effect of size on the likelihood of acquisition might be 
non-linear, at least in terms of the demand side of the market.
Empirically (which captures the intersection of both the demand and supply for small 
firms), the smaller the size of the firm the higher the likelihood of being acquired 
(Alcalde and Espitia 2003; Palepu 1986; Wheelock and Wilson 2000). It is likely that 
these results are caused by the inclusion of very large firms but also exclusion of the 
smallest businesses. The opposite has also been found in a few studies (Cosh et al. 
1996; McGuckin and Nguyen 1995; Nguyen and Ollinger 2002; Tsagkanos et al. 
2006), where the larger the firm or plant the higher chance of acquisition. Relatively 
smaller targets are also found to increase the post-acquisition performance of the 
acquirer (Ahuja and Katila 2001). In a separate study of small businesses (Cosh and 
Hughes 1994), when firm size approaches medium this increases the percentage of 
firms that have received an approach but this decreases as the firm size increases
a /
beyond this size . This evidence is consistent with a non-linear relationship of size on 
the chances of being acquired.
Age may not only reflect the amount of information that is available about a firm 
(affecting the demand side) but may also act as a form of proxy for its management 
experience (Wheelock and Wilson 2000). The managers and owners of older firms 
might be more able, or experienced, to resist takeover (Chaaban et al. 2005) -  an 
element more related to the supply side of the market for small businesses27. The 
expectation is that younger, perhaps relatively inexperienced, managers are more 
likely to be taken-over. However, as suggested earlier in this review, good 
management could be an asset that acquirers seek in small firms and so inexperienced 
ones might not reflect this.
Empirically, age is found to have a negative relationship with M&A (Chaaban et al. 
2005; Wheelock and Wilson 2000); older firms have a lower probability of takeover.
26 This does not control for other factors.
27 The supply side o f the market is explored more in the next section.
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This has also been found in the UK SME sector (Cosh et al. 1996). However, 
acquirers may also target firms with ‘accumulated experience ’, confirmed with 
empirical evidence (Tsagkanos et al. 2006, p. 187). Older firms have also been found 
to be more likely to receive an approach from larger companies relative to newer 
firms, not controlling for other factors (Cosh and Hughes 1994). An interpretation of 
this last finding is that more is known (in the public domain) about older firms and 
they are therefore more likely to be acquired.
Degree of ownership concentration may also be relevant for the demand of SMEs. In 
order for a small firm to sell, there needs to be agreement by its owner(s). It might be 
easier to negotiate (a lower price might be accepted) with a sole trader than a 
company and also a partnership, given the potential number of owners these forms of 
business structure can imply. Therefore demand might be lower for those companies 
with a more diverse ownership structure. For comparison, offers for public firms, with 
a diverse ownership structure, may result in an offer with a larger premium, to satisfy 
all owners or equity holders (Grossman and Hart, 1980 in Alcalde and Espitia 2003, 
p. 7). Empirically, for publicly quoted firms, the greater degree of ownership 
concentration, higher is the probability of takeover (Alcalde and Espitia 2003).
2.7 Cost of finance and the demand effect for SMEs
The effects of the availability and the price of finance may have a demand effect 
within the market for the corporate control of SMEs. If larger, older firms are able to 
acquire finance at a lower rate than smaller, younger firms, the same stream of 
discounted future profits will be valued differently. One source of the lower cost of 
capital for larger firms is diversification of risk and the impact on default chances. If 
a small firm is unlucky (an adverse shock occurs) it goes bankrupt. A similar shock to 
a large firm might be absorbed becaiise it has the other divisions or projects that it can 
spread the losses against. Since this is the market expectation, it faces a lower cost of 
capital.
Information opaqueness of younger, smaller firms may also give rise to different
9 Kinterest rates between firms . These vary the discount rates used to calculate future
/
28 This is explored more in the next section.
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values. A lower interest rate obtained by larger firms increases the present value of 
future profits relative to one calculated by small firms with a higher interest rate. 
Given that the value of a firm is the expected present value of future profits, a small 
and large firm’s divergence in valuation may produce a price for the SME that both 
firms consider to be a fair value; one that is greater than the small firm’s estimate of 
future profits but lower than the acquirer’s.
Access to the stock market (and changes between years) may also affect small firm 
takeovers, despite most SMEs not being quoted. This is due to a couple of reasons: 
changes in business activity and access to capital - at least for large firms (Melicher et 
al. 1983). First, a rising stock market will reflect a greater amount of business activity 
and greater optimism over future economic growth. A rising market may yield 
investments in other firms (including SMEs) to be more profitable; increasing their 
rate of return. Second, a buoyant stock market can increase the market value of 
acquiring (large) firms. This can lead to easier access of funds, at least for listed firms, 
to be able to undertake acquisitions which may include those of small businesses. 
Existing empirical evidence from the UK suggests that acquisitions are pro-cyclical 
and increase during economic upturns (Bhattacharjee et al. 2009). Stock markets also 
affect both the number and value of mergers and takeovers (Clarke and Ioannidis 
1996)29.
2,8 Supply in the market for the corporate control of SMEs
In this section I consider why SMEs might be available for, or even initiate30, 
takeovers. The supply of SMEs is potentially quite large. There are always businesses 
looking to be acquired as an ongoing concern. A simple internet search provides 
numerous websites that list tens of thousands of live small business that are put up for 
sale by their owners. Around a quarter of UK SMEs expect a transfer or closure of 
their business, and within 5 years this is 18 percent (Wiseman et al. 2005). Similar 
proportions of SMEs in the UK are also found to be available for sale or full 
ownership transfer (Institute for Employment Studies 2006a, b). However, just
29 Clarke and Ioannidis (1996) use real stock market prices. Their results differ in both the method and 
results from previous evidence by Melicher et al. (1983), Geroski (1984) and Guerard (1989).
30 In a study o f Scottish manufacturers from the mid 1960s to the 1970s, few acquirer-initiated 
takeovers were found (Ashcroft and Love 1993).
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because businesses are for sale or they anticipate one in the future, does not mean that 
they will actually be acquired. It is only where the demand (discussed previously) 
meets the supply that an acquisition will occur.
Attitudes and expectation of M&As appear to vary with the type of firm. Firms not 
anticipating growth are much more likely to anticipate a full ownership transfer or the 
closure of their business (Institute for Employment Studies 2006a). However, seller 
initiated takeovers are rarely caused by financial failure (Ravenscraft and Scherer 
1987b) and fast growing SMEs are more open to M&A and have a more positive 
attitude towards them (Cosh and Hughes 1994; Small Business Research Centre 
1992). Small and micro firms are also found to be more likely to favour, or at least 
less likely to be unfavourable to, acquisitions relative to larger and medium sized 
firms (Cosh and Hughes 1994; Small Business Research Centre 1992).
Small firms may seek acquisition to attain benefits that aid future growth (Cosh and 
Hughes 1994; Cosh et al. 1996). ‘ ...small youngfirms very often find merger the 
solution to problems they are otherwise unable to satisfactorily to m eef (Penrose 
1980, p. 164). For example, some forms of knowledge or intangibles that they are 
unable to obtain by themselves: a firm that is a specialist in innovation (e.g. invests 
highly in R&D) but with a weak product market position, it could be advantageous for 
both parties to transfer technology information (Singh and Montgomery 1987).
Acquisition by a larger firm may improve access to finance as well as ‘gaining access 
to the networks and infrastructure which large firms offef (BIS 2008, p. 48). These 
benefits to takeover might make them open to acquisition, as these services might be 
available from larger counterparts and therefore improve their chances of continued 
success. Much of this theory is related to the reason why acquirers may target firms, 
but now in the reverse as acquirers have some form of assets or knowhow.
Sellers are likely to try and initiate takeovers for a mixture of three main motives 
according to Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b). These are: solving management 
succession problems, converting personal stock to more liquid forms of assets and 
gaining better access to financial assets. Next I look at each of these in turn.
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2.8.1 Management succession
Compared to larger firms, management succession is considered an important issue 
for smaller firms (Cosh and Hughes 1994). Impending retirement and other 
management succession issues are a commonly cited reasons why firms might want to 
be acquired (Cosh and Hughes 1994; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987b). The supply of 
firms for M&As may depend upon the death or retirement of owner-managers or their 
desire and ability to pass the business on to another family member - dynastic urges. 
The potential magnitude of this problem could be quite large given that around two- 
thirds of all SMEs in the UK are family owned (Institute for Employment Studies 
2006a). The option or opportunity to sell a firm may alleviate the problem of 
succession. IES (2006a) find around a fifth of all SMEs intend to sell upon retirement 
versus a Va for those who intend passing on the business.
2.8.2 Converting Personal Stock, Capital Gains and Entrepreneurial Recycling
A small firm sale might be due to the desire of the owner-manager to realise the value 
of the business and reinvest in a new entrepreneurial project (Cosh and Hughes 1994)
- entrepreneurial recycling. Nearly two-thirds of the owners of (successful or 
unsuccessful) businesses that close continue as business owners; these are known as 
serial entrepreneurs (Stokes and Blackburn 2001). Having a successful exit from a 
firm via a sale is found to have a positive relationship with choosing to be a 
‘renascent entrepreneur\Stdim et al. 2008).
Some entrepreneurs gain reward from having an impact or from the challenge of 
starting a business, as opposed to acquiring the wealth that a successful business can 
generate (Ryan 2000 and Fraone 1999, both in Stokes and Blackburn 2001, pp. 46- 
47). This motivates a serial entrepreneur to then leave, or perhaps sell off, a firm once 
successfully up and running, to invest their efforts in starting all over again.
Takeovers are potentially an important and positive ‘exit’ route for some small firm 
owners and also for the development of a small firms (Cosh and Hughes 1994). 
Entrepreneurial recycling and the ability to transfer a small business could generate a 
process of building up successful and productive firms only to then sell, to generate 
equity to start all over again or allow the abdication of control. This phenomenon 
could generate some of the supply-side in the market for ownership and control of
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successful, may be productive, firms. However, beyond general closure, the potential 
scale of serial entrepreneurs that are linked with takeover-exits is unknown.
2.8.3 Access to finance and financial assets
Problems in securing finance can be a constraint on growth and perhaps undermine 
some firm’s achievement of their potential (Small Business Research Centre 1992). A 
possible remedy is for firms to seek a takeover to help resolve the issue and obtain 
growth finance (BIS 2008).
Evidence shows that for target-initiated takeovers, the most common reason was to 
enable firms to access extra capital that otherwise they were either unwilling or 
unable to obtain (Ashcroft and Love 1993)31. Many firms find finance hard to obtain 
(but whether this difficulty is unjustified is another matter). Around a quarter of firms 
find access to finance difficult (Wilson 2004). If one combines those firms who had 
difficulty obtaining some or all of the finance required with those who were unable to 
obtain finance, a fifth of businesses had problems accessing finance (Institute for 
Employment Studies 2006a, p. 138). More important for firms is if  they are denied 
credit outright. Seven percent of firms have a finance request denied and this is even 
higher for smaller firms (Wilson 2004). A significant proportion of firms are 
discouraged from even applying because of the expectation of denial, but this includes 
those that might not be creditworthy (Levenson and Willard 2000). Using denials of 
small business loan applications, Levenson and Willard find some firms, especially 
small ones, request debt finance at the prevailing interest rate but are denied for 
reasons other than creditworthiness.
Finance can be particularly hard to obtain for small firms. Overdraft costs fall as firm 
size increases, and so does the frequency with which firms report difficultly accessing 
finance (Fraser 2005; Wilson 2004). Firm size is also an important determinant of the 
availability of short-term debt; larger firms have better access to longer-term debt - 
reducing their dependency on short-term finance (Bougheas et al. 2006). Access to 
finance for new capital is also difficult for small firms, particularly start-ups 
(Levenson and Willard 2000). Younger firms encounter more difficulties (Binks and
31 A study o f Scottish manufacturers from the mid 1960s to the 1970s.
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Ennew 1996; Moore 1994) and the proportion of firms unable to obtain credit 
declines as firms age (Institute for Employment Studies 2006a). Business seeking to 
grow (relative to ones not seeking to grow) are also found to experience problems 
accessing finance.. (BIS 2008).
Why do some firms find it difficult to obtain finance, particularly small ones? A 
perfectly functioning capital market allocates finance to any project if it has a positive 
expected net present value from the investment. Firms presenting an unprofitable 
investment proposal, one with a low or negative expected rate of return, are rightly 
denied credit. These firms will always register as having insufficient funding or being 
refused capital. The refusal of finance is not necessarily a sign of market failure. If 
lenders of finance are unable to judge projects that are worthy investments because of 
information problems then this is a potential form of market failure.
2.8.4 Asymmetry of information and credit rationing
An asymmetry o f information between lenders and borrowers can result in credit 
rationing within the market for loanable funds (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Information 
asymmetries in credit markets occur when borrowers have more information about the 
probability o f default on a loan, relative to the lender. Lenders are effectively unable 
to judge whether borrowers are ‘good’ or ‘bad’32. In the extreme case, the lender may 
have no knowledge of the type of borrower. An option for the lender is to compensate 
by increasing the interest rate. Increasing the rate may also encourage borrowers to act 
more riskily (moral hazard) and they may apply for credit with more risky projects. 
Poor investments are assumed to ‘drive-out’ good investments for bank lending via 
adverse selection. The increase in the attractiveness of riskier investments increases 
the risk of default of a loan, decreasing the bank’s expected profits. Therefore instead 
of lenders altering the interest rate, they choose to not offer the ‘equilibrium supply of 
funds’. Constraints are placed on the supply of loanable funds offered by lenders. 
Excess demand does not increase the price of loans (the interest rate), preventing the 
perfectly competitive market outcome. The equilibrium outcome has applicants with 
an identical risk profile to existing borrowers but the former do not receive a loan or 
the full amount demanded, even if they are prepared to pay a higher interest rate. This 
1 /
32 ‘Good’ here means that they repay any loan or overdraft in full and do not default. ‘Bad’ is the 
converse case.
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outcome does not affect the degree of risk taken by applicants, providing an incentive 
for lenders to ration credit instead of changing the interest rate.
Costly information means that decisions are based on limited data, which makes it 
hard for lenders to assess applicants for credit. Therefore credit rationing is likely to 
be more acute and prevalent with SME finance, assuming that only debt finance is 
available33'
Alternatively, theory suggests that the free market interest rate is actually too low. An 
equilibrium is possible with an oversupply of loanable funds, in excess of the ‘socially 
efficient’ level (de Meza and Webb 1987). By allowing the mean return on prospects 
to vary across firms, the marginal project that obtains finance has the lowest 
probability of being successful, whereas in Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) it has the 
highest probability. An increase in the interest rate is required above the free market 
level to restore it to the socially efficient level. This occurs as low quality investments 
or projects ‘free-ride’ on good quality ones. Asymmetric information causes good 
prospects to draw in the bad ones and consequently too much investment is made at 
the prevailing interest rate. This can also be compounded by ‘unrealistic optimism’ 
about poor performing projects (de Meza 2002). Even if these effects do not occur, 
the experience of agents lending to start-ups and small businesses may also make such 
lenders proficient in their abilities to provide funds to those who are the least risk of 
defaulting (de Meza and Southey 1996). This may reduce the extent of credit 
rationing in the supply of loanable finds for small firms.
In summary, the theory of credit rationing suggests over-lending is just as likely, or 
rather; a lack of consensus exists. Empirically, bank debt is the most common source 
of finance for SMEs and many small firms are not refused credit outright (de Meza 
2002). The theory of credit rationing also suggests that the lending institutions do not 
pass on an increase in the interest rate. If lending institutions do not allow the cost of 
borrowing to rise, rationing credit instead, this will generate a degree of interest rate 
‘stickiness’. Interest rate ‘stickiness’ in the loans markets is found in both the US 
(Berger and Udell 1992) and the UK (Cowling 2007). However, evidence on secured
331 have not discussed this caveat within dp Meza and Webb (1987) but this is a fairly realistic 
assumption for the SMEs sector given their relative preference for forms o f non-equity sources o f  
finance.
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and committed loans34 suggests that this is not due to credit rationing but alternative 
reasons causing loan rates to be ‘sticky’ (Cowling 2007).
In general, empirical evidence of credit rationing is not found. However, credit 
problems caused by information deficiencies may exist (Berger and Udell 1992) even 
for SMEs that are able to pledge collateral and signal that they are ‘good’ borrowers 
(Cowling 2007).
2.8.5 Collateral
The pledging of collateral against credit can be a way of trying to overcome the 
finance problems caused by information asymmetries such as credit rationing. There 
are three roles of collateral according to Storey (1996). These are: it limits lenders 
losses if borrowers default; acts as an incentive for borrowers to commit; and a signal 
to lenders that borrowers will not default and that the investment will be a success.
The last point may overcome the asymmetry of information problems and subsequent 
potential market failure within the small business lending market. ‘Good’ borrowers 
are assumed to be willing to put up collateral against a loan because they believe they 
are a low risk at defaulting and subsequently losing their assets. Whereas ‘bad’, or 
high risk, borrowers will be less willing, knowing they may lose their pledged assets. 
This behaviour may reveal, or act as a signal to, a firm’s true nature. This could result 
in a lower interest rate or, importantly with respect to credit rationing, a supply of 
loanable funds being offered to those who offer collateral versus those who are 
unwilling.
Firms might be required to use collateral but may not have enough asset value to 
cover the loan (Besanko and Thankor, 1987 in Cowling 2007, p. 3) nor have suitable 
assets to fully pledge a loan against. For example, small firms with very few tangible 
assets (but perhaps rich in intangibles) may suffer from this. In this scenario, a ‘good’ 
borrower may still be rationed.
34 A commitment loan is here is when a lender agrees to extend credit at the borrower’s request.
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Empirical evidence finds small firms that offer collateral to obtain debt finance results 
in a five times increased chance of securing long-term finance, as collateral acts as a 
sign of commitment to the lender (Michaelas et al. 1999). However, there is also 
evidence that finds ‘bad’ borrowers are actually associated with pledging collateral 
(Leeth and Scott, 1989, Berger and Udell, 1990,1995, Booth, 1992, and Ono and 
Uesegi, 2005 all in Berger et al. 2006, p. 6). These apparently contradictory findings 
can be perhaps explained. Initially the value of collateral decreases the cost of loans 
(Burke and Hanley 2006). However, higher levels of collateral by wealthier 
individuals can still create moral hazard through reduced effort (Burke et al. 2000) or 
more risk-taking (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). This then induces a greater lending 
margin to be requested and a convex U-shaped relationship between interest rate 
margins and collateral (Burke and Hanley 2006).
Firms without suitable assets that they can pledge may offer personal collateral. A 
low re-sale value for a firm can mean that owners may opt to use the private assets of 
the owners (Binks and Ennew 1996). A large proportion of firms are found to use 
personal collateral and it is suggested that this is because the value of any existing 
assets of a firm may be hard to assess (McKillop and Barton 1995), with personal 
collateral most likely to be used by younger firms - peaking at three to five years 
(Avery et al. 1998). The majority of small business loans are found to have some form 
of personal commitment (including personal assets and personal guarantees), both in 
terms of value and frequency. Avery et al also find that there is no consistent 
relationship between personal commitment and owner wealth; just because an owner 
may have access to more money does not necessarily translate into a firm using 
personal commitments. Perhaps this is driven more on a needs basis and therefore if a 
firm has few business assets this is likely to result in more reliance on an owner’s 
personal commitment to a loan.
2.8.6 Venture Capital
The constraints on the small firm to obtain debt finance may suggest that it would be 
more suitable for the small firm to approach equity or venture capital markets. 
Traditional forms of lending are considered to be of little relevance for the most 
innovative SMEs (OECD 2006), resulting in firms requiring or even seeking more 
equity-based sources of finance such as risk capital (Mason and Harrison 1994).
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Therefore, for high growth firms, equity investments are considered to be the most 
appropriate type of finance (BIS 2008, p. 28). This is because more standard forms of 
finance, such bank or debt finance, are assessed on the value of a firm’s assets and not 
on the future potential value (return) of the business (Rowlands 2009). Therefore 
firms that rely more on intangibles, and perhaps perform highly because of them, will 
struggle to obtain sufficient secured finance sources due to the nature of their assets. 
Evidence also confirms this, as firms at an early stage of development, seeking small 
amounts of risk capital is particularly problematic (Murphy et al. 2004).
The ability to secure growth capital is also inhibited by information problems in both 
the supply and demand for such finance. For potential providers, it is difficult to 
access possible investment opportunities and suitable firms. On the demand side, 
investors are considered to lack a track record in this type of funding. This makes it 
risky for investors and so they require higher rates of return, which results in higher 
interest rates for firms (Rowlands 2009). Growth capital is also considered to be 
expensive to set-up and manage which also compounds the cost for the firm.
Venture capital might also be difficult to obtain but for those that do secure funding, it 
may result in a takeover or acquisition anyway. Informal venture capital in the UK 
does not usually involve sufficiently large injections of capital to gain ownership of 
the firm; most investors are only minority shareholders (Mason and Harrison 1994). 
Only in the rare cases of investment groups forming and investing are they more 
likely to acquire majority control. Therefore only in a minority of cases the 
entrepreneur loses absolute control to investors. However, over half of informal 
venture capital investors expect to exit between 3 and 5 years after investment and the 
most frequently cited method of exit was via a sale, merger with another company or 
flotation (Mason and Harrison 1994)35.
Exits from successful firms by investors, potentially through takeover, is an important 
process to allow funds to be recycled. It may also potentially produce a supply of 
successful businesses being (externally) sold, similar to entrepreneurial recycling -  
described above. Without this, it is likely that venture capital markets and business
35 This differs to the US where more often exit occurs by a sale to insiders.
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angel finance will be reduced and perhaps so would start-ups. However, the scale of 
firms in need for growth finance or venture capital is not great. In the Rowlands 
Review (2009), it is estimated that only around 5,000 firms are viable business 
ventures or opportunities for growth capital across the whole of the UK.
2.9 Conclusions
If highly productive SMEs are acquired by large firms, this may be detrimental for 
economic development. Conversely, takeovers may boost the performance of 
acquired firms. To understand the possible direction of effect from small firm 
acquisitions have, it is essential to understand what determines acquisition in the 
market for control of SMEs.
Prospective profits determine M&As, but what types can hope to be profitable? This 
was explored first through the two main forms of acquisition of SMEs: horizontal and 
vertical. For SMEs, horizontal mergers with quantity setting (Cournot) models are 
most profitable, and therefore more likely to occur, when they produce cost 
efficiencies. Alternatively, the greater R&D complementarities between the two 
merging firms, the larger are the gains from merger. However, quantity-setting 
models could be considered more of a long term decision and perhaps of more 
relevance, especially in the short-run, are models that allow for price-setting instead.
In price-setting (Bertrand) forms of competition, SME acquisitions are likely to be 
most profitable (and therefore most likely to occur) when firms compete in both 
product and R&D markets. It might be the case that SMEs are more dynamic but also 
more R&D intensive, at least in terms of their successes. If so, it might be profitable 
for larger firms to acquire these small, R&D intensive, dynamic firms as they may 
produce cost reductions. Large firms may then compensate for their lack of 
‘intrapreneurship’ by acquiring SMEs.
Vertical acquisition of SMEs might be also profitable when they reduce costs. In 
addition, the acquisition of SMEs can be profitable via synergies, reducing the cost of 
the acquirer or improving its R&D -  similar to the processes that make horizontal 
mergers profitable. The inclusion of more complex, but perhaps more realistic,
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features to M&As generates profitable mergers and a rationale for why they occur. 
These features are also relevant to SME acquisitions.
Profitable M&As that involve small firms would appear to rely on them generating 
cost efficiencies or some R&D advantage for the acquirer. It is therefore likely that 
the assets that might be generating these are also making the firm perform 
productively. This in turn, if observed in isolation, may signal that the firm is not a 
‘lemon’ and is worth acquiring. A positive relationship between productivity and the 
chances of takeover is perhaps unique for small firms. For larger firms, theory 
suggests less productive firms are targeted where the return is to rectify poor 
performance (e.g. the Q-theory o f mergers). It is not obvious that this is the case for 
smaller firms.
The empirical evidence concerning this relationship is limited with regard to its 
coverage on SMEs but smaller targets (including plants), unlike relatively large ones, 
do tend to be more productive. This could be a consequence of the large-small firm 
borrowing interest rate differential. A large firm may value a given expected profit 
stream more highly than a small one.
Also on the demand side, less information is likely to be available the smaller and 
newer the firm. This suggests younger and smaller firms are less likely to be acquired. 
However, within the SME sector, firms are likely to be generally both smaller and 
younger. Empirically, age is found to have a negative relationship with M&A. Size in 
general also has a negative effect, perhaps due to transaction and absorption costs, but 
with smaller firms it is reversed.
On the supply side, SMEs might accept a takeover approach because of problems with 
management succession or because the owner wants to withdraw equity. Another 
reason includes difficulties raising finance. Firms that provide the least information to 
lenders are the most likely to be under-supplied with credit. These firms are likely to 
include small and new enterprises. More significant problems in accessing finance 
might be evident for those businesses seeking small amounts of risk capital, for 
example, SMEs that are small or at an early stage of development. However, it may 
also be the case that firms unable to obtain capital are actually bad risks
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I have discussed possible reasons why small firms might be acquired both in terms of 
their relative desirability to acquirers and also on the supply side, and what large firms 
can offer. However, for takeovers to have any effect on economies, it is necessary to 
understand not only why takeovers may occur but what the effects are. This is 
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 -  The Theory of Acquisition Effects
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the theory of what happens after a firm has been acquired, the 
main strands of which concern enterprise closure or exit, and enterprise performance. 
These acquisition effects determine the impact of SME takeover targets on (regional) 
economies. A tendency to dissolve the firm or relocate it and move the assets of the 
acquired SME might depress regional productivity. Alternatively, the acquisition of a 
small firm may alter its performance. If the productivity of the target after takeover 
increases by less than it would otherwise have done, or even falls, (regional) 
economies may suffer. Conversely, acquisitions may provide SMEs with resources 
that enable them to grow and become more productive, with beneficial effects on 
aggregate productivity.
The market for corporate control of large, publicly quoted companies has been 
analysed a great deal. But very little literature considers directly the performance after 
acquisition of small, privately held firms (Hughes 1989). This chapter discusses 
various theories as to whether SME takeovers result in performance improving or 
reducing, and the firm relocating or exiting. Empirical evidence is also presented on 
whether takeovers affect subsequent productivity, profits, employment and the 
probability o f exit or relocation.
3.2 Takeovers and improved performance
The theory of takeovers and subsequent target performance is partially covered in the 
discussion of why acquirers may purchase small firms in chapter 2. First, the theory of 
‘bad’ managers or matches is relevant, where takeovers are part of the market 
economy that efficiently matches them (Lichtenberg et al. 1987). Therefore takeovers 
act as a force to rectify inefficient activity (Hirschman in Lichtenberg 1992, p. 42). 
However, if matches are somewhat random, profitability may not increase and 
takeovers might not improve performance (Bernard and Jensen 2007).
/
Second, more relevant for higher performing firms, is an element of synergy, where 
the new owners believe they can improve performance further. This may aid the
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productivity of the acquirer and the acquired, jointly increasing their profits if both 
continue to operate. Synergies may occur when a firm is successful and innovation 
rich but is unable to grow, perhaps because cash poor. Acquisition by a larger firm 
may allow the acquired to fulfil its potential and grow, providing value to the buyer 
with an increased future value of profits.
Linked to this idea is the suggestion that larger firms may acquire small, successful 
firms, as speculative investments (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987b). Once the small 
firm has grown and their value increased, the owners may then look to sell-off the 
firm, profiting from their initial investment. This motive would be consistent with 
acquirers targeting small successful firms to grow them and improve their 
performance further.
Another advantage for a small firm of being acquired by a large counterpart is the 
latter’s better access to, or lower cost of, finance. Small firms are more likely to be 
constrained in their access to finance -  as discussed in the previous chapter. The 
effects of having better access to finance can be shown with the model below from 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b).
In figure 3.1 the horizontal axis measures the quantity of capital and the vertical axis 
the cost of capital and the internal rate of return. Both the average and marginal 
product of capital schedules (ARPC and MRPC, respectively) are downward sloping. 
This reflects that as the firm obtains more capital, less rewarding projects are 
financed. If the firm has access to an elastic external capital market it faces the 
marginal cost of capital (MCC), offering a cost of capital of Rs. An elastic supply of 
capital might not be available for small, privately held firms. If not, then it is more 
likely that firms will face an inelastic constraint that is generated by either internally 
generated funds or limited bank credit. This is shown by SI curve. This restriction on 
the small firm means that they can only obtain funds up to point S and the average 
return to capital will be R j. If after an acquisition, the larger firm is able to offer the 
small firm an elastic supply of capital, any amount along the MCC schedule is 
possible. The new optimum amount of capital is increased to L - where the marginal 
revenue product of capital schedule (MRPC) intersects the MCC schedule. The
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average return then also drops from Ri to Rl. This results in an efficiency gain 
equivalent to the shaded triangle area.
Figure 3.1 - Capital allocation with elastic capital markets and capital rationing
Internal rate of return, 
cost of capital
ARPC
MCC
MRPC
S L
Quantity of capital invested
Source: Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b, p. 112).
This analysis on restrictions of finance implies gaining extra funds reduces the 
average return but increases its size. If previously capital constrained, the firm would 
have been restricted on its investments and projects. With more resources, more 
investment can be undertaken. This implies that although the firm is able to invest in 
more projects and presumably grow, it is perhaps no longer as productive. For a given 
level of inputs the return is lower as it is now able to invest in positive but lower 
yielding projects. Hence the possibility of a lower level of productivity or profitability 
post-acquisition but an increase in the size or scale of the firm (Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1989).
Alternatively, a finance injection if pm a large acquiring firm may improve 
productivity. Extra finance may allow firms to invest more in capital. This may result 
in a more optimal factor mix, enhancing productivity. By allowing the firm to use
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more capital, the firm may choose to substitute labour for capital -  capital deepening. 
This substitution may increase LP but may not affect TFP, depending on the size of 
any relative increase in output. Instead a firm may increase output with the same 
capital-labour ratio but increasing both capital and labour. This is capital widening. If 
the relative increase in output is the same as the increase in inputs, then this would 
have no effect upon TFP or LP.
Capital cost savings and an increased supply elasticity of capital of belonging to a 
larger firm are found in case studies to be one of the most important advantages of 
being acquired (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987b). However, no restrictions in the 
growth of small profitable firms that are not acquired are found. This is consistent 
with either firms managing to obtain growth capital regardless of whether the firm 
was an attractive prospect or that they were not really constrained. In a different 
study, the majority of the acquired reported that it was either easier, or cheaper, to 
obtain ‘investment funds’ after acquisition (Ashcroft and Love 1993, p. 81). This is 
attributed either to obtaining funds from a larger firm, or suppliers of finance now 
being more prepared to offer capital. Of those that used the extra funds, it is the better 
performing firms that benefit the most. This is suggestive that the better-performing 
firms are more capital-constrained hindering their future growth and development but 
can benefit from larger firms with their better access to finance.
Larger businesses may offer small firms other advantages. Concerned with alliances, 
Alvarez and Barney (2001, p. 139) list distribution, manufacturing, marketing and 
other organisational resources that might all be valuable to an SME that a larger firm 
can offer it36, all which result in an improved performance. Acquisition by large firms 
may cause ‘a technology exploitation potential for the small firm ’ (Granstrand and 
Sjolander 1990, p. 383). However, the effect of acquisition on the target’s 
performance may depend on the firm’s pre-takeover level o f performance. Already 
productive firms may benefit the most from being acquired as they are considered to 
have the ‘absorptive capacity’ required to assimilate the changes in a positive way 
(Girma 2005; Lapan and Bardhan 1973). Therefore it might be that higher 
productivity firms are more likely to improve performance after acquisition.
36 This is discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.
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Next I describe why takeovers may potentially result in a fall in performance or exit.
3.3 Takeovers and a fall in performance or exit
To aid the understanding of why acquisitions may result in a fall in performance or 
exit it is perhaps important to return to the conclusions of why a firm is acquired in 
the first place. Acquisitions due to technology or innovation may mean that the 
acquirer has no further use of the target. Acquisitions of more productive SMEs may 
allow firms to obtain new assets or technological processes that can be absorbed by 
the acquirer, making up for their own lack of ‘intrapreneurship’ (Baumol 2004). Once 
the acquiring firm has obtained the technical process or learned about it, a tendency 
might be for the new owner to under invest in the SME (Alvarez and Barney 2001). In 
some cases this could mean the small firm is dissolved. The value of the firm might 
be less than the sum of its parts, assets or expertise, especially once synergies with the 
acquirer have been considered. This can be thought of as ‘technological asset- 
stripping’ (Smith 1979).
Alternatively, an SME might close as the acquirer seeks to remove a competitor 
(Mason and Harrison 2006). This may reduce capacity within an industry and increase 
the acquirer’s profit share. This is discussed in the previous chapter with the effects of 
mergers on profits. However, consistent with previous, it is unlikely that an SME has 
any significant market share. It is more likely that the acquisition is undertaken 
because the target could be a serious rival once it has grown more or due to the 
technology or assets (including intangibles) it possesses (Gilbert and Newbery 1982). 
Incentives exist for incumbent firms to restrict entry (or perhaps prevent further 
success and growth of small successful firms) due to the potential effect on market 
power -  the reverse process of the Cournot models earlier. Empirically, this has also 
been found - firms that posses technologies are of high value to incumbents, deterring 
entry (Grimpe and Hussinger 2008).
New owners may have all the best intentions to keep the new firm but unforeseen 
problems brought on by the acquisition harm its performance. ‘Bedding-in’ problems 
may mean that performance suffers post-acquisition. This is an inverse case of the
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‘bad’ match hypothesis, where previously the managers formed a ‘good’ match but 
upon takeover the new ‘match’ is bad. A degree of uncertainty around the profitability 
of any new match between the owner and firm or plant can ultimately lead to an 
increased chance of exit (Bernard and Jensen 2007). The realisation of a lower level 
of profitability than anticipated may take time, prolonging the survival of the firm 
until it is divested or ultimately closed. Alternatively, adjustment costs and the 
process of ‘bedding-in’ may just delay the effects of performance increasing. 
Depending on the time scale, no improvement in performance may be observed. 
Impatience or the unwillingness to accept a period of poor performance may also 
increase the chances divestment or ultimate exit.
The costs of acquisition, including any transaction or adjustment costs, may result in 
the total cost of the transaction exceeding what the acquirer can afford or initially 
budgeted for. The possibility of a ‘winner’s curse’ in competitive bidder for a 
company has been raised to explain why acquisitions subsequently seem to be so 
unprofitable in the market for corporate control of large, publicly quoted, companies 
(Roll 1986; Thaler 1988). This might also apply to small firm acquisitions. Over­
paying for the firm could constrain further development because inadequate resources 
are left for development.
An acquiring firm may remove what ultimately made the firm productive and 
dynamic. If the acquired firm becomes subservient to the larger firm, eventually the 
acquired firm may adopt the processes of the larger firm that do not suit the small 
productive unit. This may hinder the acquired’s performance as the firm eventually 
loses its autonomy and dynamism, as the new owners implement their own processes 
(Fothergill and Guy 1990). These problems may be particularly problematic if the 
newly acquired firm becomes a subsidiary of.the large firm. This may create 
coordination problems and remove its autonomy (Ashcroft and Love 1993). These 
features may all result in a fall in performance.
Another reason why firms may suffer as a result of acquisition is simply bad luck 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987b). A  change in market conditions or tastes may turn 
what was once highly productive and profitable firm into an unprofitable one. Linked 
to the previous point, new owners might make the firm less able to cope with such
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changes. Evidence from interviews with companies making acquisitions in the mid- 
1970s show expansions of targets are usually intended pre-acquisition, whereas 
closures are not (Leigh and North 1978). Exits made post-acquisition are more as a 
consequence of unforeseen or uncontrollable circumstances such as adverse economic 
conditions. Acquired firms may have problems that are not observable to potential 
buyers. Asymmetry of information between sellers and buyers may create a form of 
‘market for lemons’ phenomenon but with buyers unaware of the potential problems 
their acquisition may have. These problems might hinder future performance that the 
new owners are unable to rectify. For small firms, asymmetries of information are 
likely to be inherent as they are unlisted and little public information is available, 
hence the potential problems in accessing finance.
The final reason why performance may suffer is over-optimism. Acquiring a highly 
productive small firm may make the new owners believe that they can not only 
continue the level of performance but also better it. Roll (1986) believes acquirers 
may overestimate their ability to improve acquired firm’s performance. If 
performance is already at its peak, it might be that performance cannot be improved 
much further. This could be like another form of ‘winner’s curse’ as it is hard to 
assess the true value and performance of small firms (Reur and Ragozzino 2007 in 
Capron and Shen 2007, p. 892). The uncertainty of post-acquisition performance of 
small firms is a possible way that firms try to obtain high returns (Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1987b). Many investments of this type tend to fail but when a winner is 
backed it is possible to obtain very high returns, hence a positive expected return from 
this investment strategy. But on average, failure of the acquired firm is expected if 
acquirers’ adopt this takeover motive.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
Consistent with much of the empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter, 
much of the evidence discussed below is qualitative. This is because with the 
evidence on the effects of takeovers there is no consensus and therefore the important
issue here is the direction of the effects. This can then suggest whether takeovers, or
/
at least their effect on targets, may have a beneficial or harmful effect on (regional)
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economies. I begin with looking at the empirical evidence of the effects from 
takeovers on the likelihood of exit.
3.4.1 Exits
The empirical evidence, like the theory, is mixed with respect to the effect of 
takeovers on the probability o f closure. Early evidence on the effects of acquisitions 
on the probability of exit suggests that acquisitions during the 1960s and 1970s 
accounted for a much smaller proportion of firm deaths relative to larger firms (Singh 
1975, Kuehn 1975, Samuels and Chesher 1972 all in Hughes 1989, p. 146). This is 
mainly perhaps because acquisitions are less likely to occur within the small firm 
sector and their chances of failure are higher irrespective of takeover. However, a 
different process may still occur for takeovers and survival relative to large firms. Of 
studies only looking at small, unquoted companies, an annual merger exit rate of 2 to 
3 percent is found for the 1960s and 1970s (Bolton 1971,1972 and Boswell all in 
Hughes 1989, p. 147). It is not reported whether takeovers actually increases the 
firm’s chances of exit.
At the plant level, ownership change increases the probability of survival (US food 
manufacturing, McGuckin et al, 1998 in McGuckin and Nguyen 2001, p. 743; also 
found in Nguyen et al. 1995). This is also found across the whole of US 
manufacturing (McGuckin and Nguyen 2001), where the chances of survival 
increases with a plant’s size and its (relative) productivity. In another study, plants are 
less likely to be closed after takeover if they are also more productive (US meat 
product industry, Nguyen and Ollinger 2006). These last findings on productivity and 
size suggest differential effects for large and small plants, with the latter having an 
increased risk of exit after takeover. With productivity, the most productive are more 
likely to survive. However, it is not known what the effect of being small and 
productive has on the chances of exit after acquisition. Also these effects might be 
specific to a single industry (food production), sector (manufacturing), or plants that 
belong to a multi-unit firm. In the UK, ownership change of manufacturing plants 
increases the chances of exit (Harris and Hassaszadeh 2002), the opposite to previous 
findings.
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In declining industries (UK textile and clothing 1967-72), SMEs with multiple plants 
are more likely to close if they have been recently acquired (Healey 1981). Despite 
this being found in an atypical industry where falling output has perverse effects, a 
short period occurs when the acquired are no more likely to be closed. The increased 
likelihood of closure is found only after 5-6 years after the acquisition (Healey 1982). 
This last finding implies that perhaps the time elapsed between acquisition and exit is 
important. Allowing for the possibility of up to 5 years between takeover and exit, an 
independent effect is also found for targets to be more likely to fail relative to plants 
not changing ownership (Bernard and Jensen 2007). However, this time lapse 
suggests that it was not the initial intention of the takeover to close the firm or plant; 
perhaps a different process to the takeover-exit one for small firms that I am most 
interested in.
3.4.2 Profits and productivity
The empirical evidence of the effects of takeovers on profits and productivity is also 
mixed in terms of the direction of effect. A few studies find negative or neutral effects 
on productivity or its growth due to acquisitions (Conyon et al. 2002b; Hanley and 
Zervos 2007). The former study finds suggestive evidence that acquisitions may 
actually erode any productivity advantage targets have relative to the average firm, 
although this is only found without controlling for any other variables.
Possible falls in productivity after acquisition might be offset by the gains made to the 
acquirer. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) investigate whether newly acquired plants 
are in some form complementary to the new owner. This is consistent with falls in 
post-acquisition performance of the acquired due to the new owner now using the 
firm’s assets at the target’s expense. However, evidence for this effect was only found 
with the acquisition of less productive plants.
Many studies report a positive effect on productivity post-acquisition (Bertrand and 
Zitouna 2007; Lichtenberg 1992; Lichtenberg et al. 1987; Maksimovic and Phillips 
2001; McGuckin and Nguyen 1995; Siegel and Simons 2006; Siegel et al. 2005) and 
higher productivity growth (Lichtenberg 1992; Lichtenberg et al. 1987; McGuckin 
and Nguyen 1995; Nguyen and Ollinger 2006). Most studies either concentrate on, or 
only include relatively large firms with targets also generally exhibiting lower initial
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productivity. Increases in after acquisition productivity when it was previously low, 
indicate that takeovers can act to rectifying poor performance. The post-acquisition 
effect aids performance so that it converges to the average firm or plant (Bertrand and 
Zitouna 2007; Lichtenberg 1992; Lichtenberg et al. 1987; Schoar 2002; Siegel and 
Simons 2006; Siegel et al. 2005).
Despite increases in productivity post-acquisition, some plants are still found to have 
below average performance up to 7 years after takeover (Lichtenberg 1992; 
Lichtenberg et al. 1987). Takeovers may rectify poor performance, increasing 
productivity ex post but little evidence is consistent with takeovers improving already 
productive firms or plants, at least in the short-run. Over a longer time period, it is 
possible that post-acquisition productivity may increase sufficiently so that it 
overtakes the non-acquired. This is found in only one study, in the period of 5 to 9 
years after the original acquisition (McGuckin and Nguyen 1995). Therefore 
acquisitions may improve the acquired firm’s performance but not so they become 
more productive relative to competitors, at least in the short run.
A size variation of the post-acquisition effect on productivity growth is also 
confirmed (McGuckin and Nguyen 1995). Post-acquisition productivity growth 
declines with size. The largest non-acquired plants outperform taken-over ones. This 
size finding might be important for SMEs. It suggests I might find a positive post­
acquisition productivity growth effect with SMEs.
Another feature of the post-acquisition effect is related to the attributes of the buyer. 
An increase in productivity is observed when the productivity o f the acquirer is higher 
than that of the acquired plant and vice versa (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001). 
Therefore productivity may rise or fall after acquisition depending on the performance 
of the acquirer and not just that of the target.
The effect on profits is investigated next. Profits can be very difficult to measure as it 
usually depends on how firms report it. For small firms this can be particularly 
problematic, as very little data exists that provides profit information. Also with 
takeovers, it is very difficult to disentangle profits between the acquirer and the 
acquired firms once have they have merged. Changes in accounting and how profits
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are subsequently reported between divisions of the firm can all contribute to the 
difficulties of trying to measure post-acquisition profits (Ashcroft and Love 1993). 
This is especially so when the acquired firm becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer. 
Despite these shortcomings, a few studies have managed to use data on profits. Falls, 
or non-positive changes, in the profitability and profits post-acquisition are found 
(Ashcroft and Love 1993; Dickerson et al. 1997; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987a, b, 
1989).
A post-acquisition size-profitability effect is also found. The decline in profitability 
after acquisition is greater for small firms. Larger businesses increase profitability in 
the fourth and fifth years after initial decreases in first three years (Cosh and Hughes 
1994). However, this evidence is inconsistent with the findings about productivity 
above and also with those of Gugler et al (2003) about smaller firm mergers, where 
profitability is more likely to increase after acquisition. Cycle effects may explain 
some of these differences, as they are likely to vary between studies and are not 
controlled for in the former one.
3.4.3 Employment
If performance improves after acquisition then employment might increase. General 
improvements in post-acquisition performance may result in both an increase in 
output and the demand for inputs such as employment. However, the reverse might 
also be true. Alternatively, after acquisition productivity improvements might be 
caused by a reduction in inputs (labour), or factor substitution e.g. capital for labour 
via capital deepening. Decreases in employment accompanied by an increase in sales, 
might be a consequence of finance constraints. Takeover may allow the target to 
invest and achieve a better mix of inputs, allowing the firm to become more capital- 
intensive, increasing its efficiency with a change in the capital-labour ratio (Ashcroft 
and Love 1993). Alternatively, extra investment may lead to capital widening, 
increasing employment.
For larger, less productive firms, a cpmmon theory of how takeovers can affect 
employment is that it is a chance to ‘renege’ on employment contracts (e.g. Conyon et 
al. 2002a). This results in acquisitions reducing employment, restoring employment to 
more ‘optimum’ levels. This is confirmed with some of the empirical evidence (Siegel
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and Simons 2006; Siegel et al. 2005). Alternatively, changes in ownership may ‘stem’ 
any fall in employment rather than result in mass redundancies or large sudden falls 
decreases. Empirical evidence of the poor ex ante performance of manufacturing 
plants confirms this (Lichtenberg et al. 1987). For large firms, differences exist 
between firms in continental Europe and USA. The post-acquisition effect is found to 
have adverse affects for employment in the former but not the latter (Gugler and 
Yurtoglu 2004).
The effects for large firms can be considered atypical for SMEs where they are 
perhaps less likely to have hoarded labour or be targeted if performing poorly. I am 
most concerned about the after acquisition effects of small, productive firms. 
Comparisons between different types of firms has found reductions in labour is more 
likely for large and public companies and better employment prospects might be 
expected for smaller private businesses that are acquired (Ashcroft and Love 1992). 
Perhaps acquirers are more likely to be sought out and complementary to the needs of 
the small firm e.g. via finance and available resources. Alternatively, the chances of 
‘raiders’ might be greater for small firms as it is perhaps easier and cheaper to make a 
smaller workforce redundant. Acquirers can perhaps relocate or deregister the 
business, obtaining it assets.
The evidence suggests that a separate effect does occur for smaller firms. Increases in 
employment are at their greatest for smaller, single plant enterprises, when taken-over 
by a larger firm (Green and Cromley 1982). Other evidence including all sizes of 
manufacturing plants also finds a positive relationship with post-acquisition 
employment (and wages) (McGuckin and Nguyen 2001; Nguyen et al. 1995)37.
The type of employment that is left after acquisition may vary too. The acquisition of 
some small firms might be to obtain "certain assets such as a high performing 
management team. An acquired firm could be stripped of this after acquisition. 
However, there are a large number of cases where high growth firms have been
37 However, when acquisition is observed at the firm level and the effects are aggregated, employment 
increases are not found (Nguyen et al. 1995). This is less relevant here as it relates to multi-plant firms 
that are less likely within the SME sector. '
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acquired but continued to operate with the original team in place with management 
roles (BIS 2008, p. 48).
The effects on employment may also depend on the type of acquisition. For private 
firms, as are most SMEs, takeovers are more likely to be ‘friendly’. The effects of 
these may differ from hostile takeovers. These might involve firm restructuring after 
takeover and then decreases employment. The empirical evidence finds both ‘hostile’ 
and ‘friendly’ takeovers are associated with falls in labour demand (Conyon et al. 
2001, 2002a). However, hostile takeovers are linked with immediate falls in both 
output and employment, attributed to firm divestment, perhaps more relevant to the 
acquisition of larger firms.
Another study separates acquisition and classifies them into: a change in ownership 
without integration (‘simple sale’), assets of acquired are taken without the work force 
(‘assets only’) and combining acquirer and acquired or at least partial absorption 
(‘merger’) (Brown and Medoff 1987)38. A ‘simple sale’ led to a small increase in 
employment, an ‘assets only’ sale resulted in a small decrease and a ‘merger’ no 
significant effect is found. All of these have potential implications for the acquisition 
of SMEs. If acquirer’s seek targets only for their assets then this may result in 
negative consequences for the target’s employment.
It is possible that differences of the effects on employment and productivity from 
takeover, especially those involving large firms acquiring small ones, may have a 
temporal or cyclical element which is not fully explored in the literature. When the 
stock market is increasing takeovers may increase subsequent labour productivity for 
all but the larger or most productive SMEs. A rising stock market may provide 
acquirers with more resources to invest in acquired SMEs, helping to improve the 
performance of most acquired small firms. This could result in the small firm 
achieving a more optimal factor input mix for production, as discussed above. During 
a downturn in the stock market, acquirers may not be valued as highly and therefore 
be limited in their resources that they can obtain to invest in their acquisitions. They
38 This study does not distinguish between ‘hostile’ and ‘friendly’ takeovers nor include the smallest o f  
firms. These results are also sensitive to the' year o f acquisition.
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are perhaps more likely to drain the acquired or under-invest in it; reducing its 
performance. So it is possible that these relationships may also vary across time.
3.5 Conclusions
Takeovers can affect the chances of a firm closing, or, if it survives, its performance. 
Either outcome on sufficient scale may well affect economies, perhaps even regional 
ones. On the one hand, larger firms may provide extra resources such as finance that 
could enhance the performance of acquired SMEs. On the other hand, stripping an 
SME of its innovative assets could lower performance or even trigger closure. 
Bedding-in problems of the new owners, a mismatch between firm and owner, or a 
lack of prior information on the purchase, could all also explain possible falls in 
performance after acquisition.
After takeover, increases and decreases of both productivity and employment are 
found in the empirical literature. For low productivity and smaller targets, takeovers 
increase subsequent performance. Very little evidence suggests that they help to 
improve already productive targets, even for small firms or plants.
The effect of takeovers on exits is also not conclusive in the literature. For smaller 
targets, evidence suggests an increased chance of exit but higher productivity may 
reduce this likelihood. It is not known what the effect is on both smaller and more 
productive firms. Also, it is possible that differences of the effects on employment 
and productivity from takeover, especially those involving large firms acquiring small 
ones, may have a temporal or cyclical element.
The next chapter discusses the potential for any spatial variation in the market for 
small firms and what the possible effects of these takeovers are.
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Chapter 4 - Spatial Economic Activity and Takeovers
4.1 Introduction
Having surveyed and synthesised the relevant takeover literature in the preceding two 
chapters, the thesis now goes on to consider the spatial dimension of the market for 
small firms. This chapter sets the background conditions in which the subsequent 
regional theory of small firm takeovers can be applied to. The review introduces the 
theory of why income and productivity may differ by location and the creation of core 
and peripheral regions. The different characteristics and processes in these regions 
may have implications for the mechanism of the market for small firms (as described 
in the preceding two chapters); both the acquisitions motivations and their effects.
I begin by discussing the theory of spatial income and productivity disparities.
4.2 Regional Income and Productivity Disparities
The neoclassical growth model applied to national economies, and therefore to 
regional economies, predicts conditional convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; 
Mankiw et al. 1992). That is, regions with the same savings rates, depreciation rates, 
production functions and exogenous rates of technical progress and population growth 
will converge to the same levels o f incomes and productivity. Persistent regional 
productivity gaps therefore must be due to the failure of one or more of these 
conditions - though predicted rates of convergence are very slow (around 2 percent 
per annum for European regions for instance (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, p. 400)).
An obvious shortcoming of this neoclassical model is that the technical progress 
assumed to drive long run economic growth, and therefore determining long run 
productivity gaps, is fixed outside the model. Hence considerable attention has been 
devoted to endogenising technical progress (Lucas 1988; Romer 1986, 1990). In these 
models the convergence prediction can be overturned, because the diminishing returns 
of the neoclassical model on which it depends are in effect abolished by investment in 
R&D or some other form of innovation. In these endogenous growth models a country 
or region that gets ahead, stays ahead, indeed probably with a widening productivity 
gap. Because these models have been developed to explain macroeconomic
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performance they typically lack the explicit spatial dimension essential for regional 
analysis. This deficiency is remedied by the New Economic Geography.
New economic geography (NEG) models offer an insight into why certain regions, 
such as Wales, are persistently economically disadvantaged. Agglomeration and 
clustering may create persistent differences in the levels and growth of regional 
productivity. This theory, does not explicitly address the role of firms, but assumes 
labour and production to be mobile. If the factors of production move, then so must 
firms and their assets. Not only will enterprises relocate but those in regions 
benefiting most from agglomeration will multiply and grow in contrast to those of 
other regions. The assets of small firms are much easier to transfer and they also 
provide a significant potential expansion for a (regional) economy. Takeovers are a 
mechanism that enables production to be transfer between firms, and if these 
businesses are located in different regions (core and periphery), acquisitions will 
contribute to the divergence that NEG seeks to explain. Takeovers are also likely to 
affect subsequent performance (see chapter 3). The effects of takeovers on small firms 
exits and performance, jointly dictate whether SME acquisition is beneficial to 
regional economies.
4.3 New Economic Geography
This section introduces new economic geography and applications to the UK’s 
regional disparities of productivity. It then discusses how the theory applies to firms, 
particularly SMEs, and the possible relation to acquisition activity in this sector.
It is a well established fact that geographically peripheral UK regions, such as Wales, 
have a productivity gap or at least a GVA per head gap, relative to that of the UK 
average (e.g. see ONS 2006b). Here a peripheral region is one that is distant from the 
highest income and productivity regions of the UK: London and the South East. These 
last two regions can be thought of as the core regions of the UK.
Recent growth theory, in the form of NEG, provides a framework that can help to 
explain these spatial differences in income and productivity and including the process 
by which core-periphery outcomes may occur (see for example Krugman 1991b;
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Krugman and Venables 1995). Much of the insight from NEG models has developed 
out of New Trade Theory, which assumes product differentiation, monopolistic 
competition and increasing returns to scale; so unit costs are reduced when production 
increases. Therefore, instead of spreading a number of plants across a region or 
country, the concentration of production is advantageous to the firm.
Clustering of production reduces costs of production via economies of scale (both 
external and internal -  as the market becomes bigger), contributing to regionally 
diverging incomes. Alternative forms of economies of scale are stressed by different 
authors (Martin 1999) but there are two broad sources (Armstrong and Taylor 2000). 
First, localisation economies arise from geographical concentration of plants and 
producers within the same industry. This includes transfer or linkage economies.
Also, specialisation might be beneficial along with an access to a pool of skilled 
labour, local knowledge spill-overs and specialist suppliers and business services. 
These all provide advantages to production in close proximity (Fujita and Thisse 
1996). Some of these features may help to increase intangibles such as innovation and 
R&D within a locality. Ideas, information and knowledge may all transfer more freely 
between firms when they are in close proximity; for example, by workers changing 
jobs between local firms. Information flows attenuate with distance so that further 
away locations benefit less from this process.
Second, agglomeration economies provide benefits from the clustering of firms, but 
not necessarily within the same industry. Such economies may stem from facilities 
and services provided to all industries. They include a pool of workers with different 
skills and transport facilities. The aspects of localisation and agglomeration 
economies might be reinforcing; clustering may attract highly skilled workers, who in 
turn may increase innovation. This can raise the growth rate of a core location. Core 
regions are attractive to workers as, if they lose their job, it is likely that other 
opportunities will arise without the need to relocate (Krugman 1991a). Krugman also 
indicates that this has implications for start-ups, where failures in the core mean there 
are always fall-back jobs in the locality.
The co-location of production is also desirable due to the size of markets served. As it 
is more advantageous (more profitable) to produce closer to the market (due to
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reduced transport costs), wherever possible, there is an added incentive for firms to 
produce in the core. This can equally apply to low technology sectors, which have 
also been shown to be localised. The benefits of concentrated production therefore do 
not only apply to production in high tech sectors (Krugman 1991a).
Agglomeration (or dispersion) comes about from the magnitude of transport costs and 
the degree of labour mobility. The movement of labour allows the reallocation of 
economic activities to move across regions and potentially create core-periphery 
equilibriums. Thus, higher immobility of labour helps create centrifugal pressures. 
However, product differentiation allows for many similar products to remain in the 
market, even if produced at different costs, as consumers have preferences over or 
between similar goods. This ensures that some production remains in the periphery 
and that it all does not migrate to the core.
A decline in transport costs can also affect a core-periphery outcome across regions 
(Krugman and Venables 1995). Lower transport costs results in higher (positive) 
agglomeration effects and the possibility to produce in core regions increases, as 
goods can be moved out. However, as transport costs continue to fall, it is possible for 
income differences to lower and the periphery may gain as production can be 
undertaken in the least cost regions. In part, it is the size of the transport costs that 
cause the existence and the size of core-periphery outcomes and either diverging or 
converging incomes.
Costs, or centrifugal forces (Krugman 1998), also make production in the core more 
costly. Diseconomies of scale, such as congestion and competition for land and 
labour, can increase factor input prices -  all costs of agglomeration. The higher costs 
of operation within the core provide incentives for firms to move out and redistribute 
economic activity; a ‘trickle-down’ effect. This could create a demand for firms 
outside of core areas to help enable a firm to reduce it production costs by moving 
some of it production. More peripheral locations may benefit from this. However, for 
the largest and most productive regions, it is probable that the benefits of being 
concentrated are high and that spill-overs outweigh agglomeration costs for most 
firms. This is likely to be the case for London and the South East, where it has been 
documented that services tend to migrate to the South East of England but that
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manufacturing tends to migrate the other way (Krugman 1991a). Therefore small 
firms that may benefit from better information flows may improve performance and 
profitability when located in core locations. This will create an external demand for 
firms that currently operate outside of it, an incentive to relocate or both.
The incentives for firms to operate in close proximity is found empirically where 
population density effects (controlling for human and physical capital differences) 
have a significantly positive relationship with output per worker in both the US 
(Ciccone and Hall 1996 in Rice and Venables 2003, p. 679) and in Europe (Ciccone 
2002 in Rice and Venables 2003, p. 679).
Therefore agglomeration and clustering may create persistent differences in the levels 
and growth of regional productivity, as observed within the UK. As concentration has 
a positive effect on productivity due to agglomeration economies, this leads to the 
centralisation of production to core regions and the attraction of more innovative, 
knowledge intensive, intangible rich firms that helps to keep core areas ahead of more 
peripheral ones. The core may also draw capital and resources from other areas so 
peripheral locations lose out. Acquisitions could contribute to this, allowing 
ownership, assets and production to and be moved to the core.
The movement of knowledge and intangibles, as described by NEG models are likely 
to involve firms, perhaps especially small ones. The benefits of a core location may 
aid the chances of some start-ups and help enable them to grow. But there are also 
likely to be many competing forces. In less favourable locations, such as the 
periphery, the chances for growth might be less and therefore survival might be more 
difficult. Countering these, there might be fewer start-ups and less competing forces 
aiding the chances of survival. However, the main concern of this thesis with NEG 
theory is to address the interaction of core and peripheral locations and the transfer of 
resource between them.
At the regional level, an SME relocating away from a region has the same effect as a 
firm death (assuming the exiting entrepreneur does not create a new start-up). It
results in a loss of a local productive unit and source of employment but it is likely
/
that the process is quite different from firm exits. However, regions also receive
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SMEs. Spatial feedback processes may reinforce core-periphery disparities or 
ameliorate them -  convergence or divergence is possible.
Regional disparities in the expected rates of return may generate incentives for a firm 
to relocate (Twomey and Taylor 1985). Costs of production, including transport, and 
revenues are likely to vary over space so profits might be maximised in an alternative 
location. A tendency for the concentration and localisation of plants and firms may 
also exist, as NEG models suggest, perhaps to benefit from external economies 
(Barriosa et al. 2005). The ‘pull’ of different regions could be a function of their size, 
which therefore would also identify core regions. Relocations to those regions, 
perhaps as a consequence of takeover, would enable firms to take advantage of 
agglomeration economies39.
Other benefits that core regions may provide are closeness to ‘producer services’. Due 
to the nature of clustering, it is likely that in the core a greater supply of business 
services exist. Proximity to business services and finance can aid information flows 
and perhaps improve the firm’s access to these services (Holl 2004). This too may 
increase the rate of takeovers in the core, as the information flows enable more 
opportunities to be known about, relative to the periphery.
Incentives for firms to relocate away from core regions may also exist. Increased 
clustering and a higher density of firms can cause congestion costs. Competition for 
resources and inputs can also result in higher unit costs, particularly for land rent. 
These push factors out of core locations mean that firm relocations can act as a 
mechanism of redistributing economic growth towards the periphery (van Dijk and 
Pellenbarg 2000). However, in core regions higher wages are found to have no effect 
on plant relocations (Holl 2004), but in another empirical study, labour ‘availability’ 
(which is likely to result in relatively lower wages) is significant in explaining a 
region’s differing level of firm relocations (Twomey and Taylor 1985).
In a model similar to those used in NEG with monopolistic competition, firms 
relocate to the largest regions, which is increasingly attractive for businesses with
39 Firms that choose not to set-up locally also appear to be more affected by agglomeration economies 
and their proximity to major urban centres (Figueiredo et al. 2002).
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higher productivity and vice versa (Baldwin and Okubo 2006). The more productive 
firms have an increased likelihood of benefiting from greater agglomeration forces. 
This is consistent with the idea that more productive firms have a greater absorptive 
capacity and the gains that can be made from operating in the core are greater for 
already productive firms. For less productive firms, perhaps being able to reduce costs 
by operating in the periphery is the attraction; hence low productivity firm’s draw to 
more peripheral locations.
NEG theory outlines how regional income levels and growth rate may differ. It is 
likely that takeovers, including those of SMEs, play a part in this process where the 
core attracts production at expense of the periphery, if most acquirers are assumed to 
be located in the former. How is productivity in peripheral regions affected by SME 
acquisitions? Is productivity in the periphery pulled down by the exit through 
acquisition of high productivity indigenous small businesses? Or is it the case the new 
owners are able to inject resources into the firm, improving its performance and 
benefiting the region?
First it is necessary to understand any spatial disparities in SME takeovers and if so 
what types of are involved.
4.4 The Spatial Element to the Market for SMEs
A central concern of this investigation is small firm takeovers and the difference in 
the intensity of, and perhaps the motivation for, acquisitions between the regions of 
the UK. Intangibles (including knowledge in R&D intellectual property, skills of the 
work force etc) are deemed to be key to driving both regional (via knowledge 
spillovers) and enterprise performance (Harris 2008). These intangibles can also help 
to explain why takeovers occur. They are likely to be desirable to acquirers because 
they enhance a competitive advantage providing higher productivity and profits (as 
discussed in chapter 2). As returns are greater in the core, this could result in firms 
located there acquiring assets and firms in the periphery, so that they can obtain 
maximum return from their acquisition. The assets in the target location are either 
relatively cheaper or not available in the acquirer’s home location. Foreign or external 
takeovers when the acquirer has a desire to obtain or access valuable assets can be
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called ‘asset-seeking FDF (Wesson 1999).
Takeovers might also be a product of agglomeration. NEG theory suggests that 
competition and a greater proximity of firms in core locations might increase the 
probability of takeover there, as well as a facilitating the absorption of new productive 
resources. Alternatively, takeovers might be a reaction to agglomeration costs. The 
acquisition of established units outside of core locations may enable the transfer of 
production to lower cost regions such as those in the periphery.
Larger firms with closer links to capital markets are more likely to be based in core 
areas relative to the periphery; this may create a market of corporate control that shifts 
the ownership of the most promising SMEs from the periphery. If the price of finance 
also varies between regions; lower in the core due to its proximity to capital markets 
for instance (see below), this may exaggerate the effect, further stimulating the 
demand of larger firms in the core for SMEs, especially those based in the periphery.
One of the key variables that may affect the location of targets, in relation to the 
acquirer, is information. According to NEG theory, one of the advantages of being 
located close to other firms is the improved flow of information between agents and 
firms. Information on privately owned and unlisted firms is likely to be a function of 
distance. The further away are potential targets and acquirers the less is likely to be 
known about the former. This effect, on its own, could result in the acquisition of 
SMEs being only a regional event. It is more costly to try and obtain information on 
firms that are either not listed or further away. Distant acquirers have to devote more 
resources to seek out ‘suitable non-quoted takeover targets' (Ashcroft et al. 1994, p. 
172). If acquisitions are all local, and the acquirers gain from the process, the effect 
on the target may suggest whether acquiring small firms is beneficial to regional 
economies. Gains to acquirers and also to the target, on average, will result in benefits 
from SME takeovers.
The location of a potential target will be more important if the purpose of the 
acquisition is to extend the geographical coverage of the acquirer outside of its home
region. NEG theory suggests that congestion and competition for resource might
/
make some forms of production cheaper outside of core regions and therefore firms
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located there may target firms in the periphery for these reasons. This would involve a 
deliberate regional bias for takeover targets (Fothergill and Guy 1990). Acquisitions 
that are either for expansion or diversification may result in targets that are further 
away (Ashcroft et al. 1994), for example, foreign direct investment.
The spatial element to why some SMEs might be open to an acquisition approach, the 
supply of the market for small firms, is explored next. This focuses on differential 
access to finance.
4.5 Spatial Variation in the Supply to the Market for Small Firms: 
Finance
Do supply conditions differ between the peripheral regions of the UK and the core? If 
peripheral regions have a greater tendency to sell, especially more productive SMEs, 
then perhaps they may exit through being acquired. This could potentially have 
deleterious effects on regional productivity. The most common reason for target- 
initiated takeovers is to enable firms to access extra capital, especially for acquisitions 
by regional external firms (Hayter 1981 in Ashcroft and Love 1993, p. 81). This 
suggests that if there is a location element to finance, where constrained firms look for 
an external injection, this would have differential effects in the supply of small firm 
between locations.
Within a developed economy with an efficient financial system, mobile capital may 
be expected to find profitable investment opportunities regardless of location. 
Therefore if a firm is unable to obtain finance, perhaps there is an issue with its risk- 
retum profile. But what if  proximity to the financial sector perhaps has a greater effect 
than an investment’s risk or return profile? If a worthy potential investment were 
without finance, this would represent a failure in the financial market. On the other 
hand asymmetries of information are perhaps most acute for those who are 
geographically remote from finance providers -  consistent with NEG theories of how 
information flows.
4.5.1 Relationship-lending
Distance affects relations, and ‘relationship-lending’ may enable SMEs to access
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finance with greater ease, reducing the desire for acquisition. The process involves a 
firm developing a working relationship with a lending institution. As the lending 
agent learns about the firm, it is assumed to gain soft, private information on the type 
of borrower the firm is, reducing the asymmetry of information between the two 
agents. Much of the information a lending institution can gain from a firm is with 
existing lending arrangements but this element makes relationships somewhat 
endogenous. If a firm is able to obtain finance, then the firm may not be subject to 
credit rationing. Ideally a firm may need to establish some form of relationship prior 
to approaching a lending institution for funds. This can happen through the provision 
of other services, such as existing deposit accounts. Another way that this may happen 
is via informal networks. Agents within lending institutions might get to know or 
learn about firm owners who are looking for funds. Informal financial intermediaries 
may help to ‘connect’ borrowers and lenders and play a significant role in accessing 
finance (Garmaise and Moskowitz 2003). NEG models suggest that mechanisms that 
allow information to flow between agents are more pronounced in core areas relative 
to the periphery. This may improve small firms’ access to finance in the core relative 
to the periphery.
The local discretion of managers is found to be important with regards to SME 
finance (McKillop and Barton 1995) and a relationship with a bank leads to a lower 
(perceived) constraint by the firm (Binks and Ennew 1996). Other research suggests 
that a pre-existing relationship is important in the decision on whether to extend credit 
but the duration is not (Cole 1998). But other evidence does suggest that as the 
relationship lengthens with a bank, an increase in credit is found (Berger and Udell 
1998; Petersen and Raj an 1994).
A number of studies also investigate both the supply and price of credit40. The results 
of these studies are mixed in terms of whether relationships ease credit rationing or 
information problems with small firms. Relationship strength with banks, measured in 
length and duration, is found to result in a reduced interest rate (Berger and Udell 
1998) and a longer, or stronger, relationship as measured by extending lines of credit 
or granting new ones can cause this (Berger and Udell 1995). Evidence also exists to
40 Strictly defined, credit rationing has been identified in theoretical models resulting in a reduced 
supply of loanable funds and not an increase in the cost o f credit.
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suggest the opposite - relationship-lending does little in relation to obtaining cheaper 
credit when measuring relationship strength as a continuous measure (Petersen and 
Rajan 1994).
Closeness of the firm and lending institution could also be literal; geographical 
distance may matter. Lending institutions may have more information on SMEs that 
are geographically closer, ceteris paribus. Given that more lending institutions and 
other forms of capital are likely to be more common in core areas, this may indicate 
the potential for differential access to finance between core and peripheral areas. 
Empirical evidence on the correlation between distance from the bank and the price of 
loans does not support the theory of relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan 2002). 
Small firms further away from banks in Belgium may actually obtain a loan at a lower 
interest rate41 (Degryse and Ongena 2005). The advent of banking away from 
traditional branch methods to more electronic forms, increasing the distance between 
lending institutions and borrowers, actually increased the availability of credit to firms 
(Petersen and Rajan 2002).
Findings on the effects of relationship lending on both the price and supply of credit 
must be treated with some caution; not all firms are going to be ‘good’ borrowers. If 
information is obtained over time that reveals to lenders a firm is a higher than 
average borrowing risk, then they are unlikely to be extended credit or offer it at a 
lower rate.
4.5.2 Collateral
The ability to pledge assets as collateral may help to reduce potential problems in the 
supply of finance. The value of personal assets, such as property, is likely to vary 
between core and peripheral regions, according to NEG models. Competition for 
resources and inputs in the core are likely to result in higher land rent and property 
values. These assets could be used to access finance and affect the supply of small 
firms.
41 This result implies the costs o f adverse selection, caused by having customers further away, does not 
increase relative to spatial discrimination (the loan rate decreases as the distance increases between the 
bank and firms increases to entice customers from further away) and transport costs for the firms to get 
to the branch, as the distance increases between the lender and borrower.
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The regional distribution of start-ups is not found to be affected by housing wealth, a 
form of personal collateral. However, it is an explanatory variable for VAT 
deregistration (other things being equal) (Robson 1996). Housing wealth can be used 
as collateral in order for firms to obtain new lines of credit that can ultimately help to 
prevent closure due to financial constraints (at least in the short-run). Similarly, Holtz- 
Eakin et al (1994) find that an increase in personal liquid assets (in the form of 
inheritance) increases the chance that a sole proprietor entrepreneur will continue in 
the future. Also, a change in the value of collateral is also found to affect a firms’ debt 
capacity, where a negative change in the value of collateral has an adverse affect (Gan 
2007). Therefore the size (and change in value) of personal assets are probably linked 
to the likelihood of a firm, entrepreneur, or both, exiting.
Given that changes to asset or collateral values has an effect upon debt capacity (Gan 
2007), it might be that firm owners located in regions where house prices have risen 
considerably over the last decade, - in core regions London and the South East - are 
able to obtain larger supplies of credit, secured against their own increased personal 
wealth. Therefore in regions where house prices have not increased as much, are 
generally lower or both, owners of firms in these areas will have less capacity to 
acquire debt and so perhaps incur a financial constraint sooner. In relatively more 
deprived areas it might be the case that not only is their own property worth less but 
there is perhaps an increased chance of not even owning their residence. This may 
also have potential impacts on firm owners in these regions and their access to an 
adequate supply of finance.
4.5.3 Equity markets
Firms that are most remote from finance providers could be most at risk from being 
unable to secure credit. The same may also be true for equity-finance, where 
information problems might create market failure. If investors are only aware of 
potential investments in their immediate area it is likely that firms located further 
away from investors and markets may go without finance. Centralised equity markets 
mostly deal with large international stocks (Huggins et al. 2003). A centralised 
financial market system may not allow small ‘relational’ investments, particularly in
regions that are more remote from the markets. In relation to the stock of VAT
?
registered businesses, London and Scotland are both over-represented on the financial
78
markets and only Scotland and the South East have regional market capitalisations 
greater than GDP. By contrast, Wales has the lowest proportion of its VAT-registered 
businesses listed out of all the GB regions (Klagge and Martin 2005). This suggests 
the existence of regional equity gaps in places that are peripheral to central financial 
markets. International comparisons show that Germany differs with a more widely 
spread venture capital market and more regional balanced distribution of investment 
(Klagge and Martin 2005).
The evidence above might only be partially or not at all a result of demand-side 
problems. Less suitable investment opportunities might exist within some regions. 
However, venture capitalists are mainly based where the demand is greatest for it, e.g. 
London and the South East, and some of this could be a symptom of a highly 
centralised system (Klagge and Martin 2005). Having a local supply of venture capital 
may reinforce any existing demand for this type of finance. In an area with no, or a 
limited, supply of venture capital, the low supply may reinforce the limited demand, 
leaving regions with a low supply, low demand equilibrium, reinforcing each other. 
However, as outlined above, with an efficient financial system, capital should find 
profitable investment opportunities and therefore if there is a demand for venture 
capital, then a supply is likely to be available.
More likely is that firms may not reveal their true demand for finance as they might 
be unaware of the sorts of finance that are available. Small firms might have 
insufficient information, or resources to obtain such information, to secure additional 
finance. This may also vary by region with the existence of regional differences in the 
cost of obtaining information on borrowing and the rates of (McKillop and Barton 
1995, p. 243). Part of this might be explained by regional variations in skills, and 
perhaps, small business experience. ^
Overall, little evidence relates location and the likelihood of incurring binding credit 
constraints. Peripheral regions are also no more likely to be in need finance or have 
difficulty in accessing it. As a sort of proxy for the core-periphery, no UK north-south 
divide is found with regards to reporting finance as a problem for expansion (Moore
1994). Concerning SMEs’ ability to obtain finance or the full amount requested, not
!
controlling for any differences between firms within the regions of the UK, analysis
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shows no real differences between those located a peripheral region, Wales (12 
percent), or the UK more generally (14 percent) (Wiseman et al. 2005). With respect 
to gaining access to finance without difficulty, SMEs in the peripheral region of 
Wales (83 percent) are also found to be slightly higher than the UK average (79 
percent) (Institute for Employment Studies 2006a).
Despite finding a general lack of evidence to suggest that SMEs have difficulties in 
accessing general finance -  especially debt, in his own recent literature review, 
Rowlands (2009, p. 62) concludes that there is a bias with investment capital 
provision for SMEs towards the regions of London and the South East. It is likely this 
is symptomatic of problems in both the supply and demand for such funding.
I next investigate whether there is any spatial variation or bias in the acquisition 
activity of firms.
4.6 Spatial Evidence of Acquirers and Targets
Evidence suggests that, intra-nationally, firms from the most economically active and 
prosperous areas are found to conduct a disproportionate amount of acquisitions but 
targets are much less regionally concentrated (Bockerman and Lehto 2006). Similar 
proportions of firms in core and peripheral locations (such as Wales) expect a transfer 
or closure of their business42 (Wiseman et al. 2005). Likewise for the sale or full 
ownership transfer (Institute for Employment Studies 2006a, b). With British 
manufacturing in the 1970s, acquiring firms were also found to be much more likely 
to be from the South-East but with much less concentration with regards to the 
location of the acquired (Leigh and North 1978). This is consistent with other findings 
that indicate that smaller unquoted firm’s vulnerability to takeover has increased with 
corporate control converging on the South East (Ashcroft et al. 1994). Further 
evidence shows the movement of corporate control of small firms from peripheral 
areas of Europe to large firms based in more core-like areas where the financial 
centres are located (Chapman and Edmond 2000). This may also translate to intra­
country firm movement and control between core and peripheral areas, where 
acquirers are based in the former and the acquired in the latter. 
  )
42 These are descriptive statistics and do not control for any other characteristics.
80
The empirical evidence also suggests that intra-regional acquisitions are not the only 
type (Ashcroft et al. 1994; Bockerman and Lehto 2006; Leigh and North 1978). 
However, a strong bias of acquisitions exists that involve targets close to the 
acquirer’s headquarters. This is particularly so in the largest metropolitan areas 
(Green 1990) where M&A activity declines with distance (Green and Cromley 1984). 
NEG theory suggests that competitive pressures are likely to increase the amount of 
M&As within large agglomerations. This is also found in the empirical evidence; 
large cities or locations with a large density of firms have a higher correlation with the 
number of takeovers either initiated by firms or the number of firms acquired within 
the area (Green 1990; Rodriguez-Pose and Zademach 2003). Combining both the size 
of regions and distance in a form of gravity model, takeovers in the UK are found to 
have a positive relationship with the former and negative one with the latter (Ashcroft 
et al. 1994).
4.6.1 Spatial Evidence of Acquirers and Targets: Firm Attributes
The propensity to conduct extra- or intra-regional acquisitions is found to be linked to 
the acquirer’s size. Small acquirers are much more intra-regional, consolidating their 
existing positions, whereas larger firms are more likely to be extra-regional 
(Bockerman and Lehto 2006; Leigh and North 1978). Larger firms, who may have 
better access to financial resources, are more able to target smaller unquoted firms in 
more distant locations (e.g. the periphery) (Ashcroft and Love 1992). The size of the 
acquirer also affects the required attributes of potential targets. Leigh and North 
(1978) find regions with large companies seek efficient, small firms to help enable 
future expansion. Further afield acquisitions are similarly found to be of well- 
performing (profitable) targets and those with fixed assets (Bockerman and Lehto 
2006). ^
Following the NEG theory that there is an external demand for firms then studies that 
look at foreign acquisition are instructive. In a number of these studies, foreign 
suitors are also found to acquire more productive plants or firms (Griffith et al. 2004; 
Hanley and Zervos 2007; Harris and Robinson 2002; Salis 2008), this is commonly 
termed as ‘cherry-picking’. However, evidence also suggests the opposite with 
foreign acquisitions in Sweden of firms with more than 50 employees (Karpaty 2007).
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4.6 Acquisition Effects
This final section investigates the potential spatial effects of takeovers. Acquisitions 
are potentially an important mechanism by which economic activity can change 
between regions (Green 1990). NEG models suggest a mechanism by which takeovers 
may contribute to the concentration of economic activity. Takeovers can reinforce 
core- periphery divergence (Green and McNaughton, 1989 and Aliberti and Green, 
1999 both in Bockerman and Lehto 2006, p. 850; Brouwer et al. 2004) and weaken 
peripheral locations (Ashcroft and Love 1993), with external takeovers concentrating 
economic activity within core regions (Holl 2004; Rodriguez-Pose and Zademach 
2003). This could stem from their effects on performance, on exits or on relocation 
away from the region, if acquirers are located in core regions. The overall impact 
could be a Potential Pareto Improvement but there might be a tendency for the 
periphery to lose out from SME takeovers and for the core regions to gain.
An example of an SME takeover having a negative effect on a peripheral region is
Albion Concrete Products. This firm was based at Llangadog in Dyfed, Wales and
manufactured a variety of concrete products. Albion Concrete Products was
purchased by the Hanson group (headquartered in Maidenhead, South East England)
in July 1999. However, three years after being taken over the company was reported
to be threatened with closure (The Western Mail 31st July 2002). Eventually Hanson
group reportedly sold the company (to a builders' merchant), moving all work from
Llangadog to another plant in Derby. Upon Hanson’s exit, Albion Concrete Products
had 37 jobs, around half the number in 1999 when they first bought it. This event did
not go unnoticed and was commented on by a former local MP, Adam Price;
'It's a devastating blow and it's part o f a pattern ofpredatory takeovers where 
externally owned companies come into rural areas and buy up successful indigenous 
companies in order to close them down and maximise their own position in the 
marketplace’ (The Western Mail 31st July 2002).
Alternatively, the loss of decision-making powers via external takeovers may result in 
increased production and productivity for periphery regions (Leigh and North 1978).
It may allow the transfusion of new production methods and knowledge to permeate 
its way to the periphery. Information flows within a firm that is spatially disparate 
may allow ideas to spread out from the core. Or resources could be invested in
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peripheral acquisitions that then improve performance. This may also increase the 
general productivity o f the national economy. Takeovers are a mechanism that can 
release resources and put them to a more efficient use. Therefore resources that are 
removed from a given area perhaps can be put to a more efficient use in an alternative 
area. Cheaper resources and lower demand for production inputs may mean that 
production is more profitable in a peripheral location. Takeovers may allow 
production to move to other plants that are located outside of the core.
With the movement of productive firms away from the periphery, this could generate 
a form of ‘technological leakage’ (Howells and Charles, 1989 in Howells 1990, p. 
509); the economic benefits are not seen where the (original) development occurred. 
Patterns in the movement of corporate control may turn core areas into head office 
and control regions due to its domination of the market for corporate control 
(Ashcroft et al. 1994; Leigh and North 1978). This can result in the relocation of key 
decisions and not just relocation of functions (Green and Mcnaughton, 1989 and 
Aliberti and Green, 1999 both in Bockerman and Lehto 2006, p. 850). Such a process 
may also have detrimental side-effects on regional indigenous sources of growth and 
productivity including entrepreneurship, start-ups and innovation (Rodriguez-Pose 
and Zademach 2003). This could further widen growth differentials between core and 
peripheral areas. In the extreme, there might be no production in the original region or 
perhaps just turning the firm into a production unit, instead of an important R&D 
facility with associated spill-overs and high occupational jobs and pay.
The effect of regional or foreign acquisitions is likely to depend on the purpose of the 
acquisition. FDI, like some regional takeovers, could be a mechanism to gain a 
foothold in a given location. The target would enable the acquirer to have a local 
outlet for accessing different geographical markets. If the reason is for new market 
access, then the target is likely to have an increased chance of survival, perhaps even 
benefiting from the resources (such as finance) of the acquirer. However, even with 
such a motivation for takeover, new foreign or external owners are likely to be more 
alien to local market conditions. This may lead to an increased chance of ‘bedding-in’ 
problems, relative to domestic or local acquisitions.
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Alternatively, the external firm may value the assets more highly than potential local 
acquirers as foreign owners might be better placed to divest the firm by breaking 
employment contracts and removing productive capacity- or for other reasons 
(Chapman 2003).
Firms or plants that are more remote from their headquarters might be more difficult 
to control and manage due to the geographical dislocation, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of closure (Healey 1981). Therefore external acquisitions might increase 
the chances of exit relative to domestic ones. Alternatively, if the purpose of the 
takeover is to acquire human assets or R&D, then the target might be more vulnerable 
to exit and a fall in performance, perhaps as a consequence of ‘intrapreneurship’ 
hunting.
Little evidence exists on the effects of takeovers in the periphery and the differences 
relative to the core. The limited (and now dated) evidence suggests no consistent 
evidence of regional patterns of expansion or closure after acquisition (Leigh and 
North 1978). This is important given the degree of acquisition activity that is 
concentrated in London and the South East. It suggests that expansion is perhaps not 
at the expense of peripheral regions. For manufacturing plants in a peripheral UK 
region, external ownership changes are found to increase the chance of closure (Smith 
1979). Similarly in the UK iron foundry industry, acquired small independent firms 
have a higher probability of closure, particularly within peripheral areas (Smith and 
Taylor 1983). The relevance of these results may be restricted to the period in which 
they were obtained -  a cyclical element to exit chances may exist. Even in faster 
growing, technology-intensive industries, takeovers result in the exit of plants that are 
peripheral to the main enterprise (Chapman and Edmond 2000).
Foreign takeovers are also an instructive area of research for the effects of external 
acquisition. The empirical evidence of foreign acquisitions contains studies with 
mostly positive effects on productivity or growth (Bertrand and Zitouna 2007;
Conyon et al. 2002b; Girma and Gorg 2007; Griffith et al. 2004; Piscitello and 
Rabbiosi 2005). Indeed, some studies find that the acquired improve more relative to
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domestic acquisitions (Bertrand and Zitouna 2007; Conyon et al. 2002b)43 and even 
more if initial productivity is lower, at least within the office machinery and data 
processing equipment sector (Girma and Gorg 2007). This last finding suggests that 
the effect of (foreign) acquisition on the target may depend on the firm’s pre-takeover 
level of performance.
For the highest efficiency and greatest return on the asset, a requirement might be for 
‘direct physical or economic contact’ (Wesson 1999, p. 2). For FDI this implies that 
acquirers move into the new location, but for inter-regional small firm investments or 
acquisitions, it might be optimal to move the assets to the acquirer’s location, 
internalising the assets of the acquired. The returns to this action might be a function 
of the target firm’s size. Smaller targets could be of more benefit with their 
intangibles than the rationalisation and improved performance that may occur with 
larger targets (Piscitello and Rabbiosi 2005). Consistent with this, relatively smaller 
targets are found to increase the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer (Ahuja 
and Katila 2001).
For firms to be able to benefit from takeover they may require a certain absorptive 
capacity. UK evidence of this is confirmed with foreign acquisitions, where 
productivity increases more for those that are initially more productive (Girma 2005). 
However, Findlay (1978) believes there is an externality to FDI, such as foreign 
acquisitions, that increases with the gap between available technologies. This 
externality might be demonstrated by gaps in productivity and suggests that less 
productive firms are more likely to gain from external takeover, as they benefit from a 
more advanced region’s knowhow and production techniques. This process is 
consistent with neoclassical theories of (regional) economic growth, where knowledge 
can spread within firms reducing productivity gaps.
Some empirical evidence of foreign acquisitions also finds that they can cause a fall 
(Hanley and Zervos 2007; Harris and Robinson 2002), no improvement (Salis 2008), 
or improvements in productivity only a few years after acquisition (Karpaty 2007). 
These latter findings are perhaps consistent with ‘bedding-in’ problems and
43 Bertrand and Zitouna (2007) find this only for the cross-border acquisition o f  French firms where the 
acquirers are outside o f the EU.
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adjustment costs of acquisition. It is then perhaps the timing after the acquisition that 
may produce some of these different results but the ‘controversy’ still exists on 
whether foreign acquisitions produce productivity gains (Hanley and Zervos 2007).
If some acquired firms are targeted for their (intangible) assets, or ‘intrapreneurship’ 
hunting occurs, there could be negative effects of foreign acquisitions. If so, this is 
also consistent with evidence that plants acquired by the foreign-owned firms have a 
much higher chance of subsequent exit (Harris and Hassaszadeh 2002).
Despite the conflicting evidence on the effects of foreign takeovers on productivity, a 
growing consensus is emerging that acknowledges the important role that acquisitions 
may have on the ‘evolution o f  the space economy’ (Chapman 2003, p. 310). However, 
takeovers seem equally likely to either increase or decrease the target’s performance 
after acquisition.
4.6.1 Other spatial consequences of takeovers: entrepreneurial recycling
‘Successful’ exits may be harmful to regions as they could move productive capacity 
between regions. Incentives to produce in core regions may mean that this process 
contributes to the transfer of resources and production from the periphery to the core. 
Therefore, despite being an efficient market process and exits being a ‘success’ in 
aggregate, for the region that loses a source of indigenous growth from small 
productive firms, it could be a failure and a welfare loss.
At a spatial level, entrepreneurial recycling (also explored in chapter 2) may result in 
a net gain for the periphery, especially if investment or the acquirer is from the core 
and production and the productive capacity remain in the original region after 
acquisition. However, if productivity falls or the firm is dissolved with the assets 
moving out, it is unlikely that the periphery will gain from such a process. In this 
instance, perhaps at best, a neutral effect occurs where productive capacity is initially 
lost but is eventually returned once the former owner starts up a new firm -  and at a 
similar scale to their firm sale. The neutral effect relies on the assumption that funds 
are invested back into the original region. However, the effect for a regional economy 
also depends on where the acquirer is based, as if local, it could act as a transfer of 
production between firms without having many consequences for the periphery.
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Only limited evidence on this exists. People are more likely to become serial 
entrepreneurs in urban (rather than rural) locations due to the respective opportunities 
that exist there (Van Gelderen 1999; Wagner and Sternberg 2004; Arenius and De 
Clercq 2005; Kolvereid and Isaksen 2006 all in Stam et al. 2008, p. 499). Applying 
these limited findings to context of the core-periphery suggests that if serial 
entrepreneurship occurs, it is perhaps more likely in core areas rather than peripheral 
ones.
4.7 Conclusions
The review of NEG in relation to the spatial dimensions of SME takeovers provides 
some possible regional effects. That economics may operate across space is often over 
looked (Martin 1999), especially in terms of acquisitions. Implicitly, the spatial 
dimension assumes that there is a concern is not just with efficient outcomes but also 
with (spatially) equitable ones. The distribution of the gains between regions (and 
persons) matters as well as ensuring that the national aggregate is maximised. How an 
economy is organised spatially can also have a critical effect on economic functions 
and how agents may operate.
Agglomeration economies of core areas will benefit businesses. This may incentivise 
firms to relocate or transfer assets to be used more efficiently there and result in 
greater clustering of firms. However, over time, enterprises may require different 
aspects of a region and perhaps the increased cost of the core may help to move 
production to outside regions. It is possible that takeovers may help to concentrate 
economic activity, as more firm headquarters are based in the core. Synergies might 
mean that close proximity is also desirable. More large firms located in the core may 
stimulate a process of businesses from there acquiring productive SMEs firms in more 
peripheral areas. Firms located in core areas are also more likely to engage in 
takeover activity due to the increased competitive pressures there.
New economic geography growth theory also suggests reasons why the processes of 
takeovers may have a regional element, contributing to the movement of resources
i
and production to the core from the periphery. If highly productive SMEs in the
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periphery are acquired by large core firms, this may be detrimental to the economic 
development of the periphery. Conversely, takeovers may boost the performance of 
acquired firms.
Finance might be restricted, offered at a higher rate or both for smaller firms. Being 
located further from significant capital markets may compound this problem for 
SMEs in the periphery, although there is very limited evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. Limited local capital markets might be a possible reason for a lack of 
relatively successful firms in peripheral regions; a lack of equity investment can lead 
to an outside takeover. Acquirers’ may also have access to national and international 
capital markets from which small, regional firms are excluded.
Some of the negative aspects of acquisitions also might be increased with external 
takeovers. No evidence exists specifically related to SMEs or the differences between 
regions. Despite this, empirical evidence of foreign takeovers suggests possible 
increases in productivity, or for those acquisitions where productivity does fall, 
bedding-in problems might exist; as performance picks up after a few years. External 
takeovers may therefore equally help or hinder acquired firms.
The effect of takeovers on regional economies is the sum of the effects on the 
acquirers and the acquired. If the acquirers are assumed always to benefit from 
acquisitions, then it is the location of these firms that matter. NEG models and 
empirical evidence on where large firms are location suggest that they are more likely 
to be located in the core. Given the potentially greater returns that businesses 
operating (or assets used) in the core, this may generate an external demand for 
businesses currently located in the periphery. Takeovers may enable firms in core 
locations to obtain and transfer assets, innovations and R&D that can perhaps be made 
better use of within these regions.
The transfer of resource from the periphery to the core might be an efficient outcome 
-  and a Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) 44 - but in terms of the spatial or 
interpersonal distributions, it might not be an equitable one. The periphery may lose
44 A net gain after the winners compensates the losers.
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out while the core gains, owners of capital may win at the expense of the workforce or 
both.
Next I present a model with some hypotheses about the market for small firms and its 
effects, including those on spatial economies. This is derived from the preceding areas 
of theory and literature.
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Chapter 5 -  The Model
This chapter distils from the preceding three to produce the framework and model 
which are used to estimate both the determinants of SME takeovers and the impact of 
these acquisitions on the regions in which the targets are located. Parameter 
restrictions are discussed particularly in cases where behaviour may differ between 
SMEs and large firms, and the vital spatial element to be modelled is clearly 
distinguished. The chapter also outlines the estimation problems for the system that 
must be addressed.
I begin by outlining the system in general terms, before offering some empirical 
hypotheses and then specifying specific functional relations.
5.1 Model Summary
There are three central elements of the model. The first is the market for ownership 
and control of enterprises and why this may be different for small firms. The second is 
the operation of this market and how it may subsequently affect the performance of 
targets. The third is the spatial dimension of the market, and in particular the possible 
regional disparities consequent upon the market’s functioning.
The market for ownership and control determines takeover chances and the likely 
characteristics of acquired firms. For large publicly quoted firms, Q-theory suggests 
that less productive firms are more likely to be acquired (Jovanovic and Rousseau 
2002). On the supply side, all publicly quoted firms are available for takeover if a 
‘fair’ price is paid that reflects the present value of future profits. On the demand side, 
targeting less productive businesses could constitute a good investment for predators, 
particularly when funds are relatively cheap. In this instance, the sign on productivity 
in a model estimating the chances of takeover is expected to be negative. However, 
for SMEs, their attractiveness might be their assets (tangible or intangible), perhaps 
noticed due to their high performance. Larger firms may seek such firms to perhaps to 
aid further their development; productivity would positively predict takeover. 
However, less information is likely to be available the smaller and newer the firm. 
This suggests younger and smaller firms are relatively less likely to be acquired.
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The next set of relationships determines what happens to the target enterprise after 
acquisition. Prospective buyers may value a firm more highly if they can strip out 
saleable assets. The predator may merge the target’s assets with its own group and the 
independent existence of the acquired firm is ended. Here a model looking at the 
effects of takeovers on the chances of exit would be positive; acquisition increases the 
likelihood of the firm no longer existing. Stripping out assets from an acquisition 
could also reduce the performance of an acquired firm, if it continues to operate. This 
would imply that takeovers have a negative effect on post-acquisition performance.
However, a target short of liquidity may be saved from bankruptcy, reducing the 
chances of exit. This would reduce the chances of exit after takeover. Prospective 
buyers may value a firm more than the present owners if they believe they have a 
good chance of improving performance. The market for corporate control potentially 
corrects excessively low productivity performance by acquisition. This has 
implications for post-acquisition performance, implying that takeovers may improve 
it, especially if less productive.
Given the above summary, the effects of takeovers on the chances of an SME exiting 
and its post-acquisition performance are ambiguous.
Turning now to the spatial dimension of the market for SME ownership and control, a 
‘new economic geography’ (NEG) framework is used. The concentration of 
production and markets is advantageous to the firm, favouring densely populated, 
high income regions over sparsely populated, low income areas. There are considered 
to be incentives to move and employ the assets of a newly acquired, productive firm 
in the core. Financial and political power and information may be stronger in the core 
and this might have spatial economic implications. Large companies are likely to be 
headquartered in the core. Possibly the price or availability of finance may decrease 
with proximity from the financial centre, if information attenuates with distance.
These factors might allow more takeovers of high productivity but financially 
straitened smaller companies in the periphery by large companies in the core. Or, for 
reasons of inadequate information (over and above those just relating to size and age)
91
and heightened competition in the core, the opposite could be the case, where more 
firms in the core are acquired.
The impact of the SME market on regional development not only depends on the type 
of firms that are acquired but also on the effects of takeover. NEG suggests probable 
adverse distributional consequences for periphery regions, even though the overall 
impact on the national economy may be beneficial. After takeover, an enterprise may 
be stripped of its assets and closed, its headquarters functions may be integrated with 
the acquiring firm, and the target operated as a branch plant, or investment may be 
pumped in to improve performance.
The above theory of the regional market for SME ownership may alter the previously 
described takeover relationships. Unlike large publicly quoted firms, more productive 
small businesses are more likely to be acquired. Whether the acquisition targets 
subsequently improve in productivity relative to what they would have done, or 
whether they cease trading after takeover when they would not otherwise, could have 
an impact on regional economic development, and productivity differentials. This 
could be harmful or beneficial to regional, peripheral, economies. The effects interact 
with the process of selecting targets. Low productivity selection and subsequent 
closure would boost regional productivity. High productivity selection and closure 
could lower regional productivity.
The overall effect depends also on the benefits of the takeover to the acquirer. The 
acquirer may boost its own productivity and profitability so that the sum of the two 
firms (acquirer and target) is greater than the parts - assuming the market works. In 
order to favour the NEG centrifugal hypothesis (and perhaps not unreasonably) 
acquirers are assumed to be located outside the periphery, in the core; the location of 
proportionately more large firms.
It should be noted that the spatial effect is a distributional one. All takeovers are 
assumed to be Potential Pareto Improvements (PPI) and yet there might be a tendency 
for the periphery to lose out from SME takeovers and for the core regions to gain.
This is because the PPI criterion is only that there is a net gain after the winners 
compensated the losers, even though such compensation in practice might not be
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made. Indeed if PPI from SME takeovers did impact adversely on the periphery, 
regional aid as compensation would be justified.
5.2 Hypotheses
From the outlined theory a number of hypotheses can be tested concerning SME 
takeover, exit and relocation, performance after takeover and regional productivity. 
These are:
5.2.1 Takeover hypotheses
1. When larger firms are looking for acquisitions to offset their inadequate 
‘intrapreneurship’, they create a demand for the more productive and innovative 
SMEs; their targets are more productive than the average.
2. Agglomeration triggers more intense local competition and better information 
flows in core regions and therefore a stronger demand to acquire SMEs than in the 
periphery. SMEs in the core are more likely to be taken over at all levels of 
productivity, whereas in peripheral locations the more productive will be bought.
3. Information about an SME is likely to be a function of age and size. The 
performance of the very young and small will be relatively less known to potential 
acquirers, so they will not be targets.
From these hypothesis and the availability of variables in the data set, the following 
relationship is formulated for firm i as;
+  + - + + -  
Pr(Takeoverj) =  f(Prodi, Core, Periphery, Age*, Sizej, Core*prodj,
+
Periphery*prodj)
Where ‘prod’ is productivity and ‘Pr’ probability.
5.2.2 Exit and relocation hypotheses
4. Takeovers are an investment decision, an element of which might be 
relocation or closure to take advantage of synergies with the acquiring firm’s assets.
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Where this is the case, takeovers increase the chance for SMEs relocating or exiting.
A caveat to this is input rationing, such as capital (due to its cost relative to larger 
firms), could be a handicap to the SME. In this situation, acquisition may reduce 
chances of exit and result in injections of capital or other support.
5. Acquiring firms are more probably located in core regions of the economy, as 
more company headquarters are located there. If there are complementarities to be 
exploited by proximity, after a takeover a tendency may exist for acquired firms in the 
periphery to close or relocate to take advantage of this.
From these hypotheses, the following relationships can be formulated for firm i 
(where ‘prod’ is productivity and ‘Pr’, probability) as;
? - +
Pr(Exitit+i | Relocationjt+i) =  g(T akeoverit, , Corejt-i*Takeoverjt, Peripheryit.i*Takeoverit,
+
Prodjt-i *T akeoverjt,)
5.2.3 After acquisition performance hypotheses
6 . Takeovers may provide new resources that aid small firms in improving their 
productivity and expanding their size. Alternatively, acquisitions may strip SMEs of 
their dynamism and result in decreases in performance.
7. The possible negative effect of takeovers might be more pronounced for SMEs 
located in the periphery relative to those in the core, as owners move resources, assets 
or expertise out of the former.
8 . The more productive acquired firms may lose what ultimately made them a 
high performer, resulting in a loss of performance, especially for productivity, 
consistent with ‘intrapreneurship’ hunting by acquirers.
From these hypotheses, the following relationships can be formulated for firm i 
(where ‘prod’ is productivity and ‘Pr’probability) as;
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? +
Performance* =  f(Takeover*, Periphery* *Takeover*, Core**Takeover*, Prod**Takeover*)
5.3 Method
The three equations above can be used to estimate the effect from targets of SME 
takeovers on regional productivity, the assumption of extra-regional acquisition. 
Given that I am unable to assess the effects on acquiring firms (and where they are 
located) this allows a partial assessment of whether SME takeovers (including their 
effects on acquirers) contribute to the core-periphery productivity gap.
More formally, the three lines of investigation are:
Pr(Tit) = f(prodit-i, sizeit.i, locationit.i, ageit-i, industryit.i) (la)
Pr(X*t+i) = g(Tit, sizejt-i, prodit.i, industryit.i, locationit.i, ageit.i) (2 a)
Prodjt+i = h(T*t, sizeit.i, prodit.i, industryiM, locationit.i, ageit.i) (3a)
Where Pr is probability, T is takeover and X is exit, the t subscripts denote dates and i
indexes firms.
The impact of SME takeovers on productivity depends upon the marginal effect of 
takeovers on productivity (AProd /AT) and the probability of a firm being acquired 
Pr(T). If either of these vary by firm size, then it is not appropriate to multiply the 
average effect by the number of firms to obtain the aggregate result. The simple 
approach of ignoring size effects assumes the smallest SMEs have the same 
contribution to aggregate productivity as an SME with 249 employees. If both the 
chances of takeover and its impact vary by size, then using the average figures ignores 
the possibility that large acquired SMEs disproportionately influence the total impact.
To include the effects of firm size and takeover in the performance model (equation 
3), equation 4 posits that the productivity performance (prod) of firm i is affected by 
takeover (T), an interaction of takeover and employment (T.E) and some other 
unspecified factors (Z);
/
ln(Prodit+i) = a i T h  + a 2T  it .E* t-i +  a 3Z it.i  + u* (4)
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If there is a size effect of takeovers for SMEs, 012 ^  0, and aj will reflect the size 
invariant impact of takeovers but will not capture the full effect of takeovers on 
productivity. This is;
A ln(Prod) / AT = ai + o^Ej t-i
To obtain the total impact, the marginal effect of takeovers on performance 
(Aln(Prod) / AT) is estimated for every acquired SME, providing a predicted effect of 
acquisition on its performance. Then, both the chances of takeover and its effect must 
be weighted to reflect the fact that larger SMEs contribute more to the economy. In 
short, the aggregate effect of SME takeovers on periphery productivity is the 
individual firm’s chances of takeover multiplied by the productivity impact of 
takeovers, times the firm’s weight or contribution to aggregate productivity within the 
SME sector, summed across all firms indexed by i;
£  Pr(T,)i. ( AProd / AT)it+l .WiM (5)
where W; t-i is the SMEs’ share of periphery employment, Ejt-i
Equation 5 measures only the direct impact of takeovers on productivity, assuming 
that all acquired SMEs survive. But an additional consideration is that SME exits after 
takeover may affect productivity. The aggregate effect of SME exits because of 
takeover depends upon the probability of takeover and the marginal effect of 
takeovers on the probability of exit. As with the impact of takeover on performance, if 
size affects the probability of takeover or the takeover-exit effect then it is not 
possible to estimate the aggregate effect from the sample means. Larger acquired 
SMEs have a greater impact on the aggregate than the average and the total effect 
must reflect their importance.
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The probability of takeover is the same as in (5) and the effect of takeovers on exit 
can be calculated from equation 2a. This is analogous to the productivity equation 
above; the inclusion of takeover-size interactions can capture any possible size- 
varying effects (equation 6  below);
Pr(Xit+i) = P i Tit + P 2Tjt.Eit-i + P3ZU-1 + Vi (6 )
AX / AT = Pi+P 2 -Eit-i (6 a)
From 6  and 6 a it is apparent that the effect of takeovers on the probability of exit 
includes p2 .Eit-i if exit chances vary by firm size 0 ).
The effect of takeover on exit also depends on the productivity o f firms. If takeover- 
exits involve firms that are less productive than the average then their departure 
boosts the overall level of productivity. Therefore a measure of the impact of SME 
closures consequent upon takeover must include their productivity relative to the 
(weighted) average level of productivity.
In summary, the effect of takeover-exits on periphery productivity is the product of a 
periphery SME’s individual probability of takeover, the marginal effect of takeover 
on its probability of exit, the SME’s differential productivity and its employment 
weight summed across all firms, or;
X  Pr(T)jt .(AX / AT)i t+i .((Prod* t-i - Prod M) / Prod t-i).Wi t-i (7)
where Prod t-i is the (weighted) average of productivity across all firms at time t-1.
Subtracting (7) from the productivity impact (5) of takeovers yields the total 
productivity effect (excluding any on acquirers)45;
45 For ease o f  computation, takeover-relocation effects are ignored here because they are found to be 
infrequent.
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2  [(Pr(T)i,.(AProd/AT)it+1 .Wit.,) -
(Pr(T)j,.(AX/ AT)ii+i .((Prod,,., - P rod ,.,)/ Prod t.,).Wit.,)] (8)
Any impact on the acquiring business is irrelevant to the periphery region because, by 
assumption, it occurs elsewhere. At the very least, this expression allows the 
productivity effects from targeted SMEs to be measured46.
5.4 Estimation overview
Unbiased estimates of the parameters needed to calculate the impact of takeovers 
require that the disturbance terms (u*) in the stochastic versions of the model, the 
equations below, be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, if  single equation 
estimation is used. Where T is probability of takeover, P is productivity and X is 
probability of exit;
If unobserved bad management or luck reduce the chances of takeover and increase 
the likelihood of exit, then E(ui,U2) < 0. Single equation estimation of g' requires that 
E(T, U2) = 0. Failure to take into account the disturbance correlation of the exit and 
takeover equation means that T will be unduly low when X is high because of the 
disturbance term, so the effect of takeover on exit will be overestimated by single 
equation methods. Bivariate probit estimation controls for T and U2 actually being 
negatively correlated. Potential endogeneity of takeover in the exit equation can be
ignored in the bivariate probit estimation, in contrast to linear simultaneous equations 
(Greene 1998, p. 295)47.
46 Equation (8) is a base weighted (Laspeyres) index and, if  the market works well, may understate the 
impact o f takeovers. Takeovers might enhance SME employment (but alternatively they may shed 
jobs) and more productive SMEs are likely to increase their market share (but again, takeovers can be 
mismanaged and market share lost).
47 Bivariate probit estimation requires maximising the log-likelihood instead o f  using the sample 
moments.
T = f(P, u ,) ... (1)
X = g(T, u2) ... (2)
P = h(T,u3) . . . (3)
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Higher productivity may be both a cause and an effect of takeover in equations (1) 
and (3), thereby correlating the disturbance terms and the explanatory variables. 
Assuming both structural parameters are positive, the simultaneous relationship 
implies that takeovers will be high when U3 is large and that productivity will be high 
when ui is large; E(T, U3 )  ^  0  and E(P, ui) ^  0 . An unobserved favourable shift in 
demand (large ui) might increase the chances of takeover and through equation (3) 
also improve productivity. But through equation 1 this higher productivity (P) may 
then be associated with the large uj.
The difference-in-difference method, comparing productivity before and after 
takeover, treating enterprises not taken over as controls for those that are, goes some 
way to addressing this problem (Meyer 1995). Where PI is the productivity prior to 
acquisition of enterprises that are taken over, and P2 the productivity after takeover,
P3 the productivity of non-acquired firm at the same time as PI, and P4 their 
productivity at the same time as P3, the ‘average treatment effect’ is (P2-P1) - (P4- 
P3); the difference between the productivity increase of those taken over and those 
not. Enterprises with large (or small) Ui before and after the takeover year would lose 
such effects by the differencing and focusing on the increase in P rather than the level.
However, the appropriateness of the control depends on the absence of selection of 
the takeover target; enterprises taken over would not otherwise have increased their 
productivity by more than those not acquired. Some of those not acquired cease 
trading over the period considered for the productivity performance, and these are 
likely to have been the least productive. Some of the taken over firms were closed but 
not necessarily the least productive, if their assets when integrated provided a boost to 
the purchaser’s business. If firms that would have increased productivity by less tend 
to exit then survivors will be more productive regardless of whether or not they have 
been taken over. This selection process implies that E(u2 , U3 )  >  0 . A Heckman ( 1 9 7 9 )  
estimation procedure is therefore combined with the difference-in-differences to 
control for the possible bias in equation 3, with in effect equation 2 as the selector48.
48 Actually, the inverse, survival rather than exit.
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The method outlined captures the total effects on (regional) aggregate productivity 
from the targets of small firm takeovers. It concentrates on the levels of productivity 
and does not identify the potential loss to (productivity) growth in an economy.
I begin the empirical work by estimating the acquisition of SMEs. Before this, I will 
describe the chosen data set.
/
100
Chapter 6 — Data
6.1 Introduction
Obtaining data for the study of SMEs is typically more problematic than for large 
firms. This chapter therefore describes the data requirements for the analysis of 
SMEs, takeovers and productivity.
One of the principal contributions of this thesis is to analyse the Business Structure 
Database. This is a form of the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR) - a 
comprehensive database of UK businesses -  which is available for researchers with 
the addition of firm demographic identifiers that allow mergers and takeovers to be 
identified, even for small businesses (unlike data bases created from the ARD for 
instance). A brief description of the data and the constraints of working with this data 
set are discussed. Finally, I describe the data sample, define and provide some 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis within the subsequent 
chapters.
To enable the analysis of SMEs I require a dataset that includes small firms. Region 
identifiers are required so that I can conduct regional analysis or identify regional 
trends. Also I require estimates of productivity. Ideally productivity is measured as 
total factor productivity (TFP). This requires variables such as capital and 
intermediate goods to either be available or to be computable. If these are not 
available, then at the very least I require a measure of input such as employment and 
an output measure, like turnover, to estimate labour productivity (LP).
I begin with a discussion of the Business Structure Database (BSD).
6.2 The Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR) and Business 
Structure Database (BSD)
6.2.1 IDBR Overview
The chosen dataset is a version of the IDBR. It covers 98 percent of economic activity 
in the UK (Barnes and Martin 2002), containing around 2 million observations that 
include all but the very smallest of firms. It is a representative data set of nearly the
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entire businesses population across all sectors in the UK - it is not a sample survey. 
The comprehensiveness of the data means that the IDBR is used as the sampling 
frame for ONS business surveys (Evans and Welpton 2009).
The data set will not include the smallest businesses according to both employment 
and turnover49 (and some non-profit organisations). The IDBR’s coverage is limited 
by voluntary registration for firms below the VAT registration threshold and the 
exclusion of employers whose employees are below the income tax threshold. 
Businesses with a turnover above the threshold are not required to register if they 
trade exclusively in exempt goods50. If both the criteria concerning VAT and PAYE 
are not met then firms are excluded from the Register (ONS 2007a). More 
specifically, businesses are included if they pay wages of over £ 1 0 0  per week to an 
employee (minimum level for PAYE scheme to be used) but have insufficient 
turnover to register for VAT, and vice versa (Evans and Welpton 2009). It is possible 
for companies to come in and out of the Register in consecutive years if they do not 
meet the above criteria between years.
The trade-off for the extensive coverage of the data set is that it is very narrow, it 
contains very few variables. It contains the following variables:
• Address
• Industry classification (industrial/economic activity)
• Employment
• Turnover
• Legal Status (company, sole proprietor, partnership, public 
corporation/nationalised body, local authority or non-profit body)
• Enterprise Group links
The BSD is a version of the IDBR, with the same variables apart from firm 
demographic identifiers are included in the former. These identify whether production 
has been redistributed within the firm, transfers between firms, or the entire firm has 
been transferred. Using a similar data source (ARD -  for a description see Appendix),
49 In the UK around two-thirds of all SMEs are registered for VAT and around 80 percent o f those with 
employees, increasing with the age o f the firm (Institute for Employment Studies 2006a).
50 For a list o f exempt goods see HMRC (2007).
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ownership changes have also recently been identified (Harris 2009) using a similar 
methodology to the one employed in the BSD51. However, no current data dataset 
apart from the BSD allows for the identification of SME takeovers on a sufficient 
scale to enable them to be analysed .
6.2.2 Working with VML Data
The IDBR/BSD is kept and maintained by the ONS. Business datasets such as this are 
considered to be confidential and access to it is restricted. There are constraints in 
how the data is accessed and how it can be used. ONS has created a secure 
environment that allows researchers to access the data, known as the Virtual 
Microdata Laboratory (VML). The VML is a research facility at ONS that allows 
access to their data in a secure environment (ONS 2008b). The VML can be accessed 
from all ONS sites; Newport, Titchfield and London, and now also in remote labs 
based in Belfast and Glasgow.
To enable access to confidential and sensitive data, procedures and audits are in place 
to ensure that only non-disclosive analyses are taken out of the VML. Access to 
outside sources is not permitted unless they have been cleared by ONS. Any output 
from the laboratory also needs to be cleared. For output to be cleared, values must be 
backed-up with observations of 10 or more. As all output (including preliminary 
estimates) needs to be checked, unofficially, this puts a limit on the quantity of output 
that is feasible for researchers to withdraw from the laboratory in a single visit.
Researchers are also dependent upon the computational power and capacity that is 
provided by ONS. The datasets can easily get very large and although the available 
memory to researchers is reasonable, it is not always sufficient to enable all the 
statistical techniques that might be desirable. The computational power coupled with 
the size of data samples also means that some statistical techniques are quite time 
consuming. The time and memory limits and restrictions to outside sources mean that 
statistical techniques that are relatively straightforward (relative to if the dataset could
51 Harris’ uses the ultimate ownership reference codes along with foreign ownership identifiers to 
register foreign ownership changes. This is not possible for SMEs as much o f the data concerning 
foreign ownership is missing.
52 It is highly likely that the acquisitions o f small firms may not appear on many o f the existing 
published sources such as ONS (2009c).
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be accessed outside of the laboratory) are favoured.
6.2.3 Firm structure in the BSD
The BSD structures firms in three levels: local units, enterprises, and enterprise 
groups. An enterprise can consist of either a group of local units or a single local unit. 
The definitions for each of these are53:
Local Unit;
'The local unit is an enterprise or part thereof (e.g. a workshop, factory, warehouse, 
office, mine or depot) situated in a geographically identified place. At or from this 
place economic activity is carried out fo r which -  save for certain exceptions -  one or 
more persons work (even i f  only part-time) for one and the same enterprise.’ (ONS 
2006a, p. 7)
Enterprise;
'The enterprise is the smallest combination o f  legal units that is an organisational 
unit producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree o f  autonomy in 
decision-making, especially fo r the allocation o f its current resources. An enterprise 
carries out one or more activities at one or more locations. An enterprise may be a 
sole legal unit.' (ONS 2006a, p. 7)
Enterprise Group;
'An enterprise group is an association o f  enterprises bound together by legal and/or 
financial links. A group o f enterprises can have more than one decision-making 
centre, especially for policy on production, sales and profits. It may centralise certain 
aspects o f financial management and taxation. It constitutes an economic entity which 
is empowered to make choices, particularly concerning the units which it comprises. ’ 
(ONS 2006a, p. 7)
To aid the understating of these different structures, diagrams are used to show 
example companies. The first firm (figure 6.1) is contained within a holding company 
(Firm A&B holding). This would be identified as the Enterprise Group. Within this
53 For an alternative description see Criscuolo et al (2003).
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holding company two firms exist, A and B. These are identified separately at the 
enterprise level. Below firm A ’s enterprise level are local units. These can be 
production or retail units. This is not the only set-up for a firm; many different 
permutations may exist depending on how the firm reports its business.
The set-up o f firm B in figure 6.1 is more straightforward. It is connected to A in that 
it is part o f the same holding firm, identified at the enterprise group level. However, it 
only has one local unit.
When looking at economic activity by region with micro data, it is perhaps most 
meaningful to measure this at the local unit level, as each local unit might be in a 
different region. The enterprise m ight be registered in region Z but production parts 1 
and 2 might be in regions X and Y, respectively. It would be wrong to then measure 
all o f  Firm A ’s production at location Z when it has occurred in two other regions. For 
Firm B, I do not have the same problem, all production and activity o f the firm is 
conducted within the same unit within the one location.
Figure 6.1 - Structure of Firm A and B
Firm A&B H olding
E nterprise gro u p
Firm A
E nterprise
Firm B
L ocal un it
R eporting
unit
Firm A P ro d u ctio n
'  Firm A 
P rod u ction  part 2
Firm A Retail
Firm A
P rod uction  part 1
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The simplest set-up a firm within the data set is shown in figure 6.2. Firm C only has 
a single enterprise and local unit within the enterprise group. This ‘’independent’ set­
up is likely to be the m ost comm on one for the SME sector. Most SMEs are likely to 
have only one local unit, so activity can be identified and correctly attributed to one 
location. In the rare case where units are spread over different regions, I will only 
measure the SM E’s registered location according to the enterprise level data. The 
local unit information will be ignored.
Figure 6.2 - Structure of Firm C
E nterprise g ro u p
Enterprise
Local unit
R eporting unit
A further problem w ith having different levels o f the firm is the coverage o f data. The 
level o f detail varies by each level. Firms are not obliged to report information at the 
local unit, for example, turnover information is not available at the local level. Given 
this and that I am m easuring SMEs at the enterprise level, I will miss any SME 
dynamics that occur at the local unit level but this is considered to be only in a few 
exceptional cases.
In figures 6.1 and 6 .2 ,1 also show an as yet undefined unit; the reporting unit. The 
reporting unit is not relevant for the BSD data - it is only used in the sample data sets 
such as the Annual Respondents Database (ARD - see appendix). The reporting unit is 
either a single or group o f local units. In the latter case, the firm chooses to report
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local units collectively instead of separately reporting each one. With use of the ARD, 
the reporting unit is commonly used as the unit of analysis as it is the most 
disaggregated level of the firm that has the most data coverage54.
6.2.4 Enterprises and Local Units
From the figures and descriptions, it can be surmised that within the BSD there are 
effectively two levels of the firm that can be used. The first is the enterprise level, 
where both turnover and employment are reported. The second is the local unit where 
only employment is reported. As information is limited at the local unit, one option is 
to apportion turnover between the enterprise’s local units via their employment share. 
This form of pro rata method is used to obtain values of turnover for local units by 
Harris (2002). The implication of this approach is that all local units within an 
enterprise would have the same turnover per employee. This is problematic if I use 
such a variable as a proxy for productivity (see discussion below), unlike Harris 
(2002).
Local units can be in different locations to where their enterprise is located. However, 
for SMEs, the IDBR reports that 98 percent of enterprises only have one local unit, so 
the enterprise is equivalent to the local unit in the vast majority of instances55. Single 
site enterprises also account for the largest proportion of employment (Evans and 
Welpton 2009, p. 73). Given that the lowest level of the firm that production is 
undertaken is the local unit, it is considered that this is the most economically 
meaningful unit (Harris 2002).
The local unit is not necessarily the more economically meaningful measure. Given 
that I am interested in the productivity of firms and not plants, at least for the analysis, 
it is important to consider what activities may occur at different plants for multi-site 
firms. A firm may specialise in different production in different plants and this
54 Analysis with reporting units can be a problem as the number o f local units that belong to it can 
change over time (either at the discretion o f the firm or by closures and creations o f new local units), so 
a discontinuity over time can occur for analysis at this level. Local units within the reporting unit can 
also be in different locations.
55 An alternative way o f looking at this is by asking how many local units are equivalent to the 
enterprise. Using the same data I find that nearly 93 percent o f all local units are equivalent to the 
enterprise - around 7 percent o f all local upits are part o f a multi-local unit enterprise (same proportions 
for enterprises in Wales).
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specialisation may contribute to the productivity of the firm56. However, the 
availability o f data and the fact that most SMEs are unlikely to have multiple plants 
due to their size, I consider the most suitable level for the analysis of SMEs is the 
enterprise level.
6.3 Estimating Productivity
This thesis is concerned with the productivity of SMEs. Data is required that enables 
an estimate of SME productivity to be produced. For TFP to be estimated, the amount 
of capital used in each firm’s production needs to be included. However, this is not 
available in the BSD.
An alternative method could be to obtain capital stock estimates from another data 
source, such as the ARD (see appendix for a description), which samples firms. In the 
ARD, the capital stock is estimated with capital expenditure data despite the initial 
capital stock being unknown. For most large or medium sized firms, the initial capital 
stock does not matter as long as it is sufficiently far back in the past due to the 
assumed depreciation. A capital stock that is imputed when a firm is first observed is 
discounted sufficiently so that it is not influential on the current level of capital. 
However, the same rate of depreciation is used for all firms, across all sectors. In 
reality it is unlikely that the capital stock, across very different sectors, is so 
homogeneous that a universal depreciation rate can be used.
As the level o f initial capital stock is unknown, all entrants within an industry are 
assumed to have the same average initial capital stock obtained from the industry’s 
total. This technique and assumption is perhaps most troublesome for the analysis of 
SMEs. This sector is very dynamic; many exits and entrants occur each year. This 
means that when SMEs enter, all fiijns in the same industry will have very similar 
capital stocks for many years. The effect of this would be reduced if SMEs survived 
for many years, enabling the depreciation rate to reduce the importance of the
56 For example, a firm that manufactures cars is unlikely to produce all the required parts in the same 
plant. One plant may produce wheels, one the body work and the engine in another. Virtually no 
market for car engines exists; the singular productivity o f any o f these plants is not very helpful for 
inter-industry comparisons. Interest lies in the productivity o f the car firm where a market for output 
exists. Different car firms may also configure their production o f Components differently between 
plants. Therefore what I am most interested in is the lowest level that marketable goods and services 
are produced.
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assumed initial stock level. Over time, a firm’s own reported capital expenditure is 
used to derive its own unique level of capital.
Another problem with obtaining variables in general from the ARD is that most SMEs 
are not reported between years in the ARD due to sampling -  unlike in the BSD. 
Therefore capital expenditure is unlikely to be observed in most years for small firms 
in the ARD. Also, as a consequence of the high level of entry (and exit), SMEs have 
the highest risk of failing or exiting in their first few years. For the BSD sample, over 
half of all enterprises are less than 10 years old, and over a third are 4 years or 
younger. Therefore it is likely that many SME exits will be observed with very similar 
estimated capital stock levels due to the initial rate that is provided. Therefore the 
reliability of capital stock estimates for the SME sector, where available, is likely to 
be much worse than for large or medium firms with survive for more periods. In 
summary, the estimates of SME capital stocks are likely to have very large errors 
relative to the actual amount of capital employed.
The problems with estimating the capital stock, particularly for SMEs, means that an 
estimate of TFP is considered neither robust nor suitable for the small firm sector. 
Instead an alternative measure of productivity; LP is used57. Attention now turns to 
the measurement of output, turnover and gross value added (GVA).
6.3.1 Turnover versus GVA
Two methods to measure the output of a firm can be used. The first measure is 
turnover and it is simply a measure of the value of goods and services sold by the 
firm. This is available in the BSD58. An alternative measure of output is GVA and this 
is the difference between turnover and the cost of raw materials and other 
intermediate inputs that are used in the production process. This is not available in. the 
BSD59.
57 In a previous study with estimates o f both LP and some alternative productivity measures, a high 
correlation between them is found (Foster et al. 1998).
58 This is not imputed, unlike for small firms in the Annual Business Inquiry (Evans and Welpton 
2009), which is then used to produce the ARD variables.
59 GVA is available in the ARD, as the value o f intermediate inputs is collected in the ABI survey. 
However, similar arguments to those regarding capital apply here as values belonging to the smallest 
firms will not be observed each year due to sampling methods. GVA measures can also produce 
negative productivity estimates. Annual GVA can be negative in the data if  the value o f intermediate 
inputs is greater than the firm’s turnover in a given year. In the rare cases where this occurs, it is not
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Failure to account for intermediate inputs when estimating productivity can be 
problematic. For example, if  a firm buys some iron for £500 and then sells this on 
reshaped and in smaller parts for a total of £750 then it will register as having £750 
turnover but its GVA will be £250 as it will net out the £500 originally spent on raw 
materials. The real value that the firm has produced is only £250 and not the £750. 
Similarly, outsourcing; ‘... substitution o f  primary factors o f production, including 
labour, for intermediate inputs* (OECD 2001, p. 42), might have the same effect. 
Effectively, outsourcing is when a firm uses an outside source to provide a service for 
the firm. Services that are commonly outsourced include accounting, catering and 
maintenance of computer systems. This matters for measuring productivity as firms 
that outsource more will have fewer employees but will still be paying for the inputs 
of their business via alternative means such as contracted services. For example, in 
1989 when Kodak outsourced its computer services to IBM, the latter hired around 
300 former employees of Kodak and Chrysler reportedly bought around 70 percent of 
its parts from external suppliers in 1999 (Brickley et al. 2007). Therefore firms that 
outsource more of their functions might be estimated to be more productive if bought 
in services are also not fully accounted for with intermediate inputs.
The aggregation of data is also an issue between the output measures. McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995) consider GVA more appropriate for aggregate measures, as it avoids 
double-counting. For analysis at finer levels, e.g. the firm level, ‘gross output should 
reflect the theoretical output’ (McGuckin and Nguyen 1995, p. 262) and is considered 
satisfactory.
6.4 Cross-section versus panel estimation
The BSD contains a very large number of firms. The size of the sample means that I 
am unable to use it as a standard panel when using the majority of industrial sectors. 
Due to its size, it is best treated as a cross-section.
Another option with the BSD is to create a random sub-sample from each year to 
allow the creation of a panel. The selected firms in the original sub-sample are
possible to use the logarithm o f  productivity, a common transformation. It is for this reason that Oulton 
(1998) proceeds with sales data when analysing UK LP.
110
followed across time. A problem with this is the requirement for the sample to be 
representative across time. To achieve this, random samples of all entrants would 
need to be added to the sample from each year that the sample spans, increasing the 
complexity o f the construction of the sample.
Alternatively, the smallest firms could be removed from the estimation. Firms with 
employment o f one are a significant proportion of my sample, as the descriptive 
statistics later in this chapter show. As well as being a significant proportion of the 
sample, there are a large number of takeovers within this group of firms. This 
indicates that the takeover process described in the literature review may occur for the 
very smallest of firms, so omitting them for computational ease may remove 
important information from the dataset. This may also have implications for 
estimating the impact of the (regional) effect of SME takeovers. Therefore by 
truncating the sample to exclude the smallest firms I would have to add more 
qualifications to estimate the aggregate effect. This would not answer the aim of the 
thesis which is to access the effects of SME takeovers on regional productivity.
To create a panel of firms deflators are required. Panel estimation compares firms 
both across time and in a cross section. To control for the changing value of money, 
the real values are required. This means output needs to be deflated to account for 
inflation. Not accounting for inflation will incorrectly result in more recent estimates 
of productivity being higher than previous years even without any real changes to the 
firm60. The effects of inflation are also likely to vary by sector. For the manufacturing 
sector deflators exist that relate to the SIC 3 and 4 digit level.
The equivalent deflators for the service sectors of the economy, and all other non­
manufacturing industries, are not so readily available as it is quite difficult to measure 
and compare the prices of the service sector output (Paton et al. 2004). Some deflators 
are available for the service sectors, currently published by ONS (2008a). The 
Services Producer Price Index (SPPI) is available for 33 industry-level indices. This is 
approximately equivalent to the number of service sectors when measured at 2 -digit 
UK SIC 1992 but is well short of those when measured at the more desirable less
60 The opposite occurs with deflation.
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aggregated levels o f industry and they do not cover all non-manufacturing business 
areas, e.g. the primary sector and some other service sectors. Also, the exact 
identification of the appropriate SPPI for each industry is difficult in many instances 
as the coverage of SPPI are not totally in line with the SIC classifications61.
The lack of non-manufacturing sector deflators, along with the problems of estimating 
the capital stock, has probably dictated what methods and sectors have been used in 
all previous empirical work using UK data. The vast majority of research uses the 
manufacturing sector or a specific industry within it (e.g. Disney et al. 2003; Harris 
2002, 2006; Harris and Hassaszadeh 2002; Harris and Robinson 2002). A limited 
number of studies include the non-manufacturing sector. One method is to pool both 
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and use the data set as a cross 
section (e.g. Boddy et al. 2005; UWE 2006). Another option is to look at individual 
industries of non-manufacturing sectors. Using plant or firm level data from only a 
single industry reduces the problem o f inflation, allowing firms and plants to be 
compared across time; like with panel data analysis. This is underpinned by the 
assumption that within a single industry, similar factor prices occur (Paton et al.
2004). In two single sector studies of the productivity and its growth (Paton et al.
2004; Paton and Williams 2007), the Consumer Price Index series for a specific sector 
is used to deflate output62. This implies that all firms in a given year have their output 
deflated by the same rate. The results are robust to the choice of deflator used, but this 
is for a single industry only and the method is not appropriate for cross-sector 
analysis. The only work that has extensively made use of non-manufacturing sectors 
of the economy over time in a panel is by Harris and Li (2007; 2008). They make use 
of the SPPI indices for deflating service industries. As indices are only available at the 
2 -digit industry level, this is the level that they are able to deflate output63.
I use the data as an annual cross-section of the data. To measure performance across
61 An added complication arises if  GVA is used as the measure of output. Intermediate inputs will also 
need to be deflated and appropriate deflators will also be required across all sectors for these inputs.
Again, the availability o f such data is limited.
62 Paton and Williams also show in their appendix the effects o f using Recreation and Cultural 
Services (CPI series D7F1) as the deflator.
63 Harris and Li (2007; 2008) use a weighted sample o f firms form Financial Analysis Made Easy 
(FAME), that is only a fraction o f the total population o f firms. They obtain their weights from the 
ARD according to total output.
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time with measures such as productivity that use output and will require controls so 
that some of the industry-wide inflationary effects can be captured. This could be 
achieved with the use of industry variables when performance is a dependent variable, 
or a relative measure of performance (i.e. performance of a firm relative to the 
industry average) if  performance is an independent variable.
One of major implications of using a cross-section instead of a panel is that 
unobserved firm characteristics cannot be controlled (Greene 2003). Within a panel, 
using a fixed effect estimator, unobserved characteristics of firms can be controlled, 
assuming that they do not alter with time. Another drawback from not using a panel is 
that I am unable to include any temporal effects. For example, with acquisitions the 
propensity might vary depending on changes of the stock market or the 
macroeconomic environment.
6.5 Sample and variable definitions
I have restricted the SME64 sample to include only active firms that are registered 
either as companies, sole proprietors or partnerships; excluding public corporations, 
central government bodies, local authorities and non-profit making bodies. The 
sectors according to UK SIC 1992 of Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security, Education, health and social work, Private households with employed 
persons and Extra - territorial organisations and bodies have been excluded from the 
study. Non-private sector observations have also been removed because the market 
process under consideration only concerns private firms and different mechanisms 
may occur for non-private sector firms.
To enable the use of employment and turnover data, I have also removed a small 
number of observations that either have missing or zero values for these two variables 
in 2004. The resulting sample of SMEs contains firms with between 1 and 249
64 SMEs are defined as enterprises registered with fewer than 250 employees and turnover less than 
£22.8m in 2004 (see Office o f  Public Sector Information 2004). Alternatively I could have made use 
of a more relative concept for SMEs. A relatively small enterprise in the agricultural sector might be a 
quite different size from a relatively small one in the manufacturing sector. However, I choose to use 
the absolute measure for two related reasons. Firstly, for simplicity; it is easy to explain why an 
enterprise is defined as an SME across both sectors and time. The second reason is that I have made 
use o f the legal definition o f  SMEs, commonly used by other UK studies. This allows possible 
comparisons to be made with them.
113
employees65 and positive turnover in 2004.
In the BSD nearly 400,000 enterprises exist with only one employee. The Small 
Business Service Statistics (table 1 in BIS 2006) show that the UK has in excess of 3 
million enterprises with no employees out of the total 4.3 million in the UK. The total 
number of firms in the BIS (2006) source is derived from both the IDBR and the LFS, 
by analysing self employment information. There, one-employee businesses are 
classed as being no employee firms and one working proprietor. However, working 
proprietors do not count as being self-employed in the methodology as they are still 
officially employees of the company. For my dataset, I only find a very small fraction 
of firms are registered with zero employees. The vast majority of firms in my data 
sample are single employee enterprises and probably self-employed owner-manager 
firms. The main reason why I do not capture all the small businesses according to BIS 
(2006) is that they are not registered for VAT or do not need to run a PAYE scheme 
and are therefore not originally in the IDBR. Therefore I do not observe all of the very 
smallest firms as no large UK data set currently exists that include these firms.
6.5.1 Merging data
Additional requirements of the data mean some merging occurs from the original 
BSD sample. The first merge involves obtaining more detailed geographic 
information concerning the SMEs. The second merge is obtaining demographic 
information independent from the other characteristics of the firm.
The 2004 BSD only contains postcode data; it does not have region identifiers. To 
identify the region where the SME is currently registered, I link the postcode to the 
National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) (February 2007 version)66.1 expect to 
lose a few observations when matching BSD with the NSPD for a few reasons. First, 
inaccuracies in the BSD’s postcode data do not allow an exact match with the NSPD. 
This is perhaps caused by inaccuracies of inputting the data. Second, firms may have 
a new postcode that is not recognised in the version of NSPD. This can occur when a 
firm becomes large enough for it to have its own new postcode. Alternatively, if a
65 Employment is measured as the total number of paid full and part time workers at the Enterprise, 
plus any working proprietors. >
66 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geographv/nspd.asp for more information.
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firm moves to a brand new building, this will also result in a new and potentially 
unrecognised postcode. However, I have used a postal code database that is newer 
than the BSD data. This will result in the inclusion of all new postcodes for
* • 67enterprises in 2004 . Looking at the enterprises with missing geographic information, 
it appears that many are due to errors in the entry of the postcode information. The 
enterprises with missing geographic information equates to just less than 1 percent of 
my SME sample. I drop the few observations where postcode matches are not made. 
SMEs registered in the Isle o f Man and Channel Islands are also omitted.
A change in corporate control of the firm is likely to change certain aspects of the 
firm. I am interested in what characteristics SMEs have prior to being acquired -  the 
characteristics of the firms need to be observed independently from takeover. To do 
this I merge consecutive years of the BSD data using the unique enterprise reference 
number. Takeovers can then be observed one period after the firm’s characteristics are 
measured. Unfortunately the process of merging is not perfect. I include firms that 
have no link between the year t (2004) and t+1 (2005). If a firm ‘exits’ the dataset 
between these years, it is kept in the sample but does not register a takeover. This is 
important as the process identified by Disney et al (2003) indicates that firms that exit 
tend to be less productive. Excluding subsequently exiting enterprises biases the 
productivity estimates, as more productive firms would be selected -  a form of sample 
selection bias. This does not occur within my sample.
6.6 Definition of Variables
6.6.1 Productivity
As I am unable to include capital, I do not estimate TFP but LP. Ultimately what I 
require is a measure that can be computed so that it reflects the true level of 
productivity. Christiansen and Haveman (1980: p.3 in Paton et al. 2004, p. 5) assert 
‘although [these (labour)7productivity measures ... have serious weaknesses, the 
picture ofproductivity change which they yield is not greatly different from that o f  
more complete measures.’ However, it is likely that the level of LP is quite varied
67 The reverse to this may also be possible; unused postcodes for two years are removed from the 
database. Therefore it is possible that enterprises that exit during 2004 create an unused postcode for 
the next two years resulting in it not being included in the NSPB data source.
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across the different sectors of the economy. Evidence in Griffith et al (2004, p. 445) 
shows;
'In 2001, the average British worker in production industries produced just under 
£40,000 worth o f  goods, while the average British worker in hotels and restaurants 
and other services produced on average less than half this amount. In wholesale and 
retail trade, the average value o f  services produced per worker was £24,000. ’
These variations can make comparisons across different sectors of the economy quite 
difficult68. This suggests that a gross analysis of all SMEs in the private sector using a 
simple estimate of LP using turnover is unlikely to be very meaningful as each sector 
and industry are likely to have very different input compositions. Sectors with high 
capital-labour ratios will have very different estimates relative to sectors that are in 
more labour intensive industries, as reflected in the results of Griffith et al (2004).
The possible options to make the analysis more insightful are first, to undertake 
analysis across all industrial classifications, estimating productivity relative to other 
firms in their own industry. This method removes any industry specific factors, a 
motivating factor for its use by Griffith et al (2004). Second, one could estimate each 
industry separately so that different sectors are not pooled together. This is used in a 
few studies discussed above. This last solution is not very suitable to the investigation 
as I am concerned with cross-sector effects that might have a location element.
Instead I choose the former option, to estimate relative labour productivity (RLP) of 
just the SME sector, using turnover as the measure of output and employment as the 
measure of labour. Employment is measured as the total number of paid full and part 
time workers at the Enterprise, plus any working proprietors - owners directly 
involved in the business (ONS 2007b)69 70.
68 This has been documented by Baumol and W olff (1984).
69 This is usually 0 for a company, 1 for a sole proprietor or 2 for a partnership (ONS 2007b).
70 To account for the quality o f  labour, Paton et al (2004) present a method o f accounting for some 
degree o f the heterogeneity o f labour, such as age, education and hours worked. With BSD such 
decompositions cannot be used because the data only covers total employment for the firm, not even 
identifying the proportion o f part-time employment. A lack o f  information on part-time employment is 
another reason to use a relative concept o f  productivity (and employment size). It aids comparisons 
across sectors by removing the industry-specific factors, which in this case might be the rough 
proportions o f  part-time employment used; some industries might have a much higher intensity o f  part- 
time labour than others.
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Following McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), I compute RLP; normalising LP across 
industries. A figure greater than one will indicate greater than the average 
productivity and a value o f less than unity will indicate productivity less than the 
industry average;
RLPjj = LPy/ ALPj 
or
ln(RLPij)= ln(LPjj)— ln(ALPj)
Where i is each firm and j is each industry, LP is labour productivity, ALP is average 
labour productivity. I measure industry at the 3-digit level of the UK SIC 1992 
classification. To improve the robustness of observations within each industry, small 
industries are removed. Industries with less than 50 cases, measured at the 3-digit SIC 
92 level, are omitted. This helps to ensure that a single firm’s LP is not overly 
influential within the overall industry average level. To maximise observations within 
each industry, the estimates of productivity includes SMEs located in Northern 
Ireland but the analysis does not. The Financial intermediation sector is included 
despite recording turnover data that is considered to be ‘not available on a 
comparable basis’ (BIS 2006). I interpret this as meaning that turnover can be used 
within a relative measure, such as RLP where LP comparisons (using turnover data) 
are only within industry. Effectively controls for industry are being used within the 
productivity measure, capturing the inconsistencies that occur within the sector.
6.6.2 Takeover definition
To enable demographic events to be identified within the BSD, simplifications are 
made of the type of events that occur. The advantage is that it results in a new data set 
that includes changes of ownership and structural changes of all firms ftom the IDBR. 
This should enable all M&As of SMEs to be identified. The disadvantage is that I am 
imposing uniformity on M&As, perhaps an oversimplification of the different 
processes that can occur.
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For takeovers, the definition can be chosen from three categories of ownership change 
that relate to all business71 in the BSD (ONS 2006a)72. These are;
1) a ‘pure change o f ownership’ such as when an owner manager retires, selling the 
business to a successor
2) a ‘merger’, when for instance two enterprises integrate entirely and lose their 
identities, and
3) a ‘takeover’ when two enterprises integrate entirely, but one enterprise retains their 
identity, by which I understand, ‘controls the combined operation’.
By ‘identity’, BSD appear to mean the possession of a unique registration number at 
the enterprise group level - the red squares in figures 6.1 and 6.2. As all of these 
changes apply to the enterprise group level, it is still possible to identify all firms that 
have been subject to these changes at the enterprise level -  the blue squares in figures
6.1 and 6.2. They do not result in the enterprise reference automatically ‘exiting’ the 
Register . Therefore employment and turnover are continued to be reported even 
once the firm is acquired74.
A limitation with these variables is that they are binary. This means that I am only 
able to identify if  an enterprise is subject to any of the above and not how many times 
in a given year. It is unlikely that SMEs are repeatedly acquired in the same year but 
ultimately I am unable to identify if this is actually occurs. Another problem, linked 
with the simplification, is that the event might be a mixture of these categories. 
Another limitation for the second and third definition is that I am unable to identify 
the other merging or acquiring firm(s).
In the analysis presented, I make use of the third category -  ‘takeover’. This is a 
similar definition to the seminal work of Singh (1971). All three categories are 
significant for SMEs. However, for the process I am most interested in, the ‘takeover’ 
category appears to be the most appropriate. This definition implies that the SME is
71 It includes takeovers o f  SMEs by SMEs but also those by non-SMEs.
72 ONS follow the guidance that is provided by Eurostat (2003).
73 They can be the cause o f  a firm to subsequently exit but this is something different and I try to 
estimate this in a later chapter.
74 These concerns have been raised with ONS and I have been reassured that these figures belong to the 
acquired firm - at least in the short run. In the longer term, it is perhaps more likely that the 
employment and turnover o f  the acquired firm is less able to be identified.
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the target and it can be implied that it is acquired by a larger firm than itself (this 
could be a relatively larger SME or a large business)75, hence the continuation of the 
acquiring enterprise’s identity.
The data I use to identify takeovers may not be suitable for the analysis of large firms. 
The data records a demographic event for the firm but this may not be correct due to 
the complexity o f M&As. The data simplifies many events to enable them to be 
recorded. However, with large, complex firm structures, the data may not accurately 
represent what really occurs. Part of the problem is that I have made use o f a very 
specific event -  a takeover. For smaller firms, I assume that the degree of 
simplification of demographic events is not a problem as this sector has a quite 
straightforward firm structure (e.g. firm C in figure 6.2 above). But the type of event 
is likely to be less accurately captured for larger firms.
In the large firm sector, not only are M&As more complex, but the whole process of 
acquisition and assimilation might take more time. For example, an acquired large 
firm with many local units might continue to operate under its former name whilst it 
gradually re-organises and is restructured. Within the data, the event might be 
recorded with a delay, as the units that continue to operate under the old ownership 
will not register as experiencing a demographic event until after they have actually 
changed ownership fully.
The takeover variable is certainly not perfect and liable to be subject to some error. It 
perhaps does not pick-up all takeovers and for those it does, there is a chance that they 
are incorrectly labelled. One method that can be used to control for this measurement 
error is to instrument for takeover. Given the limited number of variables that I can 
use, I am unable to instrument for this. However, it is likely that the degree of error is 
random, reducing the need to instrument for measurement error76.
Earlier it is stated that the takeover variable - and the dataset more generally - is 
unable to identify acquiring firms and therefore it is not possible to identify a match
75 It assumed that large firms acquire small ones and not the other way round.
76 When using takeover as a dependent variable, any errors o f measurement still give unbiased 
estimates o f the parameters and their variances. However, the estimated variances will be larger than in 
the case without errors (Gujarati 2003).
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between the acquirer and the acquired. It is not possible to identify what the 
characteristics of acquiring firms are.
Measuring the total effect of acquisitions requires estimates on what happens to the 
acquired (e.g. exit, relocation, change in performance) and the effect on performance 
to the acquirer. In cases of asset stripping, the resources are not lost, more transferred 
from one firm to another. Therefore measuring the exit or change in performance of 
the acquired firm does not provide the full estimate of the effect as this also needs to 
include the change in performance of the acquirer which may result from the newly 
acquired assets. This is not possible with the data. It could be assumed that the effects 
of takeovers for acquirers is positive, at least on average, consistent with the theory of 
takeovers presented in the theory chapters. If acquisitions do not result in a positive 
change in productivity or profits, then rationally no takeovers would occur. Therefore 
without an estimate, it is possible to generate a plausible assumption of the direction 
of the effect from takeover to the acquired.
If it can be assumed that acquisitions are beneficial to acquirers and if it is found that 
the effects on acquisition targets from takeovers is to boost productivity, then it can be 
inferred that the total effect is positive. However, any relative defences between 
locations cannot be judged as it is not possible to identify the relative scale of the 
(assumed) positive effects on acquirers. If the effects from acquisition on targets are 
negative, then it is unknown what the total effect of SME acquisitions are as the scale 
of the (assumed) positive effects on acquirers is unidentified.
Similarly, without knowing the location of acquirers (and where those gains accrue), 
it is not possible to look at the relative gains (or losses) due to acquiring SMEs. The 
NEG theory and empirical evidence suggests that most large firms are located in the 
core area. NEG theory also suggests that there are incentives or processes that may 
mean that some takeovers are between locations, with most large acquirers based in 
the core. It is therefore probable that some acquisitions are between the core and 
periphery but this cannot be tested here. It is also not possible to estimate the relative 
gains or losses between locations as this also requires an estimation of the 
performance effects on acquirers as well as their location.
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Therefore only an assessment of the total impact on regional productivity from the 
targets of small firm acquisition can be estimated.
6.6.3 Exits
Measuring firm exits is problematic as it can depend on how the data is compiled. In 
the UK, a major source on small business stems from VAT records. It is therefore 
possible to lose a firm and conclude it has ‘exited’ if  it is no longer ‘VATable’. This 
can happen if the firm has fallen below a given threshold size or it operates within 
sectors that are exempt from VAT. If an enterprise is below the threshold for more 
than one year in the IDBR, it is declared dead and if it creeps above the threshold in 
the future it is given a new enterprise reference number and treated as a new 
enterprise. As I am unable to identify this form of ‘exit’ from the data, I simply have 
to be mindful that some of the exits I subsequently record might be due to firms 
falling below the relevant size thresholds for inclusion. Like many empirical studies, 
it is likely that when measuring an exit from the data it is an economic one that is 
trying to be explained.
In an economic sense, exits occur when the revenue of a firm is inadequate to cover 
costs, and credit is exhausted. If the price a firm receives is less than its average total 
cost; the firm is generating no normal profit, then in the medium - to long-term, the 
firm will exit. Here exit means a firm disappears from the market. Firms may exit a 
market but survive as a business entity by transferring production to an alternative 
market. A significant share of ‘exits’ accord with this in Dunne et al (2005). More 
recent concern with productivity has implied an exit involves a cease in production.
A legal exit is not necessarily associated with firm failure, losses and inefficiency. A 
legal exit may occur for many reasons. For example, when a firm changes its name or 
ownership but continues production in the same market. Only one-third of businesses 
are judged to have closed under circumstances that the owners’ termed as 
unsuccessful (Headd 2003). For small firms, exit might be a sign of success; 
managing to cash-in their assets for more liquid forms of capital. A limited 
distinction exists within the industrial organisation literature of the negative aspects of 
small firm failure and exits (Bates 2005). Empirically, bankruptcy-exits are found to
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be different from other forms of exit77 (Schary 1991). Therefore closure does not 
necessarily mean failure for all firms.
Small business exits are also linked to entrepreneurial exits. Entrepreneurial exit 
might be particularly relevant for small firm dynamics, where the prospects of the 
firm are more entwined with the owner. Business owners or entrepreneurs may 
choose alternative employment. Seemingly successful and productive firms may also 
exit due the firm owner or entrepreneur choosing to voluntarily exit due to personal or 
non-business reasons (Everett and Watson 1998). For example, small firms and 
entrepreneurs may exit or discontinue due to succession problems78.
Effectively owners or entrepreneurs can continue, sell-up, liquidate (voluntarily) or be 
declared bankrupt. This thesis is most interested in firm exits and the loss of a 
productive unit. I do not consider exits that may relate to entrepreneurs but 
acknowledge that some firm exits might be caused by these reasons.
It is important that I only count an exit when it is an economic exit. I deem this to 
mean when a business is no longer producing valuable output or not using any 
resources. I identify an exit when a firm is no longer registered, registered as inactive, 
or is no longer registering any positive turnover or employment in the dataset79. If a 
firm keeps trading but is sold, changes its name or moves production to an alternative 
market, this does not result in deregistration and so is not identified as an exit. Exits 
(and takeover events) are identified using the unique reference number for the firm. 
This does not relate to the name of the unit. If a firm ceases to be eligible for VAT or 
PAYE then this reference number becomes obsolete and the firm exits the register and 
therefore my sample.
6.6.4 Size and structure
77 Bankruptcies can be weakly explained by the firm’s characteristics but not other exits such as 
mergers and voluntary liquidations. However, this comes with a caveat o f being found within a 
declining industry that may generate some perverse results.
78 Exits are found to increase with the age o f a firm when this is connected with the retirement age o f  
the owner-manager (Martin et al. 2002; Santarelli and Lotti 2005).
79 Over time firms will change their turnover and employment. I do not omit firms if  they grow to 
become non-SMEs. SMEs are measured acpording to their status in 2004 or, in my alternative sample, 
2001 .
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Employment is the total number o f paid full and part time workers including any 
working proprietors. I also use the structure of the firm and this can also be thought of 
as a measure of scale. This is the number of local units within the enterprise. It is 
measured as the logarithm of the number o f local units. The entity o f the firm is also 
captured, whether a firm is registered as a sole proprietor, partnership or company80.
6.6.5 Location and age
The Government Office Regions (GOR) is used to identify the region o f firms. I also 
create three different locations within Great Britain on the basis of GVA per capita 
data (see tables A6.1 and A6.2 in the appendix). The first is the ‘core’ location, the 
South East and London, with the highest output per head. The ‘mid-periphery’ 
contains the regions of East England, East Midlands, South West, West Midlands and 
Scotland, with intermediate ranking for output per head. Lastly, the ‘periphery’ 
contains Wales, North East, North West and Yorkshire and the Humber. These are the 
British regions with the lowest rank for GVA per capita.
6.6.6 Relocation
Relocation is identified when the SME is no longer registered in its originally 
recorded region (GOR) but is still active and has not exited, as defined above. It is 
assumed that the whole firm (including its employees -  although these may not be the 
same ones) move to the new location. In the case of takeover-relocations, it might be 
the case that the firm’s name changes but it can still be identified as the firm is not 
tracked by its name.
6.6.7 Age
Age is not a continuous variable but a set of dummy variables grouping ages together. 
This is because the birth of the firm is not captured in the IDBR as a pure continuous 
variable as many firms (around 7 percent) appear to be bom in 1973, perhaps when 
the data was first collected. In the proceeding years hardly any births exist; in 1974
o  1
less than 1 percent of firms are bom, gradually increasing in more recent years .
80 The ‘company’ variable is unable to distinguish between whether is a privately or publicly limited 
company due to limitations o f the data. ,
81 It is only around 2001 that my sample has a birth rate equivalent to that recorded in 1973.
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The age groups are measured in 2004 and consist of 0 to 1 years, 2 to 4 years, 5 to 9 
years, 10 to 19 years and 20 years plus. Normally having dummies for a variable that 
can be estimated continuously is quite inefficient. Given that I have a very large 
sample size, I am not concerned about the increase in the degrees of freedom82. The 
recorded age is not strictly the real age of the firm. The age recorded is calculated 
from when the enterprise enters the IDBR and not when it first comes into existence.
It can be the case that an enterprise trades for a number of years below the VAT 
threshold and does not elect to voluntarily register. Therefore the variable derived 
from birth year is not strictly capturing the age of the firm. However, I use this 
variable as a proxy for the enterprise’s ‘true’ age.
6.6.8 Industry
Industry is measured at the 2-digit group level according to the UK SIC 1992. It 
consists of 49 different sectors, spanning the primary sector, manufacturing and 
service industries.
There is no distinction between new emerging industries and sectors. However, part 
of the takeover process might involve the acquisition of high performance ventures of 
which some firm might be shaken out of the market if they were to continue 
independently. This is consistent with previously cited theory, where firms in more 
mature industries, with lower growth rates and less competition, are more likely to be 
acquired if they have lower productivity but the reverse for firms in newer industries 
(Vernon, 1966 in Harris and Robinson 2002, p. 563). One o f the main problems in 
trying to identify new and emerging industries are, by their very definition, usually 
not defined suitably in SIC codes (version 1992 used here) as their definition is yet to 
be frilly established. This means that most dynamic and new sectors are unable to be 
suitably identified, masked by older industries.
Although I am partially interested in this ‘shake-out’ process, it is the aggregate effect 
of takeovers and its effect on regional economies that is the motivation of this thesis. 
Analysis of a single, perhaps small, sector will not provide much insight to this, more
82 In theory I could have estimated separate dummies for nearly all o f the ages, but still I do need to 
take into consideration the number o f dependent observations when I measure rare events such as 
takeovers.
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fulfilling only in an industrial economics focus of takeovers. Although a significant 
issue for takeovers, this is perhaps beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.7 Final Sample and SME Summary Statistics
The data used is a cross-section of British SMEs from 2004. Once some exclusion 
restrictions are applied, it consists of just less than 1.9 million observations at the 
enterprise level. All o f the observations have employment of at least one (including 
working proprietors) and positive turnover. Productivity is measured by RLP. The 
relative measure of productivity should capture industry differences in the 
intensiveness of intermediate goods and capital. Next I provide some descriptive 
statistics of the data set.
The table 6.1 below shows the percentage of registered takeovers in the data. There 
are around twelve and half thousand takeovers within the sample. This equates to 0.66 
percent of SMEs.
Table 6.1 -  SME Takeover by Productivity
Total no. of 
SMEs (2004)
Total no. of 
takeovers (in 2005) 
of 2004 sample
Acquired SMEs (in 
2005) as percentage 
of SME sample 
(2004)
1,897,288 12,504 0.66%
Source: ONS
Table 6.2 shows the size distribution of firms within my SME sample. Over a third of 
my sample is made up o f firms with only one employee. These are likely to be owner- 
managers. A further quarter of the sample is made up of firms with employment of 
two. Most of the sample, around 90 percent is made up of micro firms, those with 
employment of less than ten employees. Medium sized firms, those with 50 or more 
employees makes up around 1.5 percent of the sample.
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Table 6.2 — SME Size Distribution
Employment Frequency
Percentage 
of sample
1 682,235 36.0%
2 481,209 25.4%
3 198,272 10.5%
4 ' 125,964 6.6%
5-9 232,137 12.2%
10-19 96,527 5.1%
20-49 54,868 2.9%
50-259 26,076 1.4%
Total 1,897,288 100%
Source: ONS
Despite the sample being primarily made up of micro businesses, takeovers (in 2005) 
occur across the entire size distribution. Table 6.3 shows takeovers across the size 
distribution of the SME sample. For single employee firms, over 2,500 takeovers 
were registered. This equates to a rate of around 0.4 percent but over a fifth of the 
total number of takeovers in my sample. Similarly for firms sized 2 to 4 employees, 
only; around 0.4 percent of firms are acquired but this size band contributes over a 
quarter (26.5 percent) of the takeovers in my sample. Firms in the 10 to 49 
employment size band contribute around another quarter of takeovers, with an 
incidence rate of 2.2 percent. The highest chances of takeover at 4.5 percent are for 
those in the medium sized category, 50 to 249 employees. This category contributes 
less than 10 percent of all the takeovers in my sample.
Firms with employment less than 5 contribute nearly half of my observed takeovers 
and micros; firms with employment less than 10, contribute nearly two-thirds of all 
the takeovers in my sample. The removal of the smallest firms would therefore 
remove information on the process of SME acquisitions and their potential effects on 
regional development. Due to the high absolute number of observed takeovers with 
small firms in my sample, I keep these businesses in all of the subsequent estimations.
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Table 6.3 - SME Takeover incidence by size
Employment Takeover
Percent of takeovers 
within size band
Percentage of 
takeover total Total
1 2,611 0.38% 20.9% 682,235
2-4 .  3,311 0.41% 26.5% 805,445
5-9 2,120 0.91% 17.0% 232,137
10-49 3,294 2.18% 26.3% 151,395
50-249 1,168 4.48% 9.3% 26,076
Total 12,504 0.66% 100.0% 1,897,288
Source: ONS
To examine the spatial distribution o f SMEs, I use the regions of Britain and create 
three different locations; the core, mid-periphery and periphery. The periphery has 
467,893 SMEs (24.7 percent) of the total sample. Out of this, Wales has 85,661 SMEs 
(4.5 percent) of the sample. The mid periphery has 807,875 SMEs (42.6 percent) and 
the core 621,520 (32.8 percent) of the SME sample.
Table 6.4 - SME Location
Location (2004) N %
Periphery 467,893 24.7%
Wales 85,661 4.5%
N. East 50,117 2.6%
York. & Hum. 140,990 7.4%
N. West 191,125 10.1%
Mid-periphery 807,875 42.6%
W. Mid. 160,339 8.5%
E. Mid. 134,121 7.1%
S. West 185,228 9.8%
Scot. 131,365 6.9%
E. Eng. 196,822 10.4%
Core 621,520 32.8%
S. East 324,909 17.1%
London 296,611 15.6%
Total 1,897,288 100%
Source: ONS
The next table shows the age distribution of the sample. The youngest SMEs, those 
aged 0 to 1 year constitute around 13 percent of the sample. Around a quarter of the 
sample is aged between 2 and 4 years old. Over a fifth of the sample (22.4 percent) is 
aged between 5 and 9 years old. Therefore around 60 percent of the SME sample is 
less than 10 years old. Just under a quarter of the sample (23.7 percent) is aged 10 to
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19 years and a further 16 percent is 20 years or older.
Table 6.5-SM E Age
Age (in 2004) N %
Age 0 to 1 251,667 13.3%
Age 2 to 4 470,247 24.8%
Age 5 to 9 425,463 22.4%
Age 10 to 19 448,731 23.7%
20+ years 301,180 15.9%
Total 1,897,288 100%
Source: ONS
Most SMEs in the sample are companies (either public or privately held); over 50 
percent (967,787). Sole proprietors (591,858) make up the next significant proportion, 
over 31 percent of the sample and Partnerships (337,643) just fewer than 18 percent.
Table 6.6 -  SME Firm Type
Firm type N %
Company 967,787 51.0%
Partnership 337,643 17.8%
Sole proprietor 591,858 31.2%
Total 1,897,288 100%
Source: ONS
Table 6.7 shows the frequency and percentage of SMEs in my sample by broad 
industry sector, according to the UK SIC 1992 classification. The largest broad sector 
in my sample is Real estate, renting and business activities at just under a third (30.1 
percent) of my sample. Next is Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods at just under a fifth (20.4 percent) of 
my sample. The smallest sectors are Electricity, gas and water supply (0.02 percent) 
and Mining and quarrying (0.05 percent). The primary sectors of Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry and Fishing contribute around 7 percent of the total sample.
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Table 6.7 -  SMEs by Industry
Industry Frequency
Percentage 
of sample
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 136,243 7.18%
Fishing 3,670 0.19%
Mining and quarrying 972 0.05%
Manufacturing 157,103 8.28%
Electricity, gas and water supply 430 0.02%
Construction 212,483 11.20%
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods 386,126 20.35%
Hotels and restaurants 134,493 7.09%
Transport, storage and communication 82,171 4.33%
Financial intermediation 22,962 1.21%
Real estate, renting and business activities 609,385 32.12%
Other community, social & personal service activities 151,250 7.97%
Total 1,897,288 100%
Source: ONS
The table 6.8 (below) shows relocations and exits (in 2006) across the regions of 
Great Britain. Over 23 percent (around 440,000) of the total 2004 sample exit by 
2006. Across the regions, the largest percentage of SMEs not surviving over the 
period 2004 to 2006 is London (26.4 percent) and the smallest is Wales (20.5 
percent).
Only around 1.5 percent of SMEs locate to another region over the period 2004 to 
2006. London has the largest percentage of SMEs relocating (2.9 percent) to another 
region, followed by the East of England and the South East (both 1.7 percent). 
Scotland has the smallest percentage of its SMEs relocating (0.4 percent), followed by 
Wales (0.8 percent or 643).
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Table 6.8 - SME relocation and exit frequencies by region
Region (2004)
No 
relocation 
or exit 
(2006)
Relocating
(2006)
% relocating 
(2006)
Exit
(2006)
% exiting 
(2006)
Total
(2004)
Wales 67,453 643 0.75% 17,565 20.5% 85,661
N. East ~ 37,777 431 0.86% 11,909 23.8% 50,117
York. & Hum. 107,658 1,366 0.97% 31,966 22.7% 140,990
N. West 144,796 1,787 0.93% 44,542 23.3% 191,125
W. Mid. 122,789 1,830 1.14% 35,720 22.3% 160,339
E. Mid. 101,855 1,891 1.41% 30,375 22.6% 134,121
S. West 142,975 2,106 1.14% 40,147 21.7% 185,228
Scot. 101,316 575 0.44% 29,474 22.4% 131,365
E. Eng. 149,744 3,431 1.74% 43,647 22.2% 196,822
S. East 243,532 5,503 1.69% 75,874 23.4% 324,909
London 209,719 8,596 2.90% 78,296 26.4% 296,611
Total 1,429,614 28,159 1.48% 439,515 23.2% 1,897,288
Source: ONS
6.8 Limitations
The data set, with its very large sample, allows for the use of econometric methods to 
be used to explore the role of takeovers and productivity with small businesses. 
However, there are a number of limitations with the data, many of which have already 
been described, that are summarised here.
First, there are a limited number of variables that can be used to explore takeovers and 
their potential effects. This may result in some potentially interesting and useful 
relationships not being explored. For example, the role of capital in the production 
function and therefore productivity and how this is affected after acquisition. Second, 
there is no information available about the acquirers. Therefore I am not able to 
estimate the effects on the buyers of SMEs or include where they are located; core or 
periphery. It can be assumed that these firms are relatively larger, as it is unlikely that 
a relatively small business purchases a larger one. Third, I am unable to provide a full 
description of what has occurred when a takeover occurs. In part this is intentional, 
the data and methods will allow me to assess what on average occurs with takeovers; 
which SMEs are targeted and what the effects are. The literature (see previous 
chapters) has been used to try and illustrate reasons and explanations for what is 
expected and observed. I do not attempt to look at the qualitative aspects of small firm 
takeovers. The motivation is to assess the potential effects that SME takeovers have 
on regional productivity. Further insight could then be provided from follow-up
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studies to try and understand why businesses are acquired with any possible 
differences across regions along with whether there are any differential effects across 
sectors (e.g. between new emerging industries and more established ones), but this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, analysis of the BSD enables small business takeovers to be identified and is 
an improvement on all existing data sources for this purpose. This means that the 
study presented is unique in showing the scale and analysing SME acquisitions in the 
Great Britain.
In the following chapters I will use this dataset and econometric methods to 
investigate: SME takeovers and their subsequent exit, relocation and performance 
effects. In the next chapter I investigate SME takeovers and identify what 
characteristics o f SMEs are more likely to be associated with takeovers. Specifically, I 
will test whether more productive SMEs are more likely to be acquired and if this is 
affected by location.
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Appendix
A6.1 The Annual Respondents Database
The more commonly used data set for firm level analysis is the Annual Respondents
Q A
Database (ARD) . The ARD has two types of coverage, ‘selected’ and ‘unselected’. 
The ‘selected’ ARD has information that is obtained from the Annual Business 
Inquiry (ABI), a stratified sample survey based on the IDBR. The ‘non-selected’ firms 
have essentially the same information available as the IDBR above.
The survey enables much more information to be known about firms in the UK than 
the simple information available from the IDBR, e.g. capital expenditure and value of 
intermediate goods. Small firms are only sampled every few years to ease their 
administrative burden. This results in small firms not filling out the form every year. 
Therefore small firms are deliberately unobserved between years regardless of 
whether they are still actively trading or not. This makes it unsuitable for analysing 
small firms as they are sampled on a small scale and not consistently tracked across 
years.
83 In studies using micro data, the ARD has been used to investigate topics such as the relationship 
between foreign ownership and productivity (Griffith et al. 2004), ownership effects at plant level and 
the effects on the probability o f  closure (Harris and Hassaszadeh 2002), comparing the performance o f  
acquired UK plants by the foreign-owned sector with other comparable o f  plants (Harris and Robinson
2002) and the analysis o f  the contribution of'internal' restructuring (changes in market share) and 
'external' restructuring (exit and entry) to productivity growth in UK manufacturing (Disney et al.
2003).
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A6.2 Tables
Table A6.1 -  Output per head by region
GVA per head  (2004) GVA per hour w orked (2004) GVA per filled job (2004)
W ales 79.1 Northern Ireland* 81.9 Northern Ireland* 85.8
North East 79.9 W ales 90.7 W ales 89.7
Northern Ireland* 80.2 Yorkshire & Humber 91.4 Yorkshire & Humber 90.2
Yorkshire & Humber 88.8 North W est 92.5 North W est 91.4
North W est 88.9 North East 93.6 North East 92.2
W est Midlands 91.2 W est Midlands 94.0 South W est 92.8
East Midlands 91.5 South W est 95.1 W est Midlands 94.6
South W est 92.9 Scotland 98.1 Scotland 96.8
Scotland 96.2 East Midlands 98.5 East Midlands 97.5
East 108.7 East 101.2 East 100.9
South East 116.1 South East 105.5 South East 104.2
London 132.1 London 118.8 London 124.7
UK 100 UK 100 UK 100
Source: ONS (2006b)
NB ‘Northern Ireland not included in the analysis
Table A6.2 -  Location classifications
Core M id-Periphery Periphery
South East East W ales
London East Midlands North East
South W est Yorkshire & Humber
W est Midlands North W est
Scotland
Chapter 7 - SME Takeovers
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 discusses why it might be profitable for a larger firm to acquire a smaller 
firm. It also explains the supply conditions necessary for an SME takeover, and that 
jointly with expected profitability determine takeover chances. Profitability is likely 
to be closely linked with relative productivity, so are more productive SMEs more 
likely to be acquired and does this effect increase in more peripheral regions? In this 
chapter I investigate the characteristics of SMEs that are associated with takeover. Of 
particular interest is the relationship o f productivity with the probability o f takeover 
and regional heterogeneity.
Using the BSD data, I find more productive SMEs have a higher likelihood of 
acquisition — unlike the existing evidence for relatively larger firms. Firms located in 
the core regions of Britain are also more likely to be acquired at all levels of (relative) 
labour productivity. The productivity findings are consistent across two years of 
takeover; 2002 and 2005, at different points of the stock market trend.
The chapter begins with a set of hypotheses established from the literature review that 
are tested in the data. Measurement and estimations problems are then discussed 
before the presentation of descriptive statistics of SME takeovers. The final section 
tests the hypotheses with multivariate analysis.
7.2 Hypotheses
In the literature review a number o f variables are discussed that may influence 
whether an SME might be taken-over. A number of hypotheses are formulated out of 
this literature. They are:
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1. When larger firms are looking for acquisitions to offset their inadequate 
‘intrapreneurship’, they create a demand for the more productive and innovative 
SMEs; their targets are more productive than the average.
2. Agglomeration triggers more intense local competition and better information 
flows in core regions and therefore a stronger demand to acquire SMEs than in the 
periphery. SMEs in the core are more likely to be taken over at all levels of 
productivity, whereas in peripheral locations the more productive are more likely to 
be bought.
3. Information about an SME is likely to be a function of age and size. The 
performance of the very young and small will be relatively less known to potential 
acquirers, so they will not be targets.
From these hypothesis and the availability of variables in the data set, the following 
relationship is formulated for firm i as;
+ + + +
Pr(Takeover,) = f(Prodj, Core, Periphery, Age,, Size;, Core*prodj,
+
Periphery*prodj)
Where ‘prod’ is productivity and ‘Pr’, probability
7.3 Descriptive Statistics
The first stage o f the analysis is to investigate the link between productivity and the 
probability o f takeover. Descriptive statistics are instructive of the possible 
relationships within the data. Statistics are presented that look at the chances of 
takeover by productivity, age and then location84.
Table 7.1 below shows the percentage of registered takeovers in the data by quartiles 
o f the productivity distribution. SMEs in the top quartile of productivity have the 
highest percentage of takeovers (0.91 percent), significantly different from the overall
84 For descriptives on SME takeover incidence by size see table 6.3 - chapter 6.
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sample percentage of takeover at the 99 percent level. This is over one third greater 
than for the entire sample.
The next highest percentage of takeovers is within the lowest quartile of (relative) 
productivity (0.63 percent). This suggests a form of j-curve relationship between SME 
productivity and the chance of acquisition. The lowest probabilities are for small 
businesses with performance around the average; higher probabilities for those at each 
end of the productivity distribution, with the most production having the highest 
chances of takeover.
Table 7.1 - Takeover (2005) by Productivity
Quartile of 
RLP
Percent of 
takeovers within 
each quartile
1st quartile (top) 0.91%***
2nd quartile 0.55%***
3rd quartile 0.54%***
4th quartile (bottom) 0.63%**
Total 0.66%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Sample size 1,897,288
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 7.2, below, shows the percentage of takeovers by the age o f the SME. Without 
controlling for any other factors, SMEs between 10 to 19 years old have the highest 
percentage of takeovers (0.81 percent). The youngest firms are least likely to be taken 
over. These are all statistically different from the average percentage of chances of 
takeover across the whole sample at the 99 percent level. Only those firms aged 20 
years or more have a probability that, statistically, does not differ from the sample 
average.
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Table 7.2 - Takeover (2005) by Age
Age (years)
Percent of 
takeovers within 
each age category
0 to  1 0.45%***
2 to 4 0.57%***
5 to 9 0.72%***
10 to 19 0.81%***
20 plus 0.67%
All ages 0.66%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Sample size 1,897,288
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
To examine the spatial distribution of takeovers, I use the regions of Britain and 
create three different locations; the core, mid-periphery and periphery. Table 7.3 
shows that all locations (including core-periphery variables) have a percentage of 
takeovers that are statistically different from the sample average at the 99 percent 
level, except for the South East and East England.
The highest percentage of SMEs subject to takeovers is in the ‘core’ (0.89 percent). 
Within the core, London has the highest percentage of takeovers (1.14 percent). The 
location with the next highest is the ‘mid-periphery’ (0.56 percent). Within this 
location the West Midlands has the highest percentage of takeovers (0.61 percent) and 
the South West the lowest (0.44 percent). The location with the lowest percentage is 
the ‘periphery’ (0.53 percent). Within this location, Wales is found to have the lowest 
percentage of takeovers (0.36 percent) and Yorkshire and Humberside the highest 
(0.59 percent).
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Table 7.3 - Takeover (2005) by Location
Takeover Percent of takeovers
Location 2004 freq. within each location
Periphery 2,459 0.53%***
Wales 308 0.36%***
N. East 222 0.44%***
York. & Hum. 834 0.59%***
N. West 1,095 0.57%***
M id-periphery 4,488 0.56%***
W. Mid. 974 0.61%**
E. Mid. 709 0.53%***
S. West 819 0.44%***
Scot. 741 0.56%***
E. Eng. 1,245 0.63%*
Core 5,557 0.89%***
S. East 2,174 0.67%
London 3,383 1.14%***
Total 12,504 0.66%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
7.4 Multivariate Estimation
An empirical model is specified that allows tests o f the hypotheses about the 
determinants o f SME takeovers. The model below shows the estimation equation, 
where Pr is probability, Y = 1 if takeover has occurred.
P r ( T j )  = ao + otiprodj + o^sizej + <X3locationj + o^agej + asindustryj + aeEntityi + 
ct7Structurej + as prodj*locationj + u* (1)
The dependent variable in this is a binary variable -  whether an SME has been 
acquired or not. A linear probability model can be estimated with OLS. However, the 
linear probability model is not suitable for the analysis o f most binary dependent 
variables, as the estimation does not constrain the resulting probability of a positive 
outcome (takeover) to be bounded within 0 and 1 (Greene 2003). Two common 
binary variable estimators are logistic and probit85. To estimate the probability of the 
categorical variable of takeover equalling one (in year t) a probit model is used with 
(Huber-White) robust standard errors to produce heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors86. The model is estimated with Stata version 9. Probit is chosen in preference to
85 The choice o f  estimator between these two matters for this analysis because the tails differ between 
these two functions and the dependent variable is a rare event.
86 In probit (and logit) models, heteroskedasticity causes problems to the conditional means and not just
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the logistic form as the log-likelihood for former is slightly higher (less negative) 
when compared to the same model estimated via the latter (not shown)87.
The descriptive statistics show that it is not common for an enterprise to be acquired. 
Modelling takeovers can be considered a form of rare event. Recent work on rare 
event studies (King and Zeng 2001) has shown that the resulting estimates of event 
probabilities can be too small with standard categorical regression methods. It is 
shown that;
‘logit analysis is suboptimal in finite samples of rare events data, leading to errors in 
the same direction as biases in the coefficients' (King and Zeng 2001, p. 138).
A trade-off exists between the probability of rare events and the sample size but ‘no 
sample size is large enough to evade finite sample problems if  the events are 
sufficiently rare* (King and Zeng 2001, p. 153). I have a very large sample and do not 
expect to suffer from bias caused by estimating a rare event. For robustness, I also 
estimate the model (below) by relogit (Tomz et al. 1999), comparing it to the logit and 
probit estimations. The results o f this are shown in the appendix table A7.3. As 
expected, I do not find any qualitative differences between the models. However, all 
o f the models under predict takeovers relative to the observed percentage of 
takeovers. The rare event logit performs better than the normal logit in terms of 
prediction but the probit model performs better than both o f the logit models.
7.4.1 Simultaneity
Regressors may affect the dependent variable (takeover) but the latter may also affect 
the independent variable. First, productivity is an attribute acquirers perhaps seek in a 
target. Second, takeovers can lead to a change in productivity. Takeovers can have a 
two-way association with productivity, potentially causing simultaneity.
It is possible to specify the model as either;
the conditional variances (Greene 2003). This can result in inconsistent coefficient estimates. Using a 
robust option to compute standard errors does not deal with this. An alternative solution is to use a 
heteroskedastic consistent probit estimator. For sensitivity, this is also estimated within Stata (hetprob) 
and little qualitative differences occur between the normal probit model and the heteroskedastic 
consistent estimator.
87 As recommended by Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
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T = f(Prod) or, 
Prod = f(T)
A form of endogeneity is present and productivity might be correlated with the error 
term;
Tj -  cLoXj + a\Prodj + w,
Prodi = yoXj +  y \ T j  +  Zj 
Solving for Prodi (assuming that 1- aiyi ^  0),
Prodi = (Yo + Yiao)/(l -  aiyi)x,+ 1/(1 - aiyi)z, + yi/(l - aiyi)w,
Assuming that xt and z, are uncorrelated with Uj, or pxU = Pzu = 0;
E(Prodj ud = yi /  (1 - a i  yi) E(w, «,) ^  0
If estimated by OLS (ignoring that T is binary for now) then this can create 
inconsistent estimates. However, this ignores the temporal aspect. It is highly likely 
that the effect of takeover on productivity will only occur in subsequent periods; 
Prodt+n = f(Tt)
and prior productivity may influence subsequent takeover;
Tt = f(Prodt.„)
More formally;
Tu = OLoXu.n + a i Prodit.n + uit
P r o d n + n  ~  y o X it + yi T u  Zit+n
So (Prodit+n Uit)  -  o
Similarly, other variables such as size and location could be affected by takeover. 
Intuition also exists on the meaning of these lagged values; how productive an SME is 
prior to takeover. The interest at this stage does not concern productivity during or 
after the takeover.
(lb)
(2b)
(la)
(2a)
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It is possible that the use of lagged variables, such as productivity, might not be 
independent of subsequent takeover for a few reasons. First, firms might be expecting 
to be bought or acquired; this might produce changes to pre-acquisition productivity, 
e.g. an ‘Ashenfelter dip*. However, it might be just as likely that nothing changes 
until new owners are in place, even if the acquisition is expected. The literature 
review also documents that there is no effect such as the ‘Ashenfelter dip’, or 
alternatively a rise in performance pre-acquisition, found in any o f the existing 
empirical studies.
Second, some acquisitions might be quite protracted affairs and not formally 
announced or registered in the data until after changes have occurred to the firm. This 
effect could also be due to a delay in the data recognising a change in ownership 
despite it already having an effect upon the firm’s output or inputs, and therefore 
productivity. For an SME, these possibilities are reduced. For example, with a large 
company the trading name of a company (and therefore other facets of the firm) might 
not change for a number of years whilst the company is being restructured88. With 
smaller firms, the structure is simpler and they are unlikely to experience protracted 
changes in ownership.
Therefore all o f  the explanatory variables, such as productivity, size and location, are 
measured one period prior to takeover so that acquisition cannot affect these89. As 
explained above, for SMEs this is a reasonable assumption. Variables are measured in 
the year t-1 (2004) preceding takeover (2005). The interpretation of the variables is 
the same as productivity; they display the attributes of the firm that explain 
acquisition in a subsequent period.
7.4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
Relevant regressors that are not included but correlated with an included one give rise 
to omitted variable bias. For causal interpretation of the model, relevant unobserved 
factors are particularly problematic. Unobserved components of the model that are
88 This is partially explained in the data chapter (6) regarding the measurement o f  takeovers.
89 Some o f  the variables may not change due to takeover, such as age, but these are also measured at 
time t-1.
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correlated with existing regressors are known as unobserved heterogeneity (Verbeek 
2008).
Firms are likely to differ in many aspects that are not observed. If unobserved 
variables are correlated with productivity, then the cause of takeovers may be driven 
by this unobserved factor and not productivity; for example, research and 
development (R) good management (M).
From equation 1 it is likely that;
U i = f ( R ,  M , . . . . )
but it is also likely that;
Prod = f(R+, M +,......)
Estimation of 1 assumes Uj independent of other regressors (e.g. Prod). But the above 
indicates that the unobserved factors (R and M) are related to productivity. Therefore 
not controlling for these unobserved factors might, on one interpretation, upwardly 
bias the observed productivity effect on the probability o f takeover90. It is likely that 
productivity will be caused by unobserved variables such as management and R&D 
success, among other factors, which are likely in themselves to increase the 
desirability o f an acquisition. However, the choice of variables included is ultimately 
dictated by the data and whether it is available for at least the majority o f the observed 
SMEs. I return to this issue in later chapters when investigating the effects of takeover 
on the subsequent exit and its effects on performance.
7.4.3 Estimated equation
The model below shows the estimation equation, where Pr is probability, Yt = 1 if 
takeover has taken place in year t (2005) and 0(.) is the distribution function;
Pr(Yt= l) = O(<xo + ailn(RLPt-i) + ct2 Entityt.i + o^Aget-i + ajndustryt-i +
90 One method that can potentially reduce this are fixed effects within a panel. Fixed effects remove 
unobserved characteristics that do not change across time, i.e. time invariant components o f  Uj. 
However, the use o f  a panel is not possible with this sample o f  SMEs. Also, this does not resolve the 
problems i f  any o f the characteristics are time variant. For example, R&D and management could 
change between years.
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asLocationt-i + agEmploymentt-i + a 7 Structuret-i + agLocationt.i *ln(RLPt-i) + 
a9ln(RLPt.i)2 + aioEmploymentt-i2 + anEmploymentt.i3 anEmploymentt-i4 + Uj) (lc)
The productivity variables (InRLP and ln(RLP)sq) allow for non-linearities in the 
productivity-takeover relationship. ‘Employment’ measures the effects of size on the 
chances of takeover and has polynomials (Employment^2, Employment^3 and 
Employments4) to best fit for non-linearity in the relationship. ‘Entity’ measures 
whether a firm is registered as a sole proprietor (omitted case), partnership or 
company. ‘Age’ is measured in 2004 and is a set of dummy variables grouping ages 
together91. The groups are; up to 2 years, (omitted case), 2 to 4 years, 5 to 9 years, 10 
to 19 years and 20 years and over92. ‘Industry’ is a set of dummies (49 in total) for 
each 2-digit UK SIC 1992. ‘Location’ identifies whether the SME is located in the 
‘core’ (omitted case), mid-periphery or periphery of Great Britain. ‘Structure’, 
controls for SMEs that may have multiple local units and is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of local units.
Hypothesis 1 is the demand for SME corporate control involves the more productive 
and innovative businesses (oci>0) - targets are more productive than the average, ag 
tests whether high productivity firms in the periphery are more prone to takeover; 
hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 is that the market value o f innovative SMEs only becomes 
apparent when they have accumulated a track record, and therefore so does the 
chances o f takeover (ct3>0 ).
7.5 Results
The results from the takeover equations for the full sample are shown in table 7.4. The 
model equations are also estimated with a sample without the primary and real estate 
activities sectors (table 7.4). I remove the primary sector because the data might be 
less accurate and in any case it is likely to be atypical. Real estate activities are 
omitted following the recommendations of Daffin and Lau (2002) that measuring
91 Measured age is not strictly the true age o f  the firm. It is the age when the enterprise enters the 
IDBR. An enterprise might have been trading for a number o f  years below the VAT threshold, and not 
electing to register, prior to crossing the VAT threshold. A disproportionate number o f  firms in the 
BSD are recorded as bom in 1973.
92 Introducing dummies for a variable that can be estimated continuously is inefficient, but in view o f  
the very large sample size I do not need to be concerned about the reduction in the degrees o f  freedom.
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productivity but omitting capital may not be suitable for this sector. For brevity, the 
industry controls are not presented in any of the multivariate regressions as they are of 
lesser interest here. The majority o f the industry effects are found to be significant.
The (McFadden’s) pseudo r-squared statistics indicate a poor ‘goodness’ of fit for 
each model93. A low explanatory power of takeover models is fairly common for this 
type of estimation in the literature (see Alcalde and Espitia 2003; Palepu 1986; Powell 
1997). In tables 7.4 and 7.5, both the productivity measure and its square are 
significant and positive. This indicates that after controlling for factors such as the 
age, size and industry o f the SME, the probability o f takeover increases with the 
SME’s (relative) productivity, in accordance with hypothesis 1.
93 Pseudo R2 statistics are only guide and are not deemed to be very reliable. It is also suggested that 
these should be removed from write-ups and reports (Sribney 1997b).
Table 7.4 — SME takeover (2005) probit results -  full SME sample
Variable C oefficient Marginal e ffec t Mean value
Takeover (dependent variable) - - 0.0066
Ln(RLP) 0.0914*** 0.000543 -0.5353
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0201*** 0.000119 1.2303
Ln(local unit) -0.1474*** -0.00088 0.0228
Employment 0.0433*** 0.000257 5.2
E m ploym ents -0.0007*** -4.09E -06 220.2
E m ploym ents 4.2E-06*** 2.47E-08 27284.8
E m ploym ents -8.3E-09*** -4.90E -11 4538466
Age 2 to 4 0.1099*** 0.00071 0.2479
Age 5 to 9 0.1602*** 0.001089 0.2242
Age 10 to 19 0.1593*** 0.001076 0.2365
20+ years 0.1081*** 0.000717 0.1587
Company 0.9621*** 0.007216 0.5101
Partnership -0.0704** -0 .00039 0.1780
Mid-periphery -0.0858*** -0.0005 0.4258
Periphery -0.1011*** -0 .00056 0.2466
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0024 1.44E-05 0.0066
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0196** 0.000117 -0.5353
Industry controls Y -
N 1,897,288
Pseudo R2 0.15
Predicted takeover (at sam ple n nm fi?
average)
Log-likelihood -63,810
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
NB constants removed. Marginal effects estimated at sample average. 
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Table 7.5 -  SME takeover (2005) probit results -  SME sample without primary
sector and real estate activities
Variable C oefficient Marginal e ffe c t Mean value
Takeover (dependent variable) - - 0.0065
Ln(RLP) 0.0952*** 0.000625 -0.5152
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0214*** 0.000141 1.1341
Ln(local unit) -0.1360*** -0.00089 0.0242
Employment 0.0439*** 0.000288 5.4395
E m ploym ents -0.0007*** -4.60E -06 240.32
E m ploym ents 4.2E-06*** 2.77E-08 29944.7
E m ploym ents -8.4E-09*** -5.51 E-11 5.E+06
Age 2 to 4 0.1340*** 0.000971 0.2616
A ge 5 to 9 0.1930*** 0.001492 0.2270
A ge 10 to 19 0.1910*** 0 .001462 0.2393
20+ years 0.1300*** 0 .000986 0.1315
Company 0.9310*** 0 .007154 0.5326
Partnership -0.0503 -0.00031 0.1536
Mid-periphery -0.0855*** -0 .00055 0.4150
Periphery -0.0973*** -0.0006 0.2422
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) -0.0005 -3.08E -06 -0.2260
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0190** 0.000125 -0.1317
Industry controls Y -
N 1,676,588
Pseudo R2 0.15
Predicted takeover (at sam ple n
average)
Log-likelihood -56 ,180
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
NB constants removed. Marginal effects estimated at sample average.
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
The dummies for both locations are statistically significant and negative. This 
indicates that SMEs located outside the ‘core’ (London and the South East - the 
omitted location), are less likely to be taken over. However, peripheral locations 
appear to have statistically significant interactions with productivity. In figure 7.1 the 
predicted probabilities are computed at the sample averages94 of the full sample’s 
estimates. The probabilities are computed for each location across a range of values 
for productivity to allow the full effects of the location-productivity variables to be 
appreciated. These predicted probabilities show the differences between locations’ 
probabilities of takeover across productivity, after controlling for variables such as 
sector, age and size.
94 Where multiplicative dummies are used the computed means are not used but the product o f  the two 
mean values o f  the variables.
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Figure 7.1 -  Predicted Probability of Takeover by Location and Productivity
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PeripheryCore
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Estimated at the sample average 
The values shown in table A7.2
The figure shows the already-discussed positive relationship with productivity and the 
predicted probability o f  takeover, consistent with a search for synergies and 
compensating for ‘intrapreneurship’ shortages (hypothesis 1) but the location 
variations are instructive as well. Across the entire range o f productivity shown,
SMEs in the ‘core’ have the highest probability o f acquisition, significantly different 
from both the other locations. This result is consistent with a greater intensity o f 
competition or readier access to finance in the core -  hypothesis 2. The ‘mid­
periphery’ has the next highest probability, but the evidence suggests that this might 
be surpassed by SMEs in the periphery at the very high end o f  the productivity 
distribution.
Turning to the role o f size in acquisition chances, larger SMEs generally have an 
increased likelihood o f acquisition — consistent with hypothesis 3. Employment has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability o f takeover but this is not 
straightforward as polynomials o f  size are also significant and vary in sign. Figure 7.2 
shows the predicted probability o f  takeover with the distribution o f SME employment 
size from the full sample’s estimates (table 7.4). The linear trend line confirms the 
generally positive relationship o f size with probability o f  takeover. However, at the
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top o f the distribution, the chances o f  takeover fall and the highest likelihood o f 
acquisition is for firms w ith around 200 em ployees w ith a 2.5 percent predicted 
probability. Perhaps beyond this size, the relative cost o f  absorption become so large 
that they put o ff some potential suitors, as few er firm s are o f  a sufficient size 
themselves to be able to acquire relatively larger SM Es. However, the results suggest 
that even the largest SMEs have a higher predicted probability o f  takeover than 
micros (businesses w ith em ploym ent o f less than 10).
Figure 7.2 -  Predicted probability of takeover by size
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E m ploym ent
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Estimated at the sample average
Another variable that may also pick up some o f  the effects o f  size is the num ber o f 
plants - ln(local units). This variable is significant and negative indicating the more 
plants an SM E has the less likely it is to be acquired.
The estim ates in table 7.4 and 7.5 show age effects that are broadly consistent with 
older SMEs being more likely to be acquired. The predicted probabilities o f  takeover 
are shown for each age category in table 7.6. SM Es aged between 5 and 19 years have 
the highest probability (0.21 percent) o f being acquired. The youngest age category (0 
to 1 year) is found to have the lowest probability o f  takeover (0.13 percent), even 
lower than those aged 20 years or older (0.18 percent). This is consistent with 
hypothesis 3, that age (along with size) is a (positive) function o f  information on 
targets.
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Table 7.6 -  Predicted probability of takeover by age
A ge (years)
Predicted
probability
Marginal
effects*
Under 2 0.127% -
Age 2 to 4 0.181% 0.05%
Age 5 to 9 0.213% 0.09%
Age 10 to 19 0.212% 0.09%
20 years and over 0.180% 0.05%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
N6 Estimated at the sample average 
*Relative to the base case -  under 2 years
7.5.1 Takeover-productivity relationship further explored
The summary statistics of the productivity distribution and takeover suggest a 
possible j -  curve type relationship, or at least a nonlinear one. The most productive 
had the highest chance of takeover followed by the least productive and SMEs with 
around average productivity had the lowest probability o f takeover. These summary 
statistics did not control for any other effects (e.g. size, sector95).
Relative productivity was estimated with its square to try and capture any possible 
non-linear effects. Both of these variables are found to be significant, suggesting that 
a non-linear relationship exists between SME productivity and the chances of 
takeover figure 7.1 broadly confirms this with a positive, and increasing gradient with 
the relationship of productivity and the predicted probability o f takeover. To further 
explore this, the model was estimated on the sample split by the productivity 
distribution: the bottom 25 percent of productivity, 25 to 50 percent o f productivity, 
50 to 75 percent of productivity and the top 75 percent. The results of these 
regressions are shown in table A7.4.
Looking across the 4 sets of results for the distribution, most of the relationships, at 
least qualitatively, remain as per the full sample. The main difference from the full 
sample results is that productivity is now insignificant except with the top quartile, 
where it is positive but decreasingly (the square of productivity is significant but 
small and negative). It is likely that by splitting the data by productivity, any 
significant variation in the probability of takeover occurs between the splits and now
95 Sector effects are controlled for in terms o f productivity but not for its effect upon the probability o f  
takeover.
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may be reflected in the constants of the estimations. The estimates for the predicted 
takeover (taken at each sample’s average) suggest this might be the case, as they 
appear to differ across the sample splits. The highest predicted probability at the 
sample average is at the top end of productivity, followed by the bottom end of the 
distribution. The middle two splits of the distribution have similar predicted 
probabilities of takeover but are lower than both the top and bottom ends.
The figure (7.3) below displays the predicted probabilities of takeover from the four 
models estimated across the productivity distribution. For the bottom three quartiles, 
the average values are plotted as productivity has no additional effect. However, for 
the top quartile, productivity does have an effect. To reflect this, values are computed 
with the different levels of productivity from the top quartile. Figure 7.3 has the 
resulting values plotted. The first three plotted values come from the bottom three 
quarters of the productivity distribution, with predicted probabilities estimated at each 
estimated sample’s averages. The last two values come from the last model; the top of 
the distribution, but with varying levels o f productivity now altering the predicted 
probability. The result is that the relationship of takeover with productivity now 
appears to be j-curved. SMEs with low productivity are more likely to be acquired 
than those with around average, but SMEs at the top end of productivity have the 
highest probability of being acquired.
For large firms, the literature suggests that less productive firms are targeted. For 
SMEs, the most productive have the highest chances of being acquired but those with 
low productivity are also an attractive investment, at least relative to median or 
average level SME performers.
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Figure 7.3 - Predicted probability of takeover by productivity distribution
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Productivity distribution
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
NB Estimated at the total sample averages. The plotted 10% point is from the 0-25 
productivity distribution model, the plotted 25% (bottom) point is from 25-50% productivity 
distribution model, the 50% point is from the 50-75% productivity distribution model and the 
75% and 90% plots are from the 75-100% (top) productivity distribution model.
7.5.2 Robustness -  non-micros
Most of the sample is made up of micro firms (over 90 percent); businesses with less 
than 10 employees. A significant number of takeovers occur in this group. However, 
proportionately, more takeovers occur with relatively larger SMEs and they are also 
likely to contribute more (per firm) to regional productivity due to their scale. In this 
section I investigate the whether the SME takeover relationships found above are 
consistent with a sub-section of the SME sample which are relatively large; firms with 
employment of between 10 and 249.
The exact same model is used as before and the results of this are shown below in 
table 7.7. The mean values are likely to alter between the full SME sample and the 
non-micro one. This may alter the coefficients and marginal effects between the non­
micro and full SME sample estimation. However, qualitatively, the results for the full 
sample are consistent with the non-micro sample. Relative labour productivity (and its 
square) is positive and significant. This indicates that relatively more productive non­
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micro SMEs are more likely to be acquired and at an increasing rate -  consistent with 
the full SME sample. Also, SMEs outside of the core are less likely to be acquired, 
even once I control for variables such as size and industry. However, the mid­
periphery and periphery’s interactions with productivity are significant but only at the 
90 percent level.
One significant difference between the full SME sample and the non-micro one is that 
the age variables are now insignificant. This could be due to size. Larger firms are 
perhaps more likely to be well known and age has much less bearing on whether a 
potential acquirer has information on a target. Whereas for the smallest SMEs, the 
youngest are perhaps less likely to be known and for these firms, age is perhaps a 
better indicator of whether they are well known.
Table 7.7 -  Non-micro SME takeover probit results
Variable C oeffic ien t Marginal effect Mean value
Takeover (dependent variable) - - 0.0251
Ln(RLP) 0.0726*** 0.002969 -0 .5110
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0149*** 0.000608 1.1183
Ln(local unit) -0.1329*** -0.00544 . 0.1876
Employment 0.0187*** 0.000765 31.4855
E m ploym ents -0.0002*** -8.60E-06 2261.1
E m ploym ents 9.8E-07*** 4.00E-08 291196
E m ploym ents -1.6E-09** -6.44E -11 4.9E+07
Age 2 to 4 -0.0214 -0.00086 0.1106
Age 5 to 9 -0.0105 -0.00043 0.1666
Age 10 to 19 -0.0154 -0.00063 0.3368
20+ years -0.0877*** -0.00348 0.3402
Company 0.8546*** 0.023419 0.7764
Partnership -0.0267 -0.00107 0.1542
Mid-periphery -0.0480*** -0.00195 0.4356
Periphery -0.0811*** -0.00319 0.2627
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0258* 0.001057 -0 .2396
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0333* 0.001362 -0.1526
Industry controls Y -
N 177,471
Pseudo R2 , 0.07
Predicted takeover (at sam ple average) 0.0164
Log-likelihood -19,397
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
NB constants removed. Marginal effects estimated at sample average. 
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
7.5.3 Takeover Results over Time
To investigate the relationships across time, another SME sample is obtained from a
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different year and the same model as above is estimated. In chapter 6 it is explained 
why a panel has not been used. However, changes to macroeconomic variables or the 
stock market may affect the chances o f acquisition. Despite most SMEs not being 
quoted, it is expected that changes in the stock market between years may still alter 
the number o f  small firm takeovers due to changes in business activity and access to 
capital - at least for large firms (Melicher et al. 1983). Both o f which can lead to 
easier access o f funds, at least for listed firms, to be able to undertake SME 
acquisitions.
Figure 7.4 shows the probability o f  takeover in the UK (including non-SME 
takeovers96) with FTSE data. It shows a broad relationship between the number of 
takeovers and the stock market, consistent with the existing empirical evidence.
Figure 7.4 - FTSE 100 and number of takeovers* 1995-2008
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Data sources: Yahoo Finance (2009), BIS (2009), ONS (2009c) 
NB ‘ Includes non-SME takeovers
The previous results relate to 2004, identifying takeovers in 2005. An earlier sample 
from 2001, where takeovers are identified in 2002, is also used for comparison.
96 The ONS aggregate data in figure 7.4 is different to the micro data used in the study. The aggregate 
data o f takeovers counts far fewer takeovers than what is registered in their micro data. These are from 
different internal sources. VAT statistics o f the total number o f registered firms for each year are used 
to debase the frequency o f takeovers and produce an annual probability o f  takeover.
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The stock market is lower in 2002 than it is in 2005, according to the FTSE. 
Consistent with the theory and existing evidence, the number and percentage of SME 
takeovers in 2002 is lower than in 2005.
Table 7.8 (below) shows the summary statistics of both SME samples. About four 
percent fewer SMEs exist in the earlier sample (1.833m versus 1.897m). However, the 
2004 sample has over 50 percent more takeovers identified in the data. This might be 
a reflection of a change in the business climate for 2002 versus 200597.
The average size of the firm in the 2004 sample is slightly smaller (5.2) than the 2001 
sample (5.3). Other differences between the samples are that the 2004 sample has a 10 
percent smaller average value for local units. The increased value signifies either that 
the sample has more multi-unit firms or multi-unit firms have more units in the 2001 
sample. The 2004 sample has proportionately more very young SMEs aged 0 to 1 
year, by around 20 percent. The 2004 sample also has relatively less sole proprietors 
by 13 percent and partnerships by 15 percent but more companies by 18 percent98. All 
other variables are roughly in the same proportions. The comparison between the 
samples of the industrial compositions across the two periods is not shown.
97 It is possible that this could be a form o f  measurement error, where fewer takeovers are identified in 
the data.
98 This change could be caused by a change in tax legalisation causing an incentive to become company 
directors instead o f  sole proprietors.
Table 7.8 - Takeover summary statistics 2001 and 2004 samples
Variable
Full 2004 GB Sam ple Full 2001 SME Sam ple 2004 a s  a percentage  
o f 2001Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Takeover (dependent variable) 0.0066 0.0809 0.0042 0.0648 157%
Ln(RLP) -0.5353 0.9715 -0 .555 1.024 96%
Ln(local unit) 0.0228 0.1634 0.0252 0.1728 90%
Employment 5.18 13.90 5.28 13.94 98%
A ge 0 to 1* 0.1327 - 0.1086 - 122%
A ge 2 to 4 0.2479 0.4318 0.2631 0.4403 94%
A ge 5 to 9 0.2242 0.4171 0.236 0.4246 95%
A ge 10 to 19 0.2365 0.4249 0.2336 0.4231 101%
20+ years 0.1587 0.3654 0.1587 0.3654 100%
Sole proprietor* 0.3119 - 0.3583 - 87%
Company 0.5101 0.4999 0.4323 0.4954 118%
Partnership 0.178 0.3825 0.2094 0.4069 85%
Core* 0.3276 - 0.3251 - 101%
Mid-periphery 0.4258 0.4945 0.4282 0.4948 99%
Periphery 0.2466 0.431 0.2467 0.4311 100%
N 1,897,288 1,832,969 104%
*Omitted variable from dummy group 
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
The probit takeover estimates from across the two time periods are compared next. 
The same estimation model is used for a full sample from both years and a sample 
that excludes the primary sector and real estate activities. Table 7.9 shows the 
resulting marginal effects for the period 2001. In general, the results are broadly the 
same between the samples; they also have a similar explanatory power as suggested 
by the pseudo-R2. Importantly, no differences occur in the statistical significance or 
signs o f the variables. Differences in the marginal effects exist across the samples but 
this is expected given fewer takeovers are observed in the 2001 sample.
SME productivity and its square are significant and positive in all of the samples 
indicating that (relative) productivity has a positive, and increasing, effect on the 
chances of being acquired across both of the periods.
The periphery and mid-periphery have negative marginal effects. Also for the 
periphery, a positive and significant interaction with productivity exists. This 
indicates that relative to the core region, SMEs have a lower chance of takeover but 
this difference in reduced as productivity increases for SMEs in the periphery.
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The age variables are also significant in all o f  the models, indicating that older age 
groups have a higher chance of takeover relative to the youngest group (0 to 1 year). 
The ages between 5 and 19 years consistently have the largest marginal effects, 
indicating that these age groups have the highest chances of takeover.
The size variables are also consistent across the models; employment generally has a 
positive effect on the chances of takeover, but this relationship is not linear as the 
polynomials of size are significant.
In general, the results are consistent and robust across the two time periods.
Table 7.9 -  Probit takeover (2002) results for 2001 SME sample
Variable C oefficien t Marginal effect Mean va lue
Takeover (dependent variable) - - 0.0042
Ln(RLP) 0.0837*** 0.000136 -0.5550
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0154*** 0.000025 1.3566
Ln(local unit) -0.0491*** -0.000080 0.0252
Employment 0.0364*** 0.000059 5.2763
E m ploym ents -0.00053*** -0.000001 222.3
E m ploym ents 3.0E-06*** 4.9E-09 27671.9
EmploymentA4 -5.9E-09*** -9.5E-12 4.6E+06
Age 2 to 4 0.152*** 0.000280 0.2631
Age 5 to 9 0.279*** 0.000595 0.2360
Age 10 to 19 0.298*** 0.000651 0.2336
20+ years 0.208*** 0.000435 0.1587
Company 1.47*** 0.006494 0.4323
Partnership 0.234*** 0.000486 0.2094
Mid-periphery -0.0738*** -0.000118 0.4282
Periphery -0.0869*** -0.000132 0.2467
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0123 0.000020 -0.2459
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0262*** 0.000043 -0.1489
Industry controls Y
N 1,832,969
Pseudo R2 0.19
Predicted takeover (at sam ple
average) 0.0454%
Log-likelihood -40,671
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
NB constants removed. Marginal effects estimated at sample average.
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter provides further evidence to the existing but limited literature on SME 
takeovers. The analysis finds that on average and holding size, industry, age and
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location constant, more productive SMEs are more likely to be acquired. This is 
consistent with larger firms attempting to compensate for a lack of internally 
generated innovation, and is contrary to the existing theory and evidence for large 
firm takeovers, such as the Q-theory o f mergers.
The SME productivity-takeover relationship is not linear. The chances of a small firm 
being acquired increases with productivity and it is highest for the most productive. 
However, the least productive are more likely to be acquired than those with around 
average performance. This suggests that there is a j-curve relationship with 
productivity and the chances of SME acquisition. The fact that some lesser productive 
small firms have a higher chance of takeover than average is indicative of some of the 
more familiar effects of productivity on the likelihood of takeover associated with 
large firms. For lesser productive acquisitions, takeovers here perhaps reallocate 
resources to be put in a more efficient use. However, this could involve the 
dissolution of the firm or extra investment to try and rectify performance. For SMEs 
in general, the dominating effect with productivity is that the most productive are 
acquired, a relationship that is perhaps unique to small firms.
It is not possible to find out if acquisitions are undertaken by larger firms from the 
core, but the evidence does find that SMEs are more likely to be acquired if they are 
located in the core regions (London and the South East). A readier access to finance, 
agglomeration there triggering more intense local competition, the better information 
flows of possible targets in the core, or all three may be causes. These are all 
consistent with NEG theory. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the more 
productive small firms from the periphery are more likely to be acquired than those in 
the core. This result is not consistent with the process of transferring production away 
from the periphery to the core which NEG models would suggest may occur.
Better information on potential targets is also found to increase the chances of 
acquisition as both firm age and size have generally positive relationships with the 
probability o f takeover.
These results are all consistent across two years of takeover; 2002 and 2005; at 
different points o f the stock market cycle. The results also do not differ when the
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smallest SMEs are removed from the sample.
The effects of takeovers on subsequent chances of relocation and exit or their post- 
performance are instructive o f the possible effects targets of SME acquisitions may 
have on regional economies. Next I look at what happens once SMEs are acquired in 
terms of their chances of relocation or exit.
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Appendix 
A7.1 Large Firms
The Q-theory of mergers (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002) and evidence pertaining to 
listed or large firms suggests that acquisitions are a channel for capital to flow to 
better firms. This means that the less productive firms are targeted, contrary to the 
findings within the SME sector. An obvious extension to the work here would be to 
try and replicate the findings for large firms with the data set used for this study. As 
explained in chapter 6, the data are not really suitable for identifying takeovers of 
large firms. Firm demographic events are very hard to classify and are increasingly so 
for larger businesses. Despite these restrictions of the data, an attempt is made to try 
and identify the direction of any productivity-takeover relationship with large firms. 
For the purposes of this analysis, large firms are classified as those with over 550 
employees; a sample o f2700 enterprises". Table A7.1 shows the results of regressing 
productivity measured in 2004 on takeover identified in 2005. No statistically 
significant relationship is found between productivity and takeover for large firms 
with either measure of productivity.
Table A7.1 - Probit Takeover Large Firm Results
Variable
Dep var Takeover  
Large firm s only
Dep var Takeover  
Large firm s only
Ln(RLP) 0.0567 -
Ln(LP) - 0.0461
Industry controls N N
N 2,763 2,763
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00
Log-likelihood -436 -436
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
NB constants removed
The result for large firms is different from that for SMEs in Britain but it does not 
necessarily mean that no relationship between productivity and takeovers exists. It is 
likely that the ‘takeover’ event that is trying to be identified identity is either not 
captured for large firms or the effects of it are already included in the ‘pre-acquisition’ 
firm characteristics. If the latter is true then the post-acquisition effects might include
99 This number o f  enterprises (deliberately) approximates the number o f  businesses listed on the 
London Stock Exchange.
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Chapter 8 -  Post-Acquisition Exits and Relocations
8.1 Introduction
The post-acquisition literature, reviewed in chapter 3, contains very little evidence on 
the acquisitions effects of small firms. It is not known what subsequently happens to 
acquired SMEs. This chapter investigates the likelihood o f acquisition resulting in 
either exit or relocation from the small firm’s original region.
Acquisitions can affect both the chances of survival and the location of production. 
The search for entrepreneurial assets in successful SMEs by acquirers might result in 
the most productive SMEs exiting the periphery after acquisition. If this occurs 
disproportionately in the periphery, this may contribute to explaining the productivity 
gap. However, at the regional level, a firm relocating away from a region has the same 
effect as a firm death. It results in a loss of a local productive unit and source of 
employment. However, it is likely that the process is quite different from firm exits. In 
an alternative scenario, the acquirer might want to move the acquired firm so that they 
are closer, instead of simply shutting it.
Multivariate analysis is used to explain SME exits and relocations. It shows that the 
acquisition of SMEs significantly increases their risk of exit or relocation. This is 
true for all regional locations but for exits, these are especially boosted by takeover in 
the core.
8.2 Hypotheses
From the literature review on exits and relocations, the following hypotheses 
concerning exits are tested;
4. Takeovers are an investment decision, an element of which might be 
relocation or closure to take advantage of synergies with the acquiring firm’s assets. 
Where this is the case, takeovers increase the chance for SMEs relocating or exiting.
A caveat to this is input rationing, such as capital (due to its cost relative to larger 
firms), could be a handicap to the SME. In this situation, acquisition may reduce 
chances of exit and result in injections of capital or other support.
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Table A7.4 - Takeover probit estimates: productivity distribution
Fourth (bottom ) quartile Third quartile S eco n d  quartile First (top) quartile
Variable C oefficient
Marginal
effect
Mean
value C oefficient
Marginal
effect
Mean
value C oefficient
Marginal
effect
Mean
value C oefficient
Marginal
effect
Mean
value
Takeover (dependent variable) - - 0.0063 - - 0.0054 - - 0.0055 - - 0.0091
Ln(RLP) -0.0355 -0.00022 -1.80108 0.104 0.00051 -0.62665 -0.433 -0.00191 -0.20877 0.225*** 0.001656 0.448904
Ln(RLP)A2 0.00038 2.37E-06 4.03027 -0.116 -0.00057 0.423955 -1.72 -0.00758 0.050733 -0.0163*** -0 ^ 0012 0.52926
Ln(local unit) -0.128*** -0.0008 0.030202 -0.185*** -0.0009 0.024843 -0.122*** -0.00054 0.0141 -0.147*** -0.00108 0.021934
Employment 0.035*** 0.00022 5.22522 0.0455*** 0.000222 5.45845 0.05*** 0.000221 4.56982 0.0437*** 0.000322 5.43683
E m ploym ents -0.0005*** -3.15E-06 218.171 -0.00079*** -3.87E-06 230.565 -0.00081*** -3.57E-06 168.612 -0.00069*** -5.12E-06 260.78
EmploymentA3 2.70E-06*** 1.69E-08 26597 5.30E-06*** 2.59E-08 28083.4 5.00E-06*** 2.20E-08 20360.3 4.10E-06*** 3.03E-08 33700.8
EmploymentM 4.70E-09*** -2.98E-11 4.40E+06 -1.20E-08*** -5.66E-11 4.60E+06 -1.00E-08*** -4.47E-11 3.40E+06 -8.00E-09*** -5.88E -11 5.70E+06
Age 2 to 4 0.0826*** 0.000557 0.212217 0.215*** 0.001257 0.238363 0.0764*** 0.000353 0.311241 0.0266 0.0002 0.229987
Age 5 to 9 0.124*** 0.000863 0.215345 0.229*** 0.001374 0.216615 0.145*** 0.000725 0.230691 0.0863*** 0.00068 0.234361
Age 10 to 19 0.108*** 0.000731 0.280499 0.249*** 0.001499 0.236001 0.141*** 0.000711 0.189828 0.0799*** 0.000626 0.240357
20+ years 0.0808** 0.000544 0.207364 0.19*** 0.001138 0.152144 0.085** 0.000416 0.100973 0.0277 0.000209 0.175067
Company 0.867*** 0.007457 0.45561 0.961*** 0.006247 0.494414 1.09*** 0.006221 0.530401 0.999*** 0.008203 0.558595
Partnership -0.137** -0.00077 0.229761 0.0246 0.000123 0.186821 -0.0884 -0.00036 0.148111 -0.158* -0.001 0.148501
Mid-periphery -0.125*** -0.00077 0.445789 -0.0903 -0.00043 0.421674 -0.0197 -8.6E-05 0.41441 -0.0921*** -0.00067 0.421594
Periphery -0.132*** -0.00076 0.258052 -0.118 -0.00053 0.249428 -0.0196 -8.5E-05 0.25172 -0.0787*** -0.00055 0.227839
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) -0.00956 -0.00006 -0.80328 -0.0108 -5.3E-05 -0.26121 0.235 0.001038 -0.08646 0.00283 2.09E-05 0.180471
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0162 0.000101 -0.45577 -0.0231 -0.00011 -0.15562 0.286 0.001262 -0.05343 -0.0201 -0.00015 0.094392
Industry controls Y Y Y Y
N 458,493 489,464 468,155 479,931
Pseudo R2
Predicted takeover (at sample 
average)
0.14
0.00198
0.16
0.0015
0.15
0.0013
0.15
0.0024
Log-likelihood -15,047 -13,945 -13,600 -20,959
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 NB constants removed. Quartiles are only approximate due to data rounding.
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
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Chapter 8 -  Post-Acquisition Exits and Relocations
8.1 Introduction
The post-acquisition literature, reviewed in chapter 3, contains very little evidence on 
the acquisitions effects of small firms. It is not known what subsequently happens to 
acquired SMEs. This chapter investigates the likelihood o f acquisition resulting in 
either exit or relocation from the small firm’s original region.
Acquisitions can affect both the chances of survival and the location of production. 
The search for entrepreneurial assets in successful SMEs by acquirers might result in 
the most productive SMEs exiting the periphery after acquisition. If  this occurs 
disproportionately in the periphery, this may contribute to explaining the productivity 
gap. However, at the regional level, a firm relocating away from a region has the same 
effect as a firm death. It results in a loss of a local productive unit and source of 
employment. However, it is likely that the process is quite different from firm exits. In 
an alternative scenario, the acquirer might want to move the acquired firm so that they 
are closer, instead of simply shutting it.
Multivariate analysis is used to explain SME exits and relocations. It shows that the 
acquisition of SMEs significantly increases their risk of exit or relocation. This is 
true for all regional locations but for exits, these are especially boosted by takeover in 
the core.
8.2 Hypotheses
From the literature review on exits and relocations, the following hypotheses 
concerning exits are tested;
4. Takeovers are an investment decision, an element of which might be 
relocation or closure to take advantage of synergies with the acquiring firm’s assets. 
Where this is the case, takeovers increase the chance for SMEs relocating or exiting.
A caveat to this is input rationing, such as capital (due to its cost relative to larger 
firms), could be a handicap to the SME. In this situation, acquisition may reduce 
chances of exit and result in injections of capital or other support.
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5. Acquiring firms are more probably located in core regions of the economy, as 
more company headquarters are located there. If  there are complementarities to be 
exploited by proximity, after a takeover a tendency may exist for acquired firms in the 
periphery to close or relocate to take advantage of this.
From these hypotheses, the following relationships can be formulated for firm i, at 
time t (where ‘prod’ is productivity and ‘Pr’, probability) as;
? - +
Pr(Exitjt+i I Relocation^) = g(Takeoverjt, , Coreit.i*Takeoverit, Peripheryit.i*Takeoverit,
+
ProdjM *Takeoverj,,)
8.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are instructive of whether takeovers may cause SMEs to 
subsequently exit or relocate. The sample is of SMEs at t-1 (2004), with takeovers in 
year t (2005) and firm exits and relocations identified at time t+1 (2006). SME exits 
and relocations are measured just one year after their acquisition in order to strengthen 
the assumption that they are directly caused by the takeover and more likely to be 
motivated by the acquisition100. It is possible to look at exit a number of years after 
takeover, but as time passes, it is more likely that exit after takeover could be caused 
by other factors such as exogenous shocks. The other variables are the same as those 
used in the previous chapter and described in Chapter 6 - Data.
If takeovers have no effect on exit or relocation, then I expect a similar proportion of 
acquired SMEs to survive or not relocate as in the whole sample, assuming the same 
characteristics across the samples. Table 8.1 shows the percentage of exits and 
relocations for the total sample, acquired and non-acquired SMEs. Of the entire 2004 
SME sample, over 20 percent exit by 2006 but only around 1.5 percent change region 
- relocate. The overall percentage of SMEs exiting is higher (by 3 percentage points) 
for those that are acquired and this is significant at the 99 percent level. Likewise for 
relocations, proportionately, a higher percentage of acquired SMEs relocate regions
100 A firm may exit at any point from 2004 onwards. Firms may exit in 2005, if  so, then takeover is not 
observed.
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than non-acquired, by 2.2 percentage points (significant at 99 percent level), over 
double the latter’s rate.
Table 8.1 -  Exits and relocations in 2006 by takeover in 2005
No takeover Takeover Difference Total
Event Frequency P ercent Frequency P ercent
Percentage
points F requency IPercent
No
exit/relocation 1,420,858 75.4% 8,756 70.0% -5.4%*** 1,429,614 75.4%
Relocation 27,699 1.5% 460 3.7% 2.2%*** 28,159 1.5%
Exit 436,227 23.1% 3,288 26.3% 3.2%*** 439,515 23.2%
Total 1,884,784 100% 12,504 100% 1,897,288 100%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
The next table (table 8.2) shows exits by region and for percentage for acquired 
SMEs. Despite the exit rate for acquired SMEs in total being higher and significant, 
two regions, the North East (-0.3 percent) and Yorkshire and Humberside (-0.5 
percent), have exits at a lower percentage with their acquired SMEs but these are not 
statistically significant. All other regions have higher rates of exits for acquired SMEs 
but are not statistically significant, except for London (significant at the 99 percent 
level). However, the core and mid-periphery (significant at the 95 percent level) do 
have higher rates of exits for acquired SMEs that are statistically significant.
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Table 8.2 -  Exits in 2006 and takeovers in 2005 by region
Region (2004) Total
Exit
frequency
Percentage 
of exits out 
of total
Percentage of 
acquired 
exiting
Difference
(percentage
points)
Periphery 467,893 105,982 22.7% 23.1% 0.5%
Wales 85,661 17,565 20.5% 23.4% 2.9%
N. East 50,117 11,909 23.8% 23.4% -0.3%
York. & Hum. 140,990 31,966 22.7% 22.2% -0.5%
N. West 191,125 44,542 23.3% 23.7% 0.4%
Mid-periphery 807,875 179,363 22.2% 25.0% 2.8%**
W. Mid. 160,339 35,720 22.3% 26.7% 4.4%
E. Mid. 134,121 30,375 22.6% 24.5% 1.9%
S. West 185,228 40,147 21.7% 23.2% 1.5%
Scot. 131,365 29,474 22.4% 24.3% 1.9%
..E-.Enfl,............... 196,822 43,647 22.2% 25.5% 3.3%
Core 621,520 154,170 24.8% 28.8% 4.0%***
S. East 324,909 75,874 23.4% 26.2% 2.9%
London 296,611 78,296 26.4% 30.4% 4.0%***
Total 1,897,288 439,515 23.2% 26.3% 3.1%***
Source: ONS, author's own calculations 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Knowing the destination of acquired and relocated SMEs is also desirable. However, 
due to the small number of firms involved it is not possible to separately report 
sample statistics where SMEs relocate after takeover by region or location.
This evidence suggests that in total, takeovers may increase the chances of exit one 
year after acquisition. This is also found to be true for the mid-periphery and the core 
locations but not for the periphery -  it is statistically insignificant there. However, this 
does not control for variables such as the industry, size and the productivity o f SMEs. 
These affect the likelihood of an SME being acquired and are also likely to affect the 
likelihood of surviving independently.
8.4 Multivariate Estimation of Exits and Relocations
This section uses multivariate methods to investigate whether takeovers increase the 
chances of exit, especially o f the most productive, and if there is any regional 
heterogeneity. For regions, relocations can be just as important as it can result in the 
loss of a productive unit, potentially harming a region’s productive capacity and 
perhaps even aggregate productivity. Therefore relocations also need to be modelled. 
It is not likely that a firm can relocate and exit -  they are a mutually exclusive event, 
at least within this data. It is also likely that different processes drive each (not just
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takeovers initiated ones). This suggests that a multinomial regression method should 
be used.
Multivariate analysis allows the identification of whether the effects of takeovers vary 
by location, whilst controlling for the effects of industry and size that may affect the 
takeover- exit and relocation relationship. To do this the location variables mid­
periphery and periphery are used with the core as the omitted case.
Where Z = exit or relocation;/ is the type o f exit (no exit (0), change location (1) and 
inactive (2))
Pr(Zi = ; ) =  . i = 0,1.2 (1)
iy '*
k=0
and
P’jXj = po + piTakeovert + p2 ln(RLPt-i) + p3Entityt.i + P ^ g e n  + pslndustryn + 
P6Locationt-i + p7Employmentt-i + psStructuret-i + P9(Employmentt.i.ln(RLPt.i)) + 
p i o(Employmentt-i *Takeovert) + pii(LocationM.ln(RLPt-i)) + 
Pi2(Takeovert.Locationt.i) + pi3(Takeovert.ln(RLPt-i)) +
Pi4(Takeovert.ln(RLPt-i).Locationt-i) + Vj (2)
The hypotheses related to exits and relocations (presented at the beginning of this 
chapter) can now be specified with equation 2. Hypothesis 4 is that the probability of 
a firm exiting or relocating increases if it is previously subject to a takeover, Pi>0101. 
Hypothesis 5 is that these conditional probabilities are higher in peripheral regions; 
the coefficients on the interaction term for peripheral locations are positive (Pi2>0) 
and also increase with productivity (Pm>0).
8.5 Results
The model is estimated on both the full SME sample and one without the primary 
sector and real estate activities. The results of this are presented in table 8.3. For
101 Strictly, this is not the total effect o f takeovers as this also needs to include the relevant interactions. 
These are not easy to include for exposition purposes but will be included when the effects are 
estimated.
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brevity the industry controls are not displayed as they are of lesser interest here102. 
The pseudo R s provide an indication of the goodness-of-fit for both models. These 
are very low in both models, indicating it is perhaps a poor fitting model. However, 
pseudo R2 statistics are only a guide and are not deemed to be very reliable (Sribney 
1997b)103. A poorly fitting model is perhaps caused by the limited number of 
variables that I am able to use to try and explain firm exits and relocations.
Table 8.3 -  Multinomial logistic relocation or exit (2006) regression results
Variable
11]
Full GB Sam ple
[2]
GB Sam ple w ithout 
primary se c to r  and real 
esta te  activ ities
R elocation  Exit R elocation Exit
Takeover 1.530*** 1.647*** 1.582*** 1.713***
Ln(RLP) 1.043*** 0.918*** 1.037*** 0.906***
Ln(RLP)A2 1.027*** 1.010*** 1.025*** 1.007***
Age 2 to 4 1.081*** 1.076*** 1.107*** 1.094***
Age 5 to 9 0.852*** 0.723*** 0.862*** 0.715***
Age 10 to 19 0.612*** 0.440*** 0.615*** 0.446***
Age 20+ years 0.415*** 0.320*** 0.427*** 0.346***
Ln(local unit) 1.520*** 0.743*** 1.564*** 0.738***
Ln(local unit)A2 0.903*** 1.093*** 0.897** 1.099***
Employment 1.000 0.982*** 1.000 0.981***
E m ploym ents 1.000 1.0001*** 1.000 1.0001***
Takeover*employment 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.999
Employment*ln(RLP) 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001***
Company 1.613*** 0.806*** 1.611*** 0.815***
Partnership 0.794*** 0.882*** 0.806*** 0.918***
Mid-periphery 0.678*** 0.911*** 0.685*** 0.912***
Periphery 0.518*** 0.927*** 0.524*** 0.939***
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 1.043*** 1.010** 1.056*** 1.011**
Periphery*ln(RLP) 1.076*** 1.017*** 1.080*** 1.025***
Mid-peripheryTakeover 1.631*** 1.012 1.636*** 1.003
Periphery*T akeover 1.808*** 0.850*** 1.770*** 0.851**
Takeover*ln(RLP) 0.920* 0.932*** 0.932 0.941**
T akeover*Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.994 1.024 0.906 0.998
Takeover*Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 1.094 1.053 1.074 1.050
Industry controls Y Y Y Y
N 1,897,288 1,676,588
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04
Log-likelihood -1,109,883 -1,013,199
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0 .0 1
NB constants removed, relative risk ratios shown 
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
102 The majority o f  the industry effects are significant.
103 It is also suggested that these should be removed from write-ups and reports (Sribney 1997b).
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Effect o f takeover
Takeover stimulates an increased chance of an SME exiting and relocation104 in both 
samples. This is partially reflected by the statistically significant and positive relative 
risk ratios on the takeover variable for both relocation and exit. However, 
interpretations o f the effect o f takeover must also include the interactions with 
location and productivity.
To fully incorporate all of the takeover effects and interactions simultaneously, the 
predicted probabilities o f  exit and relocation are computed from the model. Table 8.4 
shows the predicted probability o f SMEs exiting and relocating by location and 
takeover. The probabilities are derived from the results in table 8.3 - estimates 1, 
using the sample averages except for location, takeover and their interactions.
When a takeover occurs this increases the probability of subsequent exit for all three 
locations; the marginal effect of takeover is positive. The effect is greatest for the core 
(10.6 percentage points), closely followed by the mid-periphery (9.8 percentage 
points). The peripheral location has the smallest marginal effect of takeover on exit 
(6.5 percentage points), but still positive. The chance of exit, regardless of takeover, is 
highest for the core.
Takeovers also have a positive effect on the chances of relocation. The marginal 
effect is higher for the mid-periphery and periphery (both 1.9 percentage points) than 
the core (1.2 percentage points). However, even with takeover, the probability is still 
quite low, at around 3 percent, very low compared to the exit probabilities.
104 Relocation here means a movement between regions -  consistent with earlier. However, an SME 
could move from one peripheral region to another and relocation is still registered here.
Table 8.4 - Predicted probabilities and marginal effects of location and takeover 
on exit and relocation
Location
Probability o f  relocation  (2006) Probability o f ex it (2006)
Predicted probability  
given  takeover (2005)
Marginal e ffe c t o f  
takeover (2005)
Predicted probability 
given takeover (2005)
Marginal e ffec t of 
ta k e o v e r (2005)
Core 3.23% 1.2% 33.12% 10.60%
Mid-periphery 3.32% 1.9% 30.63% 9.78%
Periphery 2.92% 1.9% 27.61% 6.54%
Source: ONS, authors' own calculations 
NB Estimated at the sample average
The positive marginal effect of takeover on exit and relocation are consistent with 
hypothesis 4. This suggests takeovers occur so that acquirers can take advantage of 
the synergies with the acquiring firm’s assets. The lower marginal effect of takeover 
for SMEs from more peripheral locations to exit is not consistent with hypothesis 5. 
Despite being small, the higher probabilities for relocation in these locations are 
consistent with hypothesis 5.
Effect of productivity and takeover
Takeover is also interacted with productivity. To show the full effects of this, figure
8.1 shows the predicted probability o f exit from the estimates of table 8.3 (and the 
sample averages) across distribution of SME productivity in the sample.
Higher productivity (moving up the distribution) reduces the probability o f exit, 
regardless of takeover. The figure also shows that the marginal effect of takeover 
reduces as SMEs become more productive. Therefore being a more productive SME 
can reduce the chance of exit after takeover, but it does not eliminate it altogether as 
the predicted probability o f  exit is always higher for acquired SMEs than non­
acquired.
169
Figure 8.1 - SME predicted probability o f exit (2006) by productivity and
takeover(2005)
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Productivity distribution
Average - no takeover Average - takeover
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Estimated at the sample average 
The values are shown in table A8.1
The equivalent figure for relocation is not show n as its relationship w ith productivity, 
despite p ositive , does not vary much across the productivity distribution.
Takeover is also interacted with SM E size (em ploym ent). This variable is not 
statistically significant for ex its or relocations. This is consistent across both sam ples. 
This indicates that there is no size variation in the effect that takeovers have on either 
relocation or exit. This is investigated more with the analysis o f  on ly  non-m icro  
SM Es.
O t h e r  f i n d i n g s
The findings on SM E em ploym ent suggest size has a negative effect on exit, show n  
by the relative risk ratio o f  less than o n e103. T herefore larger SM Es are less likely to 
exit. This is consistent w ith production at an inefficient scale or sm aller firm s having a 
more lim ited access to , or more expensive rate o f  finance. For relocations, size is 
statistically insignificant. This m ight be due to the cost o f  relocating increase w ith size
10S The full effect o f  size should also include all o f the interactions, such as those with takeover and 
productivity. However, these are either very small, statistically insignificant or both.
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but so may do the potential returns to moving106.
As SMEs age, they are generally less likely to exit or relocate, as indicated by the 
significant but less than one relative risk ratios in table 8.3. The highest probability o f 
exit is for SMEs aged 2 to 4 years, as this age category has a relative risk ratio of 
more than one, when compared to the youngest SMEs (the omitted case). This general 
relationship is also consistent for relocations.
For exits, the fact that the youngest firms have the highest probability of exit is 
suggestive of the effects of inexperience, perhaps the development of a niche market, 
or both. For relocations, younger SMEs are more likely to move might be due to 
newer firms having fewer local links that may make relocation less costly. The 
youngest firms may also be in their most dynamic period. This might require different 
premises due to size constraints but it is not clear why this may involve a regional 
relocation. New locations might be more suitable to meet their changing needs during 
this period.
Differences between the samples
All of the effects described are (qualitatively) consistent across the two samples (with 
and without the primary sector and real estate activities) for exits and relocations. The 
only different results for exits are that a few of the takeover interactions are now 
statistically less significant (periphery-takeover and takeover-productivity). For 
relocation, the takeover-productivity interaction is insignificant in the reduced sample, 
having only been significant at the 90 percent level for the full sample.
8.5.1 Non-micro SMEs
I also re-estimate the multinomial exit-relocation model on only a sample of relatively 
larger SMEs; those with employment between 10 and 249, consistent with the 
takeover analysis. As relocations are extremely rare for non-micros, these are not
106 The number o f  plants an SME has a positive relationship on the probability o f  relocating; another 
measure o f  SME size. However, this is more o f  a control here as multi plant firms are unlikely to 
relocate all sites, just the one where the enterprise is registered. Given this, it is perhaps easier to 
‘relocate’ if  a firm has multiple sites as this only involves relocation o f  the registered sites and not the 
entire firm.
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estimated and a probit model of exits is estimated instead of the multinomial logistic 
model described above. The results of this are shown below in table 8.5.
The results indicate that, qualitatively, they are consistent with the full SME sample. 
Acquisitions still increase the chances of subsequent exit, indicated by the positive 
coefficient and marginal effect on the takeover variable. The marginal effect shows 
that it increases the probability o f exit by nearly 9 percent but this does not include the 
interaction variables, of which the takeover-employment one is significantly different 
from zero. However, it is likely that the marginal effect of takeover on exit does not 
change much with the inclusion o f the interactions due to their small (yet statistically 
significant) coefficients. Therefore the marginal effect of takeovers on exits reported 
above is comparable to that found in the full sample (see table 8.4).
Differences between the full SME and non-micro samples are that most o f the 
interaction variables are now statistically insignificant relative to the full SME 
sample. However, these do not have a great effect on the magnitude of the variables of 
interest and so qualitatively the effects are considered to be the same in the two 
samples.
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Table 8.5 — Non-micro SME exit (2006) probit results
Variable C oefficient Marginal effect Mean value
Exit(dependent variable) - - 0.134
Takeover 0.3593*** 0.0882 0.025
Ln(RLP) -0.0565*** -0.0116 -0.511
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0097*** 0.0020 1.118
Age 2 to 4 -0.2328*** -0.0427 0.111
Age 5 to 9 -0.5101*** -0.0851 0.167
Age 10 to 19 -0.6922*** -0.1249 0.337
Age 20+ years -0.8733*** -0.1536 0.340
Ln(local unit) -0.0969*** -0.0198 0.188
Ln(local unit)A2 0.0158* 0.0032 0.248
Employment 0.0013*** 0.0003 31.5
E m ploym ents -9.4E-07 -1.9E-07 2261.1
T akeover*employment -0.0024*** -0.0005 1.089
Employment*ln(RLP) 0.0004*** 0.0001 -15.48
Company -0.1284*** -0.0273 0.776
Partnership -0.1543*** -0.0296 0.154
Mid-periphery -0.0642*** -0.0131 0.436
Periphery -0.0698*** -0.0140 0.263
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0083 0.0017 -0.240
Periphery*ln(RLP) -0.0044 -0.0009 -0.153
Mid-periphery*Takeover 0.0064 0.0013 0.010
Periphery*Takeover -0.0171 -0.0035 0.006
Takeover*ln(RLP) -0.0422 -0.0086 -0.008
T akeover*Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0312 0.0064 -0.002
Takeover*Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0156 0.0032 -0.004
Industry controls Y -
N 177,471
Pseudo R2 0.05
Predicted exit (at sam ple average) 0.124
Log-likelihood -66,566
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
NB constants removed. Marginal effects estimated at sample average.
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
8.5.2 Exit and takeovers: correlated errors
The errors in the exit equations, estimated above, could be correlated with the 
residuals from the takeover equations that have previously been estimated (see chapter 
7). From theory, it is possible to suggest a few possible omitted variables that this 
could potentially apply to. For example, a good management team (M) or success in 
R&D (R). Both of which may increase the chances of takeover but reduce the chances 
of exit107. Consider the following models;
107 This negative correlation may be unique for SMEs. For large firms it may be the reverse and that 
‘bad’ management may stimulate takeover but (independently) also increase the chances o f exit, 
creating a positive correlations o f  errors.
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Pr(Tj) = O(oco + aiprodi + assize* + a 3 location, + a 4 agej + as industry i + Uj) (3)
Whereu,- = f(R+, M *...)
and
Pr(Zj) = O(po + piTj + P2 sizej + P3prodi + p^ndustryj + Pslocation; + P6agej + Vj) (4) 
Where v,= f (R ',M \..)
Here it is likely that the errors for models 3 and 4 (uj and Vj, respectively) are 
correlated; puv ^  0 and in this instance, less than zero. This suggests that the equations 
need to be estimated jointly to try and control for these unobserved effects that could 
be jointly determining takeover and exit - the two dependent variables.
The correct way to estimate this would be to use two separate probit models in a 
similar way as Seemingly Unrelated Regression. Seemingly Unrelated bivariate probit 
therefore allows for the independent variables in each equation to be different. 
However, I also require the dependent variable of equation 3, takeover, to be an 
independent variable in equation 4, to identify any possible effect takeover has on the 
chances of exit. This creates a recursive system that now also controls for the 
correlation of errors in both equations. The potential endogeneity o f takeover in the 
exit equation can be ignored in the estimation, as unlike with OLS, the sample 
moments are not used; instead I am maximising the log-likelihood (Greene 2003, pp. 
715-716).
The estimation o f a (sequential) bivariate probit model does not allow for a 
multinomial dependent variable. Therefore I ignore relocations here as they are found 
to be so rare, especially with takeover.
The bivariate probit model estimating exits and takeovers is:
Pr [Z =1, T =1 | Xz , Xt] = ® 2  (Xz’az+  Taz, Xt'Pt, P ) (5)
The bivariate probit model is estimated on the full SME sample and the sample of 
non-micro SMEs (see tables 8.6 and 8.7, respectively). The correlations of the errors 
(rho) between the exit and takeover models for both the samples are statistically
174
significant and different from zero, but not very large; around -0.15 to -0.16. This 
suggests that the models should be estimated jointly.
The marginal effects are more informative than the coefficients for this model. These 
are displayed for both the probabilities of exit and takeover, separately. The marginal 
effects for the bivariate probit model are considered to be more involved (Greene 
1996, 1998) than the standard probit model. They differ as the former depends on the 
correlation coefficient and the results of the jointly estimated model (exit and 
takeover), requiring a bivariate normal distribution.
The takeover coefficients and marginal effects108 for both the full sample and the non­
micro SME samples are very similar to those shown in the standard probit models in 
the previous chapter. Both the variables’ significance and magnitude are nearly 
identical. This is perhaps due to the relatively low value of rho in these models.
The takeover results are consistent with the standard probits already presented. 
Therefore these results are not fully discussed here109. The predicted probabilities for 
takeover (and exit) are also computed in tables 8.6 and 8.7. For the full SME sample, 
the predicted probability o f takeover is 0.185 percent. This still under predicts 
takeovers relative to the observed probability (0.66 percent) and it is slightly below 
the predicted probability for the probit model in chapter 7 (0.186 percent). However, 
this is still a higher probability than those from the rare event logistic and standard 
logistic models110. This result should also control for some of the unobserved 
heterogeneity that the model in chapter 7 may have suffered from. The results here 
indicate that the standard takeover probit model does not suffer from much bias 
relative to the bivariate version.
Comparing the bivariate probit and multinomial logitistic exit results, across the vast 
majority o f variables, the direction of relationship and statistical significance are
108 Interpretation o f  the marginal effect is not straightforward across the variables due to the 
interactions. These should be included when assessing the full effect o f a variable.
109 For a full discussion o f  the takeover results please see chapter 7.
110 For the non-micro SME sample, the predicted probability o f  takeover is the same as the standard 
probit (1.64 percent), again less than the observed probability o f  2.51 percent.
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consistent between the models111. Only the interaction variable of takeover with 
employment (which captures any potential variation that acquisition may have on the 
chances of exit by firm size) differs between the models, being significant (but small) 
in the bivariate model. Qualitatively, the results for the non-micro SMEs do not differ 
from both the bivariate probit model of all SMEs (table 8.6) and also the standard 
probit takeover and exit models of non-micro SMEs (see chapter 7 - table 7.7 and 8.5 
above, respectively)112.
111 The coefficients vary between the bivariate and multinomial logistic regressions but this is mostly 
due to the different functions (normal and logistic respectively).
112 The bivariate probit model o f  takeover and exit was also estimated on the sample without the 
primary and real estate sectors. This model also did not differ from its separate takeover and exit 
probits and the full sample bivariate model.
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Table 8.6 -  Bivariate probit of exit (2006) and takeover (2005)
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect Mean value
D ependent variable exit 0.2317
Takeover 0.6727*** 0.2397 0.0066
Ln(RLP) -0.0533*** -0.0158 -0.53532
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0051*** 0.0015 1.23034
A ge 2 to 4 0.0417*** 0.0124 0.247852
Age 5 to 9 -0.1927*** -0.0546 0.224248
Age 10 to 19 -0.4761*** -0.1265 0.236512
Age 20+ years -0.6451*** -0.1569 0.158742
Ln(local unit) -0.1562*** -0.0462 0.022771
Ln(local unit)A2 0.0495*** 0.0146 0.027224
Employment -0.0096*** -0.0028 5.18
E m ploym ents 0.0001*** 1.5E-05 220.2
T akeover*employment -0.0012*** -0.0004 0.115591
Employment*ln(RLP) 0.0005*** 0.0001 -2.6012
Company -0.1353*** -0.0400 0.51009
Partnership -0.0771*** -0.0223 0.177961
Mid-periphery -0.0481*** -0.0142 0.425805
Periphery -0.0364*** -0.0107 0.246611
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0049** 0.0014 -0 .23745
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0088*** 0.0026 -0.13971
Mid-periphery*Takeover 0.0173 0.0051 0.002365
Periphery *T akeover -0.0738** -0.0212 0.001296
Takeover*ln(RLP) -0.0426*** -0.0126 -0.00225
Takeover*Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0092 0.0027 -0.00049
T akeover*Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0252 0.0074 -0.00096
Industry controls Y
Predicted probability (exit=1) 0.2194
D ependent variable takeover 0.0066
Ln(RLP) 0.0918*** 5.4E-04 -0.5353
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0198*** 1.2E-04 1.2303
Ln (local unit) -0.1478*** -8.7E-04 0.0228
Employment 0.0424*** 0.00025 5.1787
EmploymentA2 -0.0007*** -3.92E-06 220.2
E m ploym ents 3.96E-06*** 2.34E-08 27284.8
EmploymentA4 -7.84E-09*** -4.63E -11 4.5E+06
Age 2 to 4 0.1109*** 7.1E-04 0.2479
Age 5 to 9 0.1647*** 1.1E-03 0.2242
Age 10 to 19 0.1674*** 1.1E-03 0.2365
20+ years 0.1184*** 7.9E-04 0.1587
Company 0.9655*** 0.007218 0.5101
Partnership -0.0689** -3.83E-04 0.1780
Mid-periphery -0.0877*** -5.10E-04 0.4258
Periphery -0.1035*** -5.69E-04 0.2466
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0025 1.49E-05 -0.2375
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0193** 1.14E-04 -0.1397
Industry controls Y
Predicted probability (takeover=1) 0.0019
N 1,897,288
P -0.1514***
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 N.B. constants removed. Marginal effects estimated at 
sample average.
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
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Table 8.7 -  Bivariate probit of exit (2006) and takeover (2005): non-micro SMEs
Variable Coefficients Marginal effect Mean value
D ependent variable exit 0.134
Takeover 0.7309*** 0.2088 0.0251
Ln(RLP) -0.0583*** -0.0119 -0.5110
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0091*** 0.0019 1.1183
Age 2 to 4 -0.2318*** -0.0427 0.1106
Age 5 to 9 -0.5091*** -0.0852 0.1666
A ge 10 to 19 -0.6909*** -0.1249 0.3368
Age 20+ years -0.8705*** -0.1534 0.3402
Ln(iocal unit) -0.0943*** -0.0193 0.1876
Ln(local unit)A2 0.0160* 0.0033 0.2477
Employment 0.0011*** 2.2E-04 31.4855
E m ploym ents -3.2E-07 -6.5E-08 2261.1
T akeover*employment -0.0027*** -5.4E-04 1.089
Employment*ln(RLP) 0.0004*** 8.7E-05 -15.48
Company -0.1342*** -0.0287 0.7764
Partnership -0.1541*** -0.0297 0.1542
Mid-periphery -0.0635*** -0.0130 0.4356
Periphery -0.0687*** -0.0138 0.2627
M id-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0080 0.0016 -0.2396
Periphery*ln(RLP) -0.0047 -0.0010 -0.1526
Mid-periphery *Takeover 0.0169 0.0035 0.0100
Periphery*Takeover 0.0005 9.4E-05 0.0056
Takeover*ln(RLP) -0.0430 -0.0088 -0.0082
T akeover*Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0244 0.0050 -0.0022
Takeover*Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0095 0.0019 -0.0036
Industry controls Y
Predicted probability (exit=1) 0.1242
D ependent variable takeover 0.0251
Ln(RLP) 0.0720*** 0.0029 -0.5110
Ln(RLP)A2 0.0144*** 0.0006 1.1183
Ln(local unit) -0.1328*** -0.0054 0.1876
Employment 0.0189*** 0.0008 31.4855
EmploymentA2 -0.0002*** -8.7E-06 2261.1
EmploymentA3 9.9E-07*** 4.0E-08 291196
EmploymentA4 -1.6E-09** -6.5E -11 4.9E+07
Age 2 to 4 -0.0195 -0.0008 0.1106
Age 5 to 9 -0.0064 -0.0003 0.1666
Age 10 to 19 -0.0110 -0.0004 0.3368
20+ years -0.0811** -0.0032 0.3402
Company 0.8563*** 0.0234 0.7764
Partnership -0.0274 -0.0011 0.1542
Mid-periphery -0.0488*** -0.0020 0.4356
Periphery -0.0820*** -0.0032 0.2627
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0263* 0.0011 -0.2396
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0331* 0.0014 -0.1526
Industry controls Y
Predicted probability (takeover=1) 0.0164
N 177,471
P -0.1585***
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 N.B. constants removed. Marginal effects estimated at 
sample average.
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
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The key variable of interest in the bivariate probit model is takeover when exit is the 
dependent variable. The effect of SME acquisition on subsequent exit is significant 
and positive but for its full effects, its interactions need to be included. This is done in 
table 8.8 where the predicted probability of exit given takeover and the marginal 
effect of takeover on exit are shown across the three locations.
Both the probability o f exit given takeover and the marginal effect of takeovers (6.57 
percent) are highest for SMEs located in the core. The mid-periphery has the next 
highest marginal effect of takeovers on exit (6.06 percent). The smallest marginal 
effect is for SMEs located in the periphery (3.36 percent). The relative ranking of the 
regions is consistent with the results with the multinomial logistic model earlier. 
However, the magnitude of the marginal effect is lower with the bivariate probit 
model by around 3 to 4 percentage points. Therefore not accounting for correlation in 
the errors over-predicts the effects of takeovers on the chances of an SME exiting.
This is consistent with the negative value of rho and not accounting for unobserved 
effects that increase the probability of acquisition but reduce the likelihood of exit 
more generally.
Table 8.8 - Predicted probabilities and marginal effects of location and takeover 
on exit: bivariate probit
Location
Probability o f exit (2006)
P redicted  probability  
g iven  tak eo v er  (2005)
Marginal e ffec t of 
takeover (2005)
Core 30.61% 6.57%
Mid-periphery 28.61% 6.06%
Periphery 26.18% 3.36%
Source: ONS, authors’ own calculations 
NB Estimated at the sample average
8.6 Conclusion
The regional element o f acquisition-exits and -relocations are explored with a large 
sample of SMEs. I look at the effects of takeover on the chances of exit and 
relocation.
Takeovers have significant effects on the probability of an SME exiting. One year 
after takeover, the probability of exit increases by between 3 and 7 percentage points, 
once the correlation of any unobserved variables between exits and takeovers are
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included. This is consistent with takeovers being an investment decision, in which an 
element may be closure and the stripping of the small firm’s assets to take advantage 
o f synergies with the acquiring firm  However, the findings show that SME takeovers 
have a larger impact on the probability o f exit for SMEs in the core relative to the 
periphery and mid-periphery. This is not consistent with hypothesis 5; the evidence 
does not suggest there is a greater tendency for acquired firms in the periphery to 
close or relocate.
Takeovers are also found to increase the chances of relocation by between 1 and 2 
percentage points, consistent with the hypothesis that takeovers are an investment, 
utilising synergies with the acquiring firm’s assets. However, small firm relocations 
are found to be very rare, only occurring for around 1.5 percent of SMEs, making 
SME takeover-relocations extremely infrequent. The findings for both relocations and 
exits are consistent with hypothesis 4; that takeovers are an investment decision, an 
element of which might be relocation or closure to take advantage of synergies with 
the acquiring firm’s assets. The findings for exits are also consistent with the limited 
existing empirical evidence on small firm (and plant) acquisition-exits.
The positive effect of takeovers on the probability of exit, and to a lesser degree 
relocations, suggests that acquisitions may have a negative effect on regional 
productivity from the effects on the target firm (not including any possible effects on 
the acquirers or exiting entrepreneurs being able to form a new start-up), especially 
for the core. However, many small firms survive after takeover (at least after one 
year) and acquisitions may also they have an effect on performance. This is 
investigated in the next chapter.
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Appendix
Table A8.1 - Predicted probability of exit by takeover and productivity
Productivity distribution
Location 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
No takeover 24.6% 23.3% 22.0%  21.2% 20.8% 20.3% 20.0%
Takeover 36.3% 34.1% 31.8%  30.2% 29.4% 28.4% 27.8%
Marginal effect of takeover 11.7% 10.8% 9.7% 9.0% 8.6% 8.1% 7.8%
NB Estimated at the sample average 
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Chapter 9 -  Post-Acquisition Performance
9.1 Introduction
The takeover literature finds that acquisitions can affect firm performance. However, 
it contains very little evidence about acquisition effects on small firms. It is not known 
what subsequently happens to acquired SMEs’ performance. The present chapter 
addresses this gap in the literature.
With a detailed analysis, the performance in both employment and labour 
productivity, before and after takeovers, is explored. Thus the effect of acquisitions on 
SME performance can be estimated. The results show that the effects of takeover do 
not vary between regional locations, nor do they reduce employment or productivity 
for most SMEs. However, the acquisition of highly productive firms may result in a 
cut in their labour productivity. This last finding is consistent with acquirers searching 
for entrepreneurial or other intangible assets that they can absorb into their own 
business.
More generally; with performance not related to acquisitions, there are differences in 
the changes to SME productivity and employment between locations. The SMEs that 
are located in the core increase their labour productivity more than those in the 
periphery, whereas the reverse is found with employment. This finding may help to 
explain why there is a productivity gap between the core and periphery. SMEs in the 
periphery may add to employment more than their equivalent firms in the core, 
contributing to the periphery’s lesser gains in labour productivity relative to the core.
This chapter begins by introducing the hypotheses and then tests them with regard to 
SME employment and productivity after acquisition.
9.2 Hypotheses
From the literature a number of testable, and sometimes competing, hypotheses arise 
concerning SME performance after takeover and regional productivity. These are:
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6. Takeovers may provide new resources that aid small firms in improving their 
productivity and expanding their size. Alternatively, acquisitions may strip SMEs of 
their dynamism and result in decreases in performance.
7. The possible negative effect of takeovers might be more pronounced for SMEs 
located in the periphery relative to those in the core, as owners move resources, assets 
or expertise out of the former.
8. The more productive acquired firms may lose what ultimately made them a 
high performer, resulting in a loss of performance, especially for productivity, 
consistent with ‘intrapreneurship’ hunting by acquirers.
From these hypotheses, the following relationships can be formulated for firm i 
(where ‘prod’ is productivity and ‘Pr’, probability) as;
? +
Performance! =  f(Takeoveri, Periphery! *Takeoverj, Corej*Takeoveri, Prodj*Takeoveri)
9.3 Measuring a change in performance
Takeovers can be modelled as a treatment effect (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The 
effect of takeover can be measured by comparing the effect on an outcome variable 
(Y) both before and after acquisition. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 55- 
56), this can be done with the regression of;
Y« = y + K T t+ z it, i = 1,...,N, t = 0,1 (1)
where Y jt is performance at time t. 7 7 =  1 in period 1 when acquired and Tt = 0 in 
period 0 before it is taken-over. The difference in the means before and after the 
takeover confounds the causal effect of the takeover (K) and a time effect. However, 
the time effect can be identified from the non-takeover, control group. Differencing 
between these groups is known as differences-in-differences (DiD).
Following Meyer (1995) and Cameron and Trivedi’s (2005) notation, the DiD 
equation is;
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Y/t =Y + Y\Tt + y lTJ + K T /  + z {, i = l , . . . , N  t = 0,l (2)
where j denotes whether the firm is acquired (or going to be at time t =1); Tj  = 1 if j 
equals 1 and Tj  = 0 otherwise, Ttj = 1 if  both j  and t equal 1 and Ytj  = 0 otherwise, z  
is an error term with a zero mean and constant variance113.
For those that are subsequently taken-over (j =1), at time t = 0;
Y ^ y  + y ' T ' *  z)0
And at time t =1 (or after acquisition);
Yn = y + Xj + y xT x + K + zj,
The change in performance for this group is;
Yn ~ Y* = r 1+ K  + z,11- z 10 (3)
Equivalently, for those not taken-over (j =0) performance at time t =0 and t =1 is;
Y  ^ =  y  +;0 Y ^  A 0
and
Yn = Y + Y \+  ? respectively.
The difference in performance for non-acquired firms is;
^!-^=r.+z?i-4 (4)
Ignoring takeovers, performance is affected by constants y and j \  in the second period. 
Differencing against itself across time eliminates the first (fixed) effect. However, yi 
(time effect) still remains and it is present in both the first-difference equations (3 and 
4). Taking the differences between these two equations (the acquired and non­
acquired) eliminates yj;
{K  - ! £ ) - ( #  - ^ ) = K  + (Z‘ - z ' 0) - ( z “ - z % )  (5)
113 For simplicity, this model does not include covariates, although those that do not alter across time 
are captured in y.
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If the mean of the difference o f the errors can be assumed to be zero114, an unbiased 
estimate of K  is obtained; the effect of takeover. This can be estimated by using OLS 
on equation 5.
The above is based on the assumption that observable characteristics o f the treated 
and non-treatment group do not differ. Chapter 7 finds significant differences between 
acquired and non-acquired SMEs. Therefore these differences need to be controlled 
for, for example by including variables such as productivity, age, size and industry 
into a regression equation.
Performance (or growth) can be measured in a few different ways such as revenues or 
profits. Attempting to measure some of these can be difficult, especially with small 
firms (Cressy 2006). The reported value for these measures might not be wholly 
accurate as firms may have an incentive to under-report these figures to authorities to 
avoid taxation. Cressy suggests that more suitable measures for this purpose are 
employment or total assets. However, productivity is a particular variable of interest, 
and asset information is not available.
Both productivity and employment are used as the performance measures. Labour 
productivity (LP) is used as a performance measure along with employment as 
another. The latter measure may also be informative as, with the evidence on LP, it 
may reflect otherwise unmeasured changes in the intensity of capital (and other 
production inputs). For example, takeovers may result in an increase in productivity 
but reductions in employment are consistent with capital deepening. Alternatively, if 
takeovers result in no change in productivity, but rather an increase in employment, 
then this would be consistent with capital widening115.
To measure real changes in productivity across time, price deflators are required. 
However, deflators are not available for all sectors. The change in nominal 
productivity is used and the effects of inflation are included in the summary statistics. 
A general price index could be used but this is captured in the common time effect 
(«i) and is removed when differencing acquired and non-taken-over SMEs.
114 This assumes the same error structure for acquired firms and non-acquired firms.
115 This is also consistent with a reduction and an increase in x-inefficiency, respectively.
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For multivariate analysis, controlling for industry effects will capture any common 
sector-wide inflation. The alternative measure of performance (employment) is simply 
measured as the number of employees and is not affected by inflation. However, in 
the case of employment, it is not possible to control for labour force quality changes 
in the data.
The firm effects of a takeover may take a considerable time to be realised (Bernard 
and Jensen 2007; Lichtenberg et al. 1987) and the timing of changes in performance 
may vary between firms (Ashcroft and Love 1993). The length of time it takes for 
performance to alter after an acquisition is likely to be more of an issue for larger, 
more complex, firms. However, longer post-acquisition periods make it more difficult 
to identify the takeover as the cause of any change in performance116.
Due to data constraints, the effects of takeover over 2 or 5 years are examined 
depending on the sample period. This is done by using two different samples of firms. 
The original 2004 sample is utilised (with takeover measured in 2005) and another 
sample of SMEs from 2001 (with takeover measured in 2002). The earlier sample 
allows performance to be measured over a longer period. It also allows the results to 
be compared across different time periods.
9.4 Preliminary Analysis of Performance
The performance measures (productivity and employment) are compared before and 
after acquisition by region.
Performance across the periods is measured as the difference of the logarithm level of 
either productivity or employment between two periods117. The differences are 
computed separately for those SMEs that are acquired and not taken-over. The 
difference in the mean differences is then examined. This is effectively a naive 
estimate o f the DiD of takeovers. It does not control for any other factors such as 
inflation, industry or size. Also is does not control for selection. Performance after
1.6 Using a longer time period could also increase the inflationary price effects.
1.7 The change in performance is equivalent to the region’s log growth rate; (LPt+n/LP,.i).
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acquisition is only observed for SMEs that do survive, it is not observed for firms that 
exit during the period.
9.4.1 Labour productivity
Tables 9.1 to 9.3 show the DiD estimates (final column) of takeovers on productivity 
for the periods 2004-07, 2001 to 2007 and 2001 to 2004 respectively. On average, 
acquisitions have a positive effect on SME productivity for most regions in the 
periods 2004 to 2007 and 2001 to 2007. However, very few of these results are 
statistically significant.
In the first period, 2004 to 2007, Yorkshire and Humberside (0.181) and West 
Midlands (0.177) have the highest increases in productivity from takeovers (measured 
in 2005). These differences are also statistically significant. Other significant results 
are South West (0.126) and the South East (0.094). For the other regions, the change 
in productivity for acquired SMEs is not statistically different from those that are not 
acquired in the period 2004 to 2007.
For the longer post-acquisition period- 5 years (2002 to 2007) - the DiD of takeovers 
(measured in 2002) on productivity finds only significant results for Wales (0.159, at 
the 10 percent level), London (-0.088, at the 10 percent level) and the South East (- 
0.128)118. However, these last two regions have negative effects, indicating that 
takeovers in 2002 may have deleterious effects on SME productivity in core regions 
over the period 2001 to 2007.
The final period, 2001 to 2004 (with takeovers measured in 2002) table 9.3, shows 
that, in most regions, takeovers have possibly negative effects on average SME 
productivity. However, the only statistically significant effect is for acquired SMEs in 
the South East (-0.097). Takeovers of SMEs in all other regions have no significant 
effect on labour productivity over the period 2001 to 2004.
118 The estimate for the South East (and to a lesser degree London) for the period 2001-07 is not 
consistent with the estimate for the period 2004-07 not only because it is over a shorter period, but 
critically, it uses a different year for takeovers -  2002 and 2005 respectively. This may be indicative o f  
the differential effects o f  takeovers across the stock market trend, at least for these regions.
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Table 9.1 -  DiD estimate of SME takeovers in 2005 on labour productivity 2004-
2007 by region
Region
Mean Difference 
of LP (2004-07) 
of non-acquired
Mean Difference 
of LP (2004-07) 
of acquired
Standard Errors 
of the Mean 
Difference of LP 
of acquired
DiD of 
takeovers on 
productivity 
(2004-07)
Wales 0.009 0.071 0.069 0.061
N. East 0.013 -0 .009 0.094 -0.022
York. & Hum. -0.001 0.179 0.044 0.181***
. N. West 0.004 0.055 0.039 0.051
W. Mid. -0.006 0.171 0.047 0.177***
E. Mid. -0.011 -0 .014 0.050 -0.003
S. West -0.024 0.102 0.048 0.126***
Scot. 0.013 0.085 0.051 0.072
E. Eng. -0 .018 0.015 0.038 0.033
S. East -0.066 0.029 0.029 0.094***
London -0 .018 -0.012 0.029 0.006
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Takeover measured in 2005 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 9.2 -  DiD estimate of SME takeovers in 2002 on labour productivity 2001-
2007 by region
Region
Mean Difference 
of LP of non- 
acquired
Mean Difference 
of LP of 
acquired
Standard 
Errors of the 
Mean 
Difference of 
LP of 
acquired
DiD of 
takeovers 
on
productivity
Wales 0.099 0.254 0.095 0.159*
N. East 0.119 0.145 0.107 0.038
York. & Hum. 0.086 0.014 0.060 -0.046
N. West 0.086 0.060 0.067 -0.007
W. Mid. 0.063 0.071 0.068 0.003
E. Mid. 0.061 0.164 0.062 0.101
S. West 0.043 0.095 0.067 0.028
Scot. 0.107 0.120 0.073 0.047
E. Eng. 0.040 0.054 0.059 -0.005
S. East 0.026 -0.081 0.047 -0.128***
London 0.019 -0.046 0.042 -0.088**
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Takeover measured in 2002 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 9.3 -  DiD estimate of SME takeovers in 2002 on labour productivity 2001-
2004 by region
Region
Mean Difference 
of LP of non- 
acquired
Mean Difference 
of LP of 
acquired
Standard 
Errors of the 
Mean 
Difference of 
LP of 
acquired
DiD of 
takeovers 
on
productivity
Wales 0.066 0.023 0.094 -0.071
N. East 0.087 0.193 0.092 0.101
York. & Hum. 0.072 -0.024 0.059 -0.083
N. West 0.060 -0.008 0.048 -0.056
W. Mid. 0.050 0.002 0.051 -0.048
E. Mid. 0.058 0.044 0.053 -0.009
S. West 0.048 0.071 0.057 0.014
Scot. 0.076 0.053 0.064 -0.011
E. Eng. 0.039 0.053 0.051 0.002
S. East 0.027 -0.060 0.036 -0.097***
London 0.018 -0.014 0.035 -0.048
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Takeover measured in 2002 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
9.4.2 Employment
The effect o f takeovers on SME regional employment with DiDs is shown in tables 
9.4 to 9.6 over the same periods as before: 2004 to 2007, 2001 to 2007 and 2001 to 
2004, respectively. The effect of takeovers on SME employment appears to vary 
depending on the time period.
For the first period shown, 2004 to 2007, takeovers (in 2005) appear to reduce 
employment across all regions. However, very few of these effects are statistically 
significant. Only taken-over SMEs in Wales (-0.084) and East England (-0.067 
percent) have an average change in employment that is significantly different (at 10 
percent level) from non-acquired firms.
In the period 2001 to 2007 (with takeover now measured in 2002), the results appear 
to be a little more mixed: there are both negative and positive effects of takeovers. 
However, the only effects that are statistically significant are the positive results for 
Yorkshire and Humberside (0.129, at the 5 percent level), South East (0.144) and East 
England (0.083, at the 10 percent level).
For the final period, 2001 to 2004 (with takeovers over measured in 2002), despite
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some negative results, the only significant ones are positive. Takeovers are found to 
significantly increase average SME employment in Yorkshire and Humberside 
(0.134), East England (0.101), London (0.088) and South East (0.158). For all other 
regions there is no significant effect of takeovers on average SME employment.
Table 9.4 -  DiD estimate of SME takeovers in 2005 on employment 2004-2007 by
region
Region
Mean Difference 
of emp. of non- 
acquired
Mean Difference 
of emp. of 
acquired
Standard 
Errors of the 
Mean 
Difference 
of emp. of 
acquired
DiD of 
takeovers 
on emp.
Wales 0.067 -0.017 0.043 -0.084**
N. East 0.083 0.025 0.051 -0.058
York. & Hum. 0.067 0.053 0.032 -0.014
N. West 0.065 0.044 0.027 -0.021
W. Mid. 0.049 0.011 0.029 -0.038
E. Mid. 0.060 0.013 0.032 -0.047
S. West 0.065 0.043 0.031 -0.022
Scot. 0.075 0.035 0.032 -0.041
E. Eng. 0.050 -0.017 0.029 -0.067**
S. East 0.045 0.025 0.020 -0.020
London 0.044 0.021 0.020 -0.022
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Takeover measured in 2005 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 9.5 -  DiD estimate of SME takeovers in 2002 on employment 2001-2007 by
region
Region
Mean Difference 
of emp. of non- 
acquired
Mean Difference 
of em p. of 
acquired
Standard 
Errors of 
the Mean 
Difference 
of emp. of 
acquired
DiD of 
takeovers 
on emp.
Wales 0.071 -0.021 0.075 -0.092
N. East 0.095 -0 .005 0.102 -0.100
York. & Hum. 0.082 0.211 0.060 0.129**
N. West 0.083 0.092 0.049 0.009
W. Mid. 0.070 0.052 0.048 -0.018
E. Mid. 0.082 0.012 0.050 -0.071
S. West 0.094 0.097 0.056 0.004
Scot. 0.078 -0 .004 0.069 -0 .082
E. Eng. 0.069 0.152 0.048 0.083*
S. East 0.076 0.220 0.038 0.144***
London 0.080 0.117 0.032 0.037
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Takeover measured in 2002 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 9.6 — DiD estimate of SME takeovers in 2002 on employment 2001-2004 by
region
Region
Mean Difference 
of emp. of non- 
acquired
Mean Difference 
of emp. of 
acquired
Standard Errors 
of the Mean 
Difference of 
emp. of acquired
DiD of 
takeovers 
on emp.
Wales 0.026 0.046 0.073 -0.027
N. East 0.044 0.046 0.058 -0.012
York. & Hum. 0.042 0.174 0.040 0.134***
N. West 0.043 0.066 0.035 0.032
W. Mid. 0.041 0.089 0.037 0.052
E. Mid. 0.044 0.028 0.040 -0.012
S. West 0.045 0.114 0.045 0.069
Scot. 0.023 0.028 0.050 -0.021
E. Eng. 0.041 0.137 0.036 0.101***
S. East 0.048 0.185 0.027 0.158***
London 0.055 0.112 0.023 0.088***
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Takeover measured in 2002 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
The results of the productivity and employment DiDs suggest a degree of regional and 
inter-temporal heterogeneity. Not all regions register a significant effect on 
employment or productivity from takeovers. For those that do, this preliminary 
analysis suggests the effects are not consistent between the periods.
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In terms of the likely effects on the core-periphery productivity gap, the evidence does 
not suggest that takeovers in more peripheral regions reduce productivity there. For 
SMEs in London and the South East (both core regions) a negative acquisition effect 
on productivity is found for the period 2001 to 2007. This also occurs for the latter in 
2001-04.
The lack o f consistent findings with this method across both regions and time might 
be due to two problems. First, takeovers are a rare event, as documented in the 
previous chapter. Few observations involving acquired SMEs may increase the 
regional standard errors. This might be overcome with the use of the location 
variables: core, periphery and mid-periphery. Second, the analysis uses a simple DiD 
estimate of the effects of takeovers. It does not control for factors such as industry 
(including sector level inflation), age, initial productivity and size. Also, selection is 
not controlled for. These are all controlled for in the following sections.
9.5 Multivariate Estimation of Performance
The model below shows the performance estimation equation;
Yt-i-Yt+n = Yi + KTakeovert + y2 ln(RLPt-i) + yjEntityt.i + y^Agen +
^Industry t-1 + y^Locationt-i + yzEmploymentu + ysStructuret-i + 
y9Locationt-i*Takeovert + y;oln(RLPt-i)*Takeovert + yy/Employmentt.i*Takeovert + Zi
(6)
where Y is either the logarithm o f productivity or employment and all other variables 
are as specified in previous chapters. The dependent variable is the change of 
performance and the regressors are in levels.
Using the hypotheses from the beginning o f the section, the following relationships 
can be tested using equation 6. Hypothesis 6 is that SME takeovers may either 
improve post-acquisition performance K>0 or hinder it K<0119. Hypothesis 7 is that 
the takeovers in the periphery are more detrimental to performance than those in the
119 Strictly, this coefficient does not capture the total effect o f takeovers; interactions need to be 
included but makes the exposition more complicated. The interactions are included in all subsequent 
calculations.
192
core (y9<0). Hypothesis 8, more productive acquired SMEs are more likely to be 
adversely affected by takeovers and suffer a deterioration of performance (yio<0); 
consistent with ‘intrapreneurship’ hunting.
Performance controls
The technique of DiDs controls for the initial level of performance. This is important 
when comparing productivity levels across different industries. The type of industry 
may also have an effect on the change in productivity between periods. This also has 
an effect on the likelihood of takeover. If takeover-intensive industries also have 
larger increases in performance, this change might be wrongly accredited to 
acquisitions. The inclusion o f industry dummies will control for this as well as for any 
industry-wide changes, such as the use of new technology. Importantly this will also 
include inflation.
Nominal output is used in the productivity measure because of a lack of suitable 
industry-level deflators for the entire sample. Therefore it is possible that some of the 
change in productivity observed in the previous analysis is caused by industry-wide 
inflation.
The level of productivity relative to the industry average (RLP) is also controlled for. 
Absolute size (employment) is included for both the change in productivity and 
employment. A proportionate increase in employment can be very large for the 
smallest firms; a one-employer firm can increase its size by 100 percent by only 
adding an additional employee. An employer with 150 employees would need to 
increase employment by 150 workers to achieve the same rate of change.
Size may also have an effect on the change of productivity. Smaller firms might be 
more dynamic and may experience greater changes to their productivity. Therefore 
size is controlled for in both the employment and productivity performance 
estimations.
Takeover is also interacted with size to try and capture this effect and investigate 
whether there is any size heterogeneity in the takeover effect on performance. In
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earlier chapters it has been documented that the sample mostly consists of very small 
firms. The inclusion of takeover interacted with size is used to capture any possible 
variation in the acquisition effect between the smallest and relatively larger SMEs.
9.5.1 Methodological problems
Methodological problems need to be considered before the multivariate analysis of 
performance after acquisition can be conducted.
Sample selection
Firm performance is measured across a number of years. For a firm to be included in 
the estimation it needs to exist both at the beginning period (t-1) and the end (t+n). As 
performance is measured a number of years after takeover, a significant proportion of 
SMEs will not be observed in the end period. Estimating model 6 in its current form 
will produce coefficients that are only representative of surviving SMEs and the 
estimated model may therefore be subject to sample selection bias.
Following Greene (2003) and Baum (2006), the equation of interest for firm i is;
Y i = y n ii  + zj (la)
and selection is determined by;
Xj = p Wj + v, (7)
where m and w are matrices of independent variables and X  is exit, consistent with 
the previous chapter.
Y  is only observed conditional on the outcome of X j. If  X , is equal to zero; a firm has 
survived and performance is observed in subsequent periods. If Xj equals one then 
performance is not observed. This is the selection model120.
Selection can be explained by a set of explanatory factors (w) that contain all m 
variables and some additional factors. These additional variables are the exclusion 
restriction, of which there should be at least one variable that helps to explain whether
120 It is assumed that the error term in the selection equation (v) has a zero-conditioned mean, E{wv) = 0 
impying that £(m z) = 0.
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an observation is selected (survives) but does not relate to the outcome variable 
(performance).
A degree o f correlation (p) between the errors z and v (including any omitted 
variables), gives rise to problems as the latter error is not observed but is related to x 
as shown. I f  both the errors are normally distributed with zero means, E[z|v] = pv, 
from (la) it can be shown;
£ [ Y i | W j , v ] = y m i  +  pVj
v is not observed but X is related to it according to equation 7. Therefore;
£ [ Y j |  W j,X i]=  y n ii  +  p E [ v j  | W i,X ,]
The case o f observability; the conditional expectation that E [v j | W j ,X J  for X j = 0, is 
A,j, the Inverse Mill Ratio (IMR). This can be added to equation la;
£ [ Y j |  W i, X j  =  0 ]  =  y m j +  p \x(J5 W j)
If the correlation between the errors is non-zero then estimates of the la  will not be 
consistent unless the IMR is included as it includes the parameters, Wj, from above. 
Therefore the parameters that relate to whether a firm has survived needs to be 
included to account for the selection of not observing firm’s performance for exits.
A selection model, as devised by Heckman (1979), can control for this selection bias. 
This involves estimating a selection model and transforming its estimates to be 
factored into the outcome model. Probit selection and outcome equations are jointly 
estimated with maximum-likelihood so that estimates of y, p  and p  are obtained.
For a selection model to be effective, a unique variable is required in the selection 
equation which explains survival but not performance (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
Variables that explain the latter, and that are observed, are already included in the 
outcome part of the model.
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Using the theory of the firm, it is difficult to suggest potential variables that are 
relevant to whether a firm survives but not related to a firm’s performance. It is even 
more difficult to do this with the variables that are available within the present data 
set.
One option is to use the same regressors in both equations. This can result in a poorly 
performing model as well as instability in the coefficients of Heckman selection 
models (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) can be highly 
correlated with the outcome equation’s regressors (Puhani 2000). This can create 
multicollinearity problems unless the selection equation is able to discriminate well 
between the observed and unobserved.
A similar problem to this is overcome in Dunne and Hughes (1994). There they use 
non-linear specifications of existing variables in the selection equation. This is the 
method adopted here.
The selection component of the Heckman maximum-likelihood (ML) model is 
specified below. It predicts whether a firm is observed between t-1 and t+n121;
Selection! = f(Agej, Takeover*, SizeEj, SizeV, ln(LUj), ln(LUj)2, ln(RLPj), ln(RLPj)2, 
ln(RLPj)*SizeEi, Entity;, Location!, Locationi*In(RLP)j, Location!*Takeover!, 
Takeoverj*ln(RLPj), SizeEj*Takeoverj, Industry*) (8)
The regressors in bold type within equation 8 are the unique variables that are not 
included in the performance model122. The unique variables used in this selection 
model are polynomials (square) of existing regressors (productivity and size -  both 
employee and local units). The others are interactions.
121 The selection model is very similar to the exit one in the preceding chapter. The exit model 
measures non-survival over a shorter time period 2004-06, measuring it one year after acquisition to 
strengthen the causality. It is likely that exits beyond one year from takeover are less (directly) caused 
by acquisition.
122 This is sometimes also referred to as the outcome part o f the selection model.
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The novel interactions to the selection part are location with productivity and size 
with productivity. The first capture the effect that competitive pressures may have a 
differential effect by location, so lower productivity firms may be able to survive in 
less competitive areas, such as the periphery. Size is interacted with productivity to 
produce another unique variable in the selection equation. This variable, along with 
the size variables, should capture the increased chances of survival that a relatively 
larger firm has and this is improved further if it is more productive. Larger firms may 
have higher fixed costs and this may prevent the negative effects of productivity as 
suggested in Hopenhayn (1992). The firms likely to have the highest chance of exit 
are the smallest and least productive (both jointly and independently).
Using interaction terms and polynomials of existing variables to try and address the 
problem of identification in the selection model may still result in the exclusion 
restriction only being satisfied by the degree of non-linearity in the (inverse) Mills 
ratio (IMR) (Hall 1987). Models with few exclusion restrictions, a high degree of 
censoring and low variability among the regressors (or large error variance in the 
selection equation) can all contribute to the near collinearity between regressors and 
the IMR (Leung and Yu 1996, p. 201).
Given the susceptibility o f Heckman selection methods to collinearity problems, a 
two-part model is estimated separately in addition to the (full information) ML 
selection model, as suggested by Puhani (2000)123.
The first part of the two-part model is effectively the estimates in chapter 8; the exit 
model. The second part of the model is simply equation (6) estimated by OLS, but the 
coefficients are only relevant to SMEs that survive across the entire period.
Endogeneity
Takeover and performance are linked. In chapter 7 more productive SMEs are found
123 A very high correlation amongst the regressors in the second part o f  the selection model suggests 
multicollinearity is present (no specific test for multicollinearity exists). However, the estimation 
sample is extremely large and, as shown in the results later, most o f the regressors are statistically 
significant. No variables appear to have extreme values, large standard errors are not observed and the 
model does not struggle to converge when estimated. Therefore none o f  the common potential effects 
o f  multicollinearity are found. Multicollinearity might be present in my selection model but not o f its 
consequences are. As multicollinearity does not violate OLS assumptions (Greene 2003), it is ignored.
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to have an increased likelihood of acquisition. Without a takeover, firms may 
subsequently improve their productivity. Therefore acquisitions may not cause 
productivity to improve; causation might be the other way. An unobservable 
characteristic might make the firm more productive, whilst also making it more 
desirable for acquisition. This could result in the post-acquisition productivity also 
being high. Therefore takeover might not be independent of the level o f performance, 
as acquisitions could be endogenous. To reduce the possible problem of endogeneity, 
DiD is used.
Productivity is measured both before and after takeover and the difference is 
compared to non-acquired SMEs. This removes fixed variables that are both observed 
and unobservable, which might also affect the chances of takeover (see equations (2) 
to (5))124. If  takeovers are correlated with fixed effects then DiDs will control for this.
The effects of observable characteristics, such as size or industry, are controlled for 
that may affect the change in performance and are correlated to takeovers (see chapter 
7). However, if takeovers are positively related to post-acquisition performance, it 
might be that acquired firms are bought because of some unobservable characteristic 
that also generates high productivity growth125.
Growth persistence and serial correlation
The measure of SME performance chosen -  the difference in productivity or 
employment, is also a measure of growth. If SME growth is persistent from one 
period to another then this can create serial correlation in the performance measure. 
Serial correlation can cause the estimates of equation 6 to be inconsistent when 
estimated by OLS. This is investigated with two 3-year productivity growth rates 
(2001 to 2004 and 2004 to 2007). Following Dunne and Hughes (1994), who were 
also concerned with growth persistence in their analysis o f firm growth, the later
124 DiD does not control for unobserved temporary effects that are specific to the firm that may affect 
the likelihood takeover.
125 A common solution to the endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variables. Similar work 
looking at the effect o f  acquisitions, or ownership change, is carried out elsewhere, see, for example, 
McGuckin and Nguyen (2001). An identification problem, similar to the selection problem arises 
where variables are required that are correlated with takeover but not performance change. 
Conceptually this is difficult and practically it is nearly impossible as all o f  the available variables are 
used (and significant) in predicting takeovers.
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period’s growth is regressed on the earlier period’s growth for just those SMEs that 
survive over the entire period;
(lnY07-  lnY04) = a  + p(lnY04-  InYoi) (9)
Equation (9) is estimated by OLS and the results are reported below for both 
productivity and employment. The regression sample is only of SMEs that survive 
from 2001 to 2007. This is just over half of the SMEs sample. The coefficient on past 
growth is statistically significant but negative (see table 9.7). However, the past 
change in productivity and employment (2001 to 2004) only explains 8 percent of the 
variability o f the change in productivity and 2 percent of employment respectively.
Previous growth or performance change cannot be observed for nearly half o f the 
sample. For SMEs where it can be observed, growth persistence is small, weak and 
negative, as in Dunne and Hughes (1994). Prior changes in performance appear to be 
a relatively poor predictor of later changes. Also given the substantial proportion of 
SMEs where prior growth is not observed, I do not consider that the analysis suffers 
from the persistence of growth126.
Table 9.7 — Growth persistence regression results
lnYo7-lnY04 'inY 07 -  lnY04
Variable (Productivity) (Employment)
InYw-lnYo! -0.266*** -0.136***
N 954,925 954,925
Adj. R2 0.08 0.02
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
N.B. Constants removed
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Heteroskedasticity
A potentially significant problem with estimating performance is heteroskedasticity. 
The variance of performance change (or growth) might vary by firm characteristics 
such as the size of the firm, as found in Dunne and Hughes (1994). Small firms might
126 A potentially linked source o f  upward bias can occur when lagged dependent variables are included 
in the estimation (Nickell 1981). SME fixed effects o f  productivity are removed when DiDs are used 
(see equation 3). Also equation 6 shows that the prior level o f productivity is included but this is not LP 
(used for the dependent variable) but RLP.
199
have a much higher variance of performance change relative to larger SMEs. It is not 
only size that may be a factor but also age. If the model of firm evolution is consistent 
with Jovanovic (1982), then younger firms may also display a greater variation in 
performance. If heteroskedasticity is present, OLS estimates remain unbiased, 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed (Greene 2003). However, the 
estimate will be inefficient with biased standard errors. This bias may lead to incorrect 
t values resulting in erroneous inference of variables (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).
To try to account for heteroskedasticity, both age and (absolute) size are controlled for 
in the performance estimation model. However, a Breusch-Pagan test finds the null o f 
homoskedasticity is rejected in the OLS estimations. Given the uncertainty of the 
exact nature of any potential heteroskedasticity and that not all methods can be 
integrated into a selection model, Huber-White robust standard errors are used in both 
the OLS and ML selection models127 128.
Time and business cycle effects
The DiD measure shows the difference in performance between SMEs that have and 
have not been acquired. The difference estimate uses two time periods, removing 
common time trends (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Any time effects that differ 
between the acquired and non-acquired SMEs will be reflected in the takeover 
variable. The inclusion o f independent variables with the DiD method will account for 
some of the heterogeneous time effects. For example, inflation is not accounted for in 
the productivity measures and this may vary by industry. This can be controlled for 
with industry variables.
Other effects that will vary with time might be linked to business cycles and stock 
market effects. Business cycles are likely to affect firm performance but can be 
ignored with DiDs if they affect the acquired and non-acquired equally. However, if
127 A probit model is used in the selection equation. In probit (and logit) models, heteroskedasticity 
causes problems to the conditional means and not just the conditional variances (Greene 2003). This 
can result in inconsistent coefficient estimates. Using a robust option to compute standard errors does 
not deal with this. Therefore the use o f  robust standard errors may only reduce the problems o f  
heteroskedasticity in the second (performance) part o f the model. A heteroskedastic consistent probit 
estimator within a selection model is not explored.
128 The weighted least squares are not used.
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performance is measured across different years then it is possible that the effects of 
takeover may vary across time.
Performance is measured at different intervals over the period 2001 to 2007. Figure
9.1 shows the UK growth rate between 1995 and 2008. For the period used, the 
growth rate is fairly constant at between 2-3 percent.
Figure 9.1 - UK GDP Growth 1995 to 2008
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Source: ONS (2009b)
N.b constant prices (2003)
Within the two sub-periods 2001 to 2004 and 2004 to 2007, the growth of the 
economy is also broadly equivalent, 2.56 percent for 2001 to 2004 and 2.65 percent 
for 2004 to 2007 (table 9.8). It is therefore unlikely that the business cycle may affect 
the results differentially between periods, as UK growth is relatively constant across 
the periods used for the analysis.
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Table 9.8 -  UK GDP Growth Statistics 2001 to 2007
Growth 2001-04 2.56%*
Growth 2004-07 2.65%*
Average growth rate 2001-07 2.58%
Source: ONS (2009b)
Nb constant prices (2003)
‘Compounded annual growth rates
Changes in the stock market may alter the motivations and effects of takeovers. A 
buoyant stock market can increase the market value of acquiring firms. This can lead 
to easier access to funds, at least for listed firms, and perhaps make it easier for 
acquirers to develop acquired firms. A change in the stock market may also reflect a 
change in expectations for future growth. A rising stock market might mean 
acquisitions are undertaken to allow firms to try and take advantage of the more 
favourable environment (Mueller 1969,1977 in Melicher et al. 1983, p. 424). This 
might cause further investment in the acquired firm, improving its performance. 
Alternatively, more acquirers in a rising market might result in a form of diminishing 
returns. Acquirers might be attracted into the market that is less suitable and able to 
invest and expand an acquired firm. This might lower after acquisition performance, 
increase the chances of exit or both.
The trend of the stock market varies over the periods used to measure post-acquisition 
performance. Table 9.9 shows the growth of the FTSE 100129 across the period 2001- 
2007. During the first period used for the analysis, 2001 to 2004, the FTSE fell at an 
annual rate of around 10 percent. The second period used, 2004 to 2007, when the 
FTSE grew at an annual rate of around 12 percent. The difference in market 
performance across the periods is likely to be reflected in the after acquisition 
performance of SMEs. This may partially explain some of the different results 
between periods in the preliminary analysis of performance change shown above.
129 For a graphical representation o f  these data see chapter 7 - figure 7.4.
202
Table 9.9 -  FTSE 100 2001 to 2007
Period
C om pounded 
annual growth ra tes
2001-04 -10.4%
2004-07 11.6%
2001-07 0.0%
Source: Yahoo Finance (2009)
9.6 Multivariate Performance Results
OLS and selection models are compared across each of the three periods for both 
productivity and employment performance. A change in the results between the OLS 
and selection estimates suggests the effects of exits are being captured in the latter’s 
estimation130.
9.6.1 SME productivity performance
The effect of takeovers on productivity is presented across three periods: 2004 to 
2007, 2001 to 2004 and 2001 to 2007 (tables 9.10 to 9.12, respectively). The results 
for both the OLS and selection models are presented. For each period, the selection 
model’s coefficients relating to performance are in the top half and in the lower one 
the coefficients relating to whether an SME survives the period are presented.
Table 9.10 shows the results for the period 2004 to 2007, where takeovers are 
identified in 2005. The statistical significance of rho (p) in the selection models 
indicates whether sample selection is present. In the selection model (with robust 
standard errors) a Wald test finds a significant degree of correlation with 99 percent 
confidence131. Few differences exist between the two models. Likely causes of this are 
a weakly specified selection model or selection bias does not have an effect on the 
results.
130 The OLS and ML selection models differ very little for most models o f  productivity and 
employment. This could occur for a couple o f  reasons. First, perhaps there is little sample selection is 
present in the OLS models. However, rho is significant in all o f  the selection models. Alternatively, it 
could be caused by a poor fitting selection model (Bushway et al. 2007). Given identification problems 
discussed previously, it is likely that the model is not fully accounting for attrition and this is reflected 
in our final outcome estimates in the selection model.
131 When robust standard errors are used with ML estimation, likelihood ratio tests are inappropriate 
and Wald tests should be used (Sribney 1997a).
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The performance findings described next are applicable to both the OLS and selection 
models. The coefficient on takeover is significant (with 99 percent confidence in the 
selection model) and positive. To assess the total effect of acquisitions on 
productivity, the variable interactions with takeover need to be included. The 
takeover-location (e.g. Periphery *Takeover) interactions are negative but statistically 
insignificant across the models. However, the interactions of takeover with 
productivity (Takeover*ln(RLP)) and employment (Takeover*Employment) are 
significant and negative.
Using the coefficients from the selection model, the total effect of takeovers can be 
estimated by differentiating model 6 (the estimated equation) by takeovers (T);
Y'*" ~  h  F'-'  ^= 0.21822 - 0.31995 * ln(RLP,,) -  0.00119 * Employment,, + 0 * Location 
A 7)
The total effect of acquisitions on productivity for the period 2004 to 2007 varies 
depending on the prior level o f  (relative) productivity and employment. The results 
indicate that takeovers may increase productivity and even more so if SMEs are less 
productive and smaller. At the sample averages, the effects of takeovers are;
0.21822-0.31995* -0.5353-0.00119*5.18 = 0.38
This suggests that takeovers increase productivity by 38 percent for average SMEs.
However, this is a little misleading as the takeover analysis suggests that more 
productive and relatively larger SMEs have a higher chance of takeover, both of 
which have a reductive effect on the takeover effect on performance.
Looking just at productivity, solving the above derivative = 0, and when employment 
is at the mean value;
0.31995*ln(RLP) = 0.21822-0.00119*5.18 
RLP= 1.94
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Takeovers increase productivity for averaged sized SMEs with prior RLP below 1.9. 
For firms with high relative productivity (greater than 1.9 when taken at the average 
size), takeovers reduce performance. The tipping point of productivity, that when 
higher than, results in a negative effect for takeovers on productivity is reduced for 
larger firms. For example, an SME with employment of 100, the level of productivity 
is only 1.36. Beyond this point, takeovers have a negative effect for SMEs with 
employment of 100.
This result for highly productive firms (regardless of size) is consistent with 
‘intrapreneurship’ hunting by acquirers and the acquired firms losing what ultimately 
made them a high performer. As the location-takeover interactions are insignificant, 
no location heterogeneity is found in the effect of takeovers upon productivity 
performance for the period 2004 to 2007. This is inconsistent with hypothesis 7.
Looking at the other variables, the coefficient on the prior level o f productivity is 
negative and significant. This indicates that it has an inverse relationship with the 
change in productivity -  more productive firms are likely to suffer a fall in 
performance subsequently132. This is likely to be caused by reversion to the mean; 
high or low performing SMEs return to more average levels of performance.
The location variables are both significantly different from the omitted case, the core. 
They indicate once variables such as size and industry are controlled for, SMEs 
located outside of the core are likely to suffer a relatively lower change in 
performance. This is suggestive of a widening (labour) productivity gap between 
SMEs in the core and more peripheral regions.
Below the performance results are the estimates from the selection part of the 
Heckman ML equation. It shows the effects on the probability of an SME surviving 
from 2004 to 2007. Some o f the coefficients of this equation are also of interest as the 
specification is effectively the same as the exit model in the previous chapter133. The 
selection equation shows that takeovers in 2005 decrease the chances of the SME
132 The full effect o f  productivity also needs to include its interaction with takeover.
133 The relevant model in the previous chapter looked at the probability of exit and so it is the inverse o f  
this one. A negative coefficient here is equivalent to a positive one in the exit model.
205
surviving until 2007, consistent with the previous chapter’s findings. Location- 
takeover interactions are also included and for the mid-periphery this is negative but 
not statistically significant. For the periphery, this interaction is positive and 
significant (at the 95 percent level). This indicates that takeovers in the periphery 
increase the chances o f an SME surviving two years after acquisition, relative to the 
core. However, the periphery-takeover coefficient is smaller (in absolute terms) than 
the takeover coefficient, so the total effect o f SME acquisitions in the periphery is to 
increase their probability o f exit134.
The next table (9.11) shows the results for the period 2001 to 2007. The sample of 
SMEs is from 2001 and takeovers are identified in 2002 with the change in 
productivity being measured over 6 years (5 years135 after takeover). The results from 
the selection model (second regression in table 9.11) show rho is significant according 
to the Wald test, indicating sample selection bias is present and significant.
A few differences exist between the OLS and selection models. In the latter, the 
coefficient on takeover is insignificant from zero. However, with the OLS model, 
takeovers have a significant effect. As for the interactions, the takeover-employment 
interaction is insignificant in the selection model but significant in the OLS version. 
The location-takeover variables are both positive but statistically insignificant136. 
However, the productivity-takeover interaction is significant and negative (in both 
models). The total effect o f takeovers for this period according to the selection model 
is that they may increase performance for the least productive SMEs but the reverse 
for the most productive. No location-takeover effect exists, consistent with the 
previous period137.
In both of the models for this period, SMEs in the mid-periphery and periphery have 
lower increases in productivity relative to the core, also consistent with the previous
134 This ignores the interaction o f  takeover with employment as it is statistically insignificant.
135 2002 to 2007
136 Mid-periphery-takeover is statistically significant with 95 percent confidence with OLS.
137 The main differences between the OLS and selection models for the period 2001-07 are with the age 
and business entity variables. The age category o f  2 to 4 years is statistically insignificant in the 
selection model but positive and significant in the OLS model. This is consistent with the more general 
effects o f  age being that older SMEs experience falls in productivity relative to younger firms. Also, 
the effect o f  being registered a partnership results in lower productivity performance relative to self­
proprietors (this is positive in the OLS model).
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period’s results.
The results from the selection equations for the period 2001 to 2007 are below the 
productivity estimates. The coefficient on takeover is positive but only significant at 
the 90 percent level in explaining survival138.
The final period, 2001 to 2004 (table 9.12), is with the same sample o f firms as 
previous but performance is measured over a shorter period after acquisition (two 
years)139. Rho on the selection model is significant, indicating sample selection is 
present.
In the selection model, the takeover coefficient is positive but statistically 
insignificant, as are the location-takeover interactions. In the OLS model the takeover 
variable (but not the location interactions) is significant. However, the takeover 
interactions with productivity and employment are significant and negative in both 
models. At the sample average for productivity and size, takeovers increase 
productivity consistent with the results for the period 2004-07 above. However, this 
depends on the size and productivity o f  SMEs. Using the coefficients from the 
selection model for the period 2001-04, the total effect of takeovers can be estimated 
by differentiating model 6 (the estimated equation) by takeovers (T);
^l+n—  ^ = 0 + -0.0010762*employment + -0.0967787*ln(RLP) + 0*location 
A T ,
Looking just at productivity, solving the above derivative = 0, and when employment 
is at the mean value;
0.0967787*ln(RLP) = -0.0010762*5.28 
RLP = 0.94
138 The full effect o f  SME acquisition must include the relevant interactions.
139 The length o f  time for both the time between productivity observations and after acquisition is the 
same for the 2004 sample results earlier.
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Therefore, for highly productive SMEs (productivity above 0.94) takeovers reduce 
productivity but for average or below productive firms, takeovers are beneficial. This 
is qualitatively consistent with the previous two periods. Also consistent is that both 
the mid-periphery and periphery have lower changes in productivity relative to the 
core.
Below the outcome (productivity) estimates are the ML selection equation results.
The coefficient on takeovers in 2002 for an SME surviving until 2004 is both positive 
and significant. The coefficient has the opposite sign from the results of the period 
2004 to 2007. Inclusion o f the takeover interactions (only significant one is with 
employment) indicates acquisitions in 2002 may have a positive effect on survival 
until 2004 but this is reduced with larger SMEs, with the effect reversing at around 74 
employees. This general result differs slightly from earlier results (where takeovers 
are measured in 2005)140.
140 A formal test on the effect o f  takeovers on the chances o f exit a year after acquisition is positive for 
this period (not shown).
Table 9.10 — DiD SME productivity (2004-2007) regressions
R egression  m odel
OLS with ML se lec tion  
( ro b u s t SE) m odel (ro b u st SE)
D ependent variable LnLP07-lnLPo4
T akeovers 0.120*** 0.218***
Ln(RLP)o4 -0.284*** -0.320***
Ln(loca) unit)s -0.063*** -0.093***
Employments 0.004*** 0.003***
Takeovers* Em ploym ents i o o o \ -0.001***
Age 2 to 4 0.184*** 0.174***
Age 5 to 9 0.150*** 0.037***
Age 10 to 19 0.104*** -0.103***
Age 20+ years 0.069*** -0.188***
Com panys 0.058*** 0.077***
Partnerships -0.013*** -0.023***
Mid-peripherys -0.017*** -0.041***
Peripherys -0.009*** -0.030***
Mid-periphery*T akeover05 -0 .025 -0.027
Peripheiy*Takeover0s -0 .012 -0.043
T akeover0s*ln(RLP) -0.103*** -0.103***
Industry controls Y Y
N 1,327 ,404 1,327,404
R2 0.11
Selection equation Survive 2004-07
Age 2 to 4 -0.051***
Age 5 to 9 0.143***
Age 10 to 19 0.377***
Age 20+ years 0.508***
T akeovers -0.219***
Employments 0.014***
E m ploym ents^ -7.27E-05***
T akeover0s*Employments -2.58E-04
Ln(local un it)sA2 -0.048***
Ln(local unit)s 0.109***
Ln(RLP)s 0.081***
Ln(RLP)MA2 0.032***
Ln(RLP)* Em ploym ents -0.001***
Mid-peripherys 0.041***
Peripherys 0.020***
Mid-periphery*Takeover05 -0.017
Periphery*T akeover0s 0.067**
T akeover05*Ln(RLP) 0.008
Mid-periphery*Ln(RLP) 0.013***
Periphery*Ln(RLP) 0.013***
Industry controls Y
N 1,897,288
-0.765*** _
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
N.B. constants removed
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Table 9.11 — DiD SME productivity (2001-2007) regressions
OLS ML Selection
R egression  m odel (ro b u st SE) m odel (ro b u st SE)
D ependent variable lnLP07-lnLPoi
T a k e o v e r 0.059** 0.049
Ln(RLP)oi -0.393*** -0.466***
Ln(local unit)0i -0.056*** -0.123***
Employmentoi 0.005*** 0.004***
Takeover02*Employmentoi -0.003*** -0.001
Age 2 to 4 0.066*** 0 .003
Age 5 to 9 -0.011*** -0.241***
Age 10 to 19 -0.090*** -0.478***
Age 20+ years -0.119*** -0.576***
Companyoi 0.043*** 0.067***
Partnershipoi 0.004** -0.010***
Mid-peripheryoi -0.037*** i o o OO \
Periphery0i -0.024*** -0.059***
Mid-periphery*T akeover 0.079** 0.065
Periphery*T akeover 0.040 0.018
Takeover*ln(RLP) -0.110*** -0.079***
Industry controls Y Y
N 972,791 972,791
Adj. R2 0.17
Selection equation Survive 2001-07
Age 2 to 4 0.053***
Age 5 to 9 0.293***
Age 10 to 19 0.571***
Age 20+ years 0.674***
Takeover02 0.049*
Employmentoi 0.013***
Employmentoi A2 -6.7E-05***
T akeovero2*Employmentoi -0.003***
Ln(local unit)A2 -0.048***
Ln(local unit)0i 0.145***
Ln(RLP)oi 0.097***
Ln(RLP)A2 0.016***
Ln(Rl_P)*Employmentoi -3.6E-04***
Mid-peripheryoi 0.058***
Periphery0i 0.032***
Mid-periphery*T akeover -0 .010
Periphery *Takeover -0 .016
Takeover*Ln(RLP) -0.026*
Mid-periphery*Ln(RLP) 0.016***
Periphery*Ln(RLP) 0.017***
Industry controls Y
N 1,832,969
P .....— -0.808*** —
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
N.B. constants removed
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Table 9.12 -  DiD SME productivity (2001-2004) regressions
OLS ML Selection
R egression  m odel (ro b u st SE) m odel (robust SE)
D ependent variable lnLP04-lnLPoi
T a k e o v e r 0.054** 0.015
Ln(RLP)oi -0.345*** -0.393***
Ln(local unit)0i -0.063*** -0.103***
Employmentoi 0.004*** 0.003***
T akeover02*Employmentoi -0.002*** -0.001***
Age 2 to 4 0.113*** 0.084***
Age 5 to 9 0.066*** -0.069***
A ge 10 to 19 -0.012*** -0.236***
Age 20+ years -0.041*** -0.301***
Companyoi 0.027*** 0.048***
Partnershipoi -0.001 -0.009***
Mid-peripheryoi -0.033*** -0.060***
Peripheryoi -0.036*** -0.053***
Mid-periphery^Takeover 0.034 0.030
Periphery*! akeover 0.007 0.009
Takeover*ln(RLP) -0.115*** -0.097***
Industry controls Y Y
N 1,250,712 1,250,712
Adj. R2 0.16
Selection equation Survive 2001-04
Age 2 to 4 0.012***
Age 5 to 9 0.257***
Age 10 to 19 0.526***
A ge 20+ years 0.614***
T a k e o v e r 0.161***
Employmentoi 0.014***
Employmentoi A2 -7.8E-05***
T akeover02*Employmentoi -0.002***
Ln(local unit)A2 -0.050***
Ln(local unit)0i 0.142***
Ln(RLP)oi 0.104***
Ln(RLP)A2 0.020***
Ln(RLP)*Employmentoi -0.001***
Mid-peripheryoi 0.069***
Peripheryoi 0.033***
Mid-periphery*T akeover -0.022
Periphery*Takeover -0.089*
Takeover*Ln(RLP) -0.024
Mid-periphery*Ln(RLP) 0.030***
Periphery*Ln(RLP) 0.030***
Industry controls Y
N 1,832,969
-0.722***£___________________________________
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
N.B. constants removed
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
9.6.2 SME employment performance
The analysis is now repeated using the same models across the same three periods but 
with employment as the performance measure. In table 9.13 the estimates for the two 
models (OLS and Heckman ML) are shown for the period of 2004 to 2007.
The final column shows the estimates from the selection model. Rho is significant and 
therefore not accounting for selection would yield inconsistent results; the OLS set-up 
is inappropriate. However, only minor differences between the OLS and selection 
models exist. The coefficient on takeover is significant and negative in both the OLS 
and Heckman models. The interaction with employment is also significant but 
positive and needs to be included when assessing the effects of takeover.
Using the coefficients from the selection model for the period 2004-07, the total 
effect of takeovers on employment can be estimated by differentiating model 6 (the 
estimated equation) by takeovers (T);
A(lnl“.„-1n^_,) = -0.0802859 + 0.0008777‘ employment + 0*ln(RLP) + 0*location 
A T ,
At the sample averages, the effect is -0.076. This suggests that for the average SME, 
takeover results in a fall in employment of around 8 percent. This effect reduces for 
larger SMEs. For example, it is only around 4 percent for firms with 50 employees. 
The takeover effect on employment is positive once firms are around 90 employees.
The other findings from the selection performance model relating to size, age, 
productivity and location are consistent with the OLS model141. The location variables 
are significant and suggest SMEs in the periphery and mid-periphery 
(proportionately) increase employment more than those located in the core. This 
evidence, along with that o f the overall productivity performance of SMEs outside of 
the core suggest that labour productivity decreases in the periphery (relative to the 
core) perhaps due to the relative change in employment between locations.
141 Relative productivity (RLP) is positive and significant. This suggests relatively productive firms 
increase employment proportionately more. The (employment) size coefficient is negative and 
significant. This suggests that larger SMEs add proportionately fewer employees relative to smaller 
firms.
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Below the outcome estimates of the ML selection model are the estimates of survival 
for the period 2004 to 2007. This model is similar to the selection model for 
productivity o f the equivalent period142.
The results of employment performance for the period 2001 to 2007 are shown in 
table 9.14. Sample selection for this period is significant, as shown by the significance 
of rho. The coefficient on takeover in the selection model is insignificant, like in OLS. 
The interaction of takeover with employment is also insignificant but the one with 
productivity is not (significant at the 95 percent level) and is positive. The interaction 
of takeover with mid-periphery is significant (at the 95 percent level) and negative but 
the equivalent with the periphery is not significant. These interactions with takeover 
are also (qualitatively) consistent with the OLS model.
The total effect of takeovers on employment for small firm targets in the period 2001 
to 2007 varies according to productivity. It is positive for highly productive SMEs but 
is negative for those that are around average or lesser productive, reducing slightly 
further if located in the mid-periphery.
Most of the other effects in the selection and OLS models are consistent143. The effect 
of location is the same as the previous period; SMEs in both the periphery and mid­
periphery proportionately increase employment more relative to those in the core. The 
only qualitative difference between the selection and OLS models is age144.
142 The results are qualitatively the same apart from the location-productivity interactions differ in sign. 
However, key to this study is that the interpretation o f  the effect o f  takeovers is consistent; acquisitions 
reduce the probability o f  surviving over the period 2004-07.
143 The initial level o f  productivity is positive and significant. This suggests more productive SMEs 
proportionately increase employment more than lesser productive firms. The effect o f  initial 
employment is negative (as described for the previous period) and the effect o f  age also decreases 
employment.
144 With the selection model, older SMEs are more likely to increase their employment. This is the 
opposite o f  the effects in the OLS models.
213
The selection model’s coefficients explaining whether SMEs survive over the period 
are not discussed as they are very similar to the productivity model for the same 
period145.
The results of employment performance for the final period, 2001 to 2004, are shown 
in table 9.15. Sample selection is significant as shown by statistical test on rho. The 
takeover variable in the selection model is qualitatively consistent with the OLS 
estimate; significant and positive. But the location-takeover interactions are 
statistically insignificant. The productivity -takeover interaction is positive and 
significant. The employment-takeover interaction is positive in both models but 
statistically insignificant in the selection model. These results suggest takeovers have 
a positive effect on employment, increasing with the initial level o f productivity. 
There is no size differential effect nor any location effects with takeovers.
Like the previous periods, all the effects of productivity, size and location are 
consistent across the selection and OLS models146. The location variables are 
significant and positive suggesting proportionately larger employment increases for 
SMEs located in the periphery and mid-periphery, relative to the core. Age is not 
consistent between the OLS and selection models147.
Below the performance estimates are the selection coefficients. This is the same 
model as the one used for productivity over the same period148.
Interpretation of the effects of SME takeovers on employment and productivity across 
all o f the periods are discussed next.
145 The only differences are that the coefficient on takeovers is now  more statistically significant (at 99 
percent level; previously it was only at the 90 percent level), the productivity interaction with takeover 
is insignificant and the location-productivity interactions switch signs. All other effects are consistent. 
The survival estimates suggest that for takeover in 2002 increase the chances o f  SMEs surviving the 
period to 2007 but all the interactions needs to be considered and the total effect, at least larger SMEs 
may differ to this.
146 The level o f  productivity has a significant and positive effect. S ize is also significant and negative.
147 In the selection model it is again positively related to a change in employment with each older age 
category has an increasingly positive coefficient. Generally the opposite is found with OLS, with age 
having a negative effect on employment.
148 The results o f  the first part o f  the selection model are also similar to the productivity one for the 
same period. However, the productivity-location variables have switched signs. The full effects of  
takeovers need to be interpreted along with all o f  its interactions. In doing so, takeovers increase the 
chances o f  survival for the period 2001-04 but this is reduces as SM Es get larger, until around the size 
o f  70 employees where they decrease the chances o f  survival.
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Table 9.13 — DiD SME employment (2004-2007) regressions
OLS ML Selection
R eg ressio n  m odel ( ro b u s t  SE) m odel (robust SE)
D epend en t variab le lnEmpo7-lnEmpo4
T akeovers -0 .0 3 3 ” -0.080***
Ln(RLP)o4 0.090*** 0.099***
Ln(local unit)M 0.049*** 0.066***
Employmento4 -0.003*** -0.003***
T akeovers* E m p lo y m e n t 0.001*** 0.001***
Age 2 to 4 -0.022*** -0.019***
Age 5 to 9 -0.096*** -0.045***
A ge 10 to 19 -0.123*** -0.026***
Age 20+ years -0.140*** -0.019***
Company^ 0.001 -0.001
Partnership^ -0.002** 0.005***
Mid-peripheryo4 0.036*** 0.045***
Peripheryo4 0.046*** 0.052***
Mid-periphery*T akeover0s -0 .0 0 8 -0.005
Periphery*T akeover05 0 .005 0.023
Takeover05*ln(RLP) 0 .0 0 9 0.010
Industry controls Y Y
N 1 ,3 2 7 ,4 0 4 1,327,404
Adj. R2 0 .05
Selection  e q u a tio n Surv ive 2004-07
A ge 2 to 4 -0.021***
Age 5 to 9 0.191***
Age 10 to 19 0.434***
Age 20+ years 0.575***
T akeovers -0.216***
E m p loym en t 0.022***
E m p lo y m e n ts -1.14E-04***
T akeover05*E m p loym en t -0.001
Ln(local unit)o4A2 -0.064***
Ln(local un'rt)M 0.101***
Ln(RLP)o4 0.078***
Ln(RLP)o4A2 -0.011***
Ln(RLP)* E m p lo y m e n t -0.001***
Mid-peripheryM 0.043***
Peripheryo4 0.023***
Mid-periphery*T akeover0s -0.056*
Periphery*T akeover0s 0.023
T akeovers* L n (R L P t 0.017
Mid-periphery*Ln(RLP) -0.011***
Periphery*Ln(RLP) -0.018***
Industry controls Y
N 1,897,288
. £ ___________________________
1 ___________1. *  . A  A  . * *  __ A  c . * ★ *  A H
0.621***
Source: ONS, author’s  own calculations
Table 9.14 - DiD SME employment (2001-2007) regressions
OLS (ro b u s t ML se le c tio n
R eg ress io n  m odel SE) m odel (ro b u s t SE)
D ep en d en t variab le LnEmpo7-lnEmpoi
Takeover^ 0 .0 3 0 0.036
Ln(RLP)ot 0.162*** 0.189***
Ln(loca) unit)0i 0.038*** 0.087***
Employmentoi -0.004*** -0.004***
T akeovero2*Employmentoi 0.001 -0.001
Age 2 to 4 . -0.085*** -0.046***
Age 5 to 9 -0.181*** -0.035***
A ge 10 to 19 -0.206*** 0.042***
A ge 20+ years -0.274*** 0.018***
Companyoi 0.062*** 0.048***
Partnershipoi -0.015*** -0.003*
Mid-peripheryoi 0.054*** 0.076***
Periphery^ 0.068*** 0.082***
Mid-periphery*T akeover -0.076** -0.069**
Periphery*T akeover -0 .0 3 8 -0 .023
Takeover*ln(RLP) 0.046*** 0.030**
Industry controls Y Y
N 972,791 972,791
Adj. R2 0 .0 9
Selection  eq u a tio n S urv ive  2001-07
Age 2 to 4 0.063***
Age 5 to 9 0.309***
Age 10 to 19 0.586***
Age 20+ years 0.684***
T a k e o v e r 0.075***
Employmentoi
1.CMOo
Employmentoi A2 -1.1E-04***
Takeover02*Employmentoi -0.003***
Ln(local unit)A2 -0.058***
Ln(local unit)oi 0.130***
ln(RLP)oi 0.101***
Ln(RLP)A2 -0.017***
Ln(RLP)*Employmentoi -0.001***
Mid-peripheryoi 0.052***
Periphery^ 0.025***
Mid-periphery *T akeover -0 .005
Periphery*T akeover -0 .028
Takeover*Ln(RLP) -0 .004
Mid-periphery*Ln(RLP) -0.009***
Periphery*Ln(RLP) -0.013***
Industry controls Y
N 1,832,969
£ ________________________
0.737***  __________
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
Table 9.15 — DiD SME employment (2001-2004) regressions
ML Selection
Regression model OLS (robust SE) model (robust SE)
D epend en t variab le InEmpoHnEmpoi
Takeover^ 0.037** 0.062***
Ln(RLP)0i 0.128*** 0.146***
Ln(local unit)0i 0.059*** 0.088***
Employmentoi -0.004*** -0.004***
T akeovero2*Employmentoi 0.001** 9.5E -05
Age 2 to 4 -0.041*** -0.024***
Age 5 to 9 -0.093*** -0.013***
Age 10 to 19 -0.095*** 0.038***
Age 20+ years -0.137*** 0.017***
Companyoi 0.078*** 0.071***
Partnership^ -0.008*** -0.001
Mid-peripheryoi 0.029*** 0.042***
Peripheryoi 0.037*** 0.044***
Mid-periphery*T akeover -0 .0 3 7 -0 .036
PeripheryTakeover -0 .025 -0 .025
Takeover*ln(RLP) 0.040*** 0.031***
Industry controls Y Y
N 1,2 5 0 ,7 1 2 1,250 ,712
Adi. R2 0 .08
Selection equation Survive 2001-04
Age 2 to 4 0.026***
Age 5 to 9 0.284***
Age 10 to 19 0.556***
Age 20+ years 0.638***
T a k e o v e r 0.170***
Employmentoi 0.023***
Employmentoi A2 -1.2E-04***
T akeover02*Employmentoi -0.002***
Ln(local unit)A2 -0.040***
Ln(local unit)0i 0.058***
Ln(RLP)0i 0.113***
Ln(RLP)A2 -0.017***
Ln(RLP)*Employmentoi -0.002***
Mid-peripheryoi 0.057***
Peripheryoi 0.017***
Mid-periphery *T akeover -0.011
Periphery*Takeover -0.104**
T akeover*Ln(RLP) 0.006
Mid-periphery*Ln(RLP) -0.005**
Periphery*Ln(RLP) -0.010***
Industry controls Y
N 1,832,969
£ ________________________
a ______ l. *  A  .  * +  —. r t C .  r \ A
0.644***
N.B. constants removed
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
9.7 Discussion of SME performance results
The total effect of SME acquisitions on employment and productivity can be 
summarised across the three time periods by differentiating equation 6 by takeover 
(T);
A ( i p  v  —  l n l ^  )
 —--------—  = K +ypLocationt-i + y;oln(RLPt.i) + y//Employmentt.i (10)
A Tt
where Y is either employment or productivity.
The takeover effect includes the exit element if the coefficients are from the selection 
model. The selection models presented in the previous section show the effect on 
performance is affected by the takeover coefficient (K) and the interactions of 
takeover with the (prior) level o f RLP (yio) and employment (yn). The location effect 
(y?) on post-acquisition performance (employment or productivity) is consistently 
insignificant149.
The coefficients from the above results are used to graph the effects on performance 
(productivity and employment) by prior productivity and size (employment) in figures
9.2 and 9.3, respectively. The periods 2001 to 2004,2001 to 2007 and 2004 to 2007 
are shown in each figure150 using the sample average for employment and 
productivity, respectively.
9.7.1 SME productivity perform ance
The first chart suggests that generally takeovers increase productivity. The effect of 
takeovers on productivity is positive for most firms, decreasing in effect as SMEs are 
(initially) more productive and only turning negative at the top end of productivity in 
the periods 2001 to 2004 and 2001 to 2007 (takeover measured in 2002 for both 
periods) when using the average size.
149 The takeover mid-periphery interaction is significantly difference from zero (relative to the core) for 
employment performance in the period 2001-07, this in not included here.
150 The figures use the estimates from the ML selection model (with robust errors).
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The positive effect o f takeovers on productivity is perhaps caused by synergies or 
acquirers providing new firms with resources (like finance) to be able to improve their 
performance, at least for the lesser productive firms. Whereas the result for highly 
productive firms is consistent with ‘intrapreneurship’ hunting by acquirers and the 
acquired firms losing what ultimately made them a high performer.
In the period 2004 to 2007, takeovers (in 2005) have a positive impact on all small 
businesses, when the average size is used. However, the next chart (figure 9.2) shows 
that size may have a negative relationship with the effect o f takeovers on SME 
productivity. Larger SMEs are more likely to experience much smaller changes in 
productivity post-acquisition (consistent with the period 2001 to 2004), perhaps even 
turning negative for the largest. However, over the longer period (2001 to 2007) with 
takeovers measured in 2002, there is no size variation o f the takeover effect on 
productivity. Acquisitions have a constant positive effect on productivity across the 
size distribution for that period (when using average productivity at the average 
value).
Figure 9.2 -  Effect of SME takeovers on productivity by prior productivity
50%
40%
10%
CL
40% 80% 00%20% 60%
u
- 10% Productiv ity  2004-07 takeover 2005 
Productiv ity  2001-07 takeover 2002 
Productiv ity  2001-04 takeover 2002 
Distribution of initial productivity (RLP)- 20%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Size taken at the sample average (5.2)
219
Figure 9.3 -  Effect of SME takeovers on productivity by size
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> 10%
?  0%
25020015050
P ro d u c tiv ity  2004-07  (takeover 2005) 
P ro d u c tiv ity  2001-07  (takeover 2002) 
P ro d u c tiv ity  2001-04  (takeover 2002)
-30% Employment
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations 
NB Productivity taken at the sample average
The evidence relating to size and productivity variation suggests that small business 
takeovers are beneficial to m ost firms in terms productivity except in som e instances 
for the largest and most productive SM Es. Only the very top performers or relatively  
larger SM Es may suffer in their productivity after acquisition.
The magnitude o f  the (positive) effect o f  takeover on productivity also varies across 
the periods. At the m edian value o f  RLP, takeovers increases productivity by around 
25 percent in 2004 to 2007  (at the size average) with takeover in 2005 but only around 
3 percent for both o f  the periods 2001 to 2004 and 2001 to 2007, w hen takeovers are 
measured in 2002.
9.7.2 SM E  em p loym en t p erform ance
The effects o f  takeovers on em ploym ent are shown in figure 9.4 over the distribution 
o f  productivity. A ll o f  the periods indicate that takeovers o f  the least productive SM Es 
may result in a fall in em ploym ent. H owever, the results appear to vary according to 
the period.
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For the period 2004 to 2007 with takeover measured in 2005, figure 9.4 shows the 
takeover effect on employment across the productivity distribution and it is consistent 
at around -7.5 percent. For the other two periods (2001 to 2004 and 2001 to 2007)151 
with takeovers measured in 2002, higher productivity results in less negative falls in 
employment post-acquisition, with increases in employment for SMEs at the upper 
end of productivity in the longer period (2001 to 2007). Increases in employment 
from takeover are exhibited across most instances of productivity in the period 2001 
to 2004, with only the very least productive showing falls in employment post­
acquisition.
The effect o f takeovers on employment only alters according to the size of the firm 
before it was acquired in the period 2004 to 2007 (see figure 9.5). In this period, the 
effect is negative for the smallest but becomes more positive as the SME size 
increases. At around 100 employees (using the average level of productivity) the 
acquisition effect becomes positive on employment. For the two other periods, the 
size of the firm has no effect on the takeover-employment relationship. However, it is 
positive (at around 5 percent) for the period 2001-04 but negative (at around 2.5 
percent) for the period 2001-07.
151 Although I use three time periods, only two takeover years are used, 2002 and 2005. For the periods 
2001 to 2004 and 2001 to 2007 it is only the after acquisition period that varies. Therefore there are 
only 2 independent time periods, as 2001 to 2007 is an extension o f  the period 2001 to 2004.
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Figure 9.4 -  Effect o f SME takeovers on employment by prior productivity
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The effect of takeovers varies depending on the period. The differences between the 
periods 2001 to 2004 or 2007 and 2004 to 2007 is perhaps indicative of the differing 
effects takeovers have in the years 2005 and 2002. This is perhaps caused by different 
trends in the stock market between the periods. When the stock market is increasing 
(2004 to 2007), takeovers increase subsequent labour productivity for all but the 
larger or most productive SMEs. A rising stock market may provide acquirers with 
more resources to invest in acquired SMEs, helping to improve the performance of 
most acquired small firms. Some of these gains in productivity may come about from 
the potential falls in employment that is caused by takeover (capital deepening). This 
is consistent with the lower to negative changes in productivity for the largest SMEs, 
as it is only these firms during this period that exhibit acquisitions that result in a rise 
in employment.
During a downturn in the stock market (2001 to 2004), acquirers may not be valued as 
highly and therefore be limited in their resources that they can obtain to invest in 
acquisitions. They are perhaps more likely to drain the acquired or under-invest in it; 
reducing its performance. Hence takeovers in 2002, used in the period 2001 to 2004 
and 2001 to 2007, have a smaller positive effect on productivity and a negative effect 
for the more productive or relatively larger SMEs. However, takeovers also result in 
an increase in employment (on average) during this period. Therefore this additional 
employment (the opposite to capital deepening), perhaps due to takeover, may also 
help to explain the smaller increases (or even falls in some cases) of productivity due 
to takeovers in this period.
9.8 Conclusion
Takeovers have significant effects on SME performance, even when the effect of exits 
or sample attrition is allowed for." Takeovers boost the productivity of small firm 
targets, except for the most productive or relatively larger SMEs, during a period of a 
rising stock market. However, during the same period, acquisitions may reduce small 
acquired firm’s employment, perhaps causing this rise in productivity. This is 
consistent with takeovers resulting in capital deepening, perhaps now possible from 
the injection of resources from the acquirer.
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During a falling market, takeovers may also increase the productivity o f  targets but 
reduce it for larger SMEs or those with relatively high productivity. H ow ever, during 
this period, takeovers also proportionately increase SME employment b y  around 4 
percent (on average) - even more so if they have higher initial productivity. The 
effects on productivity are broadly consistent with the existing evidence for larger, 
less productive firms and the Q-theory of mergers; takeover improves productivity 
after acquisition.
Across all periods, after acquisition, takeovers do not raise labour productivity for the 
most productive and largest SMEs. This is consistent with acquirers renew ing  their 
vitality by absorbing the ideas and entrepreneurship of these high perform ing firms.
Location has no significant influence on the impact of takeovers on either productivity 
or employment but it does affect performance more generally. The perform ance of 
SMEs, not just related to takeovers, in the periphery is stronger than those in  the core 
location in terms of adding employment. However, the reverse is true for labour 
productivity. The productivity findings are consistent with SMEs in the periphery  
adding, and using, more employment to their production functions relative to  those in 
the core. The larger employment increase in the periphery (including W ales) is 
consistent with aggregate employment statistics for the wider economy (O N S  2009a; 
WAG 2007)152. Over time, increases in SME employment in the periphery, relative to 
the core, may contribute to the relatively low labour productivity o f firms in  more 
peripheral locations.
The empirical work presented so far has showed that SMEs are more likely to  be 
acquired if they are relatively more productive. Other findings in this thesis also 
suggest that they result in a significantly increased chance of exit across a ll locations 
but especially in the core. For those that survive, on average, they result in  a n  increase 
in (labour) productivity for the acquired across all regional locations. The n e x t chapter 
combines the results that acquired small firms have a higher chance of ex it and  that
152 This is consistent with the findings o f  Hatton and Tani (2005) that find employment m igration from 
more core locations as an impact o f  immigrants. If immigrants are not suitably measured in  official 
statistics, this may account for employment increasing more in the periphery in both aggregate  and 
(official) business data.
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takeovers affect performance, to estimate the total effect on productivity of SME 
takeovers from targeted firms.
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Chapter 10 - The Aggregate Effect on Regional Productivity from
Acquired SMEs 
10.1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effects of SME acquisitions on regional 
productivity. The last three chapters have established that SMEs are on average, more 
likely to be more productive and the target firms are more likely to be located in the 
core region. Acquired small firms also have an increased likelihood of exiting in 
subsequent periods and that takeovers improve (labour) productivity for those that 
survive across all locations. It has not been possible to estimate the effects 
acquisitions have on acquirers, so I can only estimate the effect on regional 
productivity that occurs from the targets -  acquired SMEs.
The remaining empirical components of the thesis estimate the total effect on 
aggregate productivity from the targets of SME takeovers in Great Britain and the 
core and periphery regions. This allows me to answer the question whether SME 
takeovers, or at least the effects on the acquired, benefit or reduce regional 
productivity.
10.2 Methodology
10.2.1 The effect of SME takeovers on performance in aggregate
The aggregate impact from the targets of SME takeovers on productivity depends 
upon the marginal effect of takeovers on productivity (A ln(Prod) / AT) and the 
probability o f a firm being acquired Pr(T). If  either of these vary by firm size, then it 
is not appropriate to multiply the average effect by the number of firms to obtain the 
aggregate result. The simple approach of ignoring size effects assumes the smallest 
SMEs have the same contribution to aggregate productivity as an SME with 249 
employees. If both the chances of takeover and its impact vary by size, then using the 
average figures ignores the possibility that large acquired SMEs may 
disproportionately influence the total impact. To overcome this, it is possible to also 
weight each firm according to their employment share.
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Equation 1 posits that the productivity performance (prod) of firm i is affected by 
takeover (T), an interaction of takeover and employment (T.E) and some other 
unspecified factors (Z)153;
ln(Prodjt+j) = aiTlt+ a2Tit.Eit-j + a3Zjt-j + Uj (1)
If size (employment) does not influence the productivity impact of takeover, larger 
acquired SMEs subsequently increase productivity by the same proportion154 as small 
firms, then a2 = 0. In this scenario, the average effect (ai) is relevant to all SMEs and 
so may be multiplied by the average productivity change o f firms taken over and the 
number of firms acquired to obtain the aggregate effect. It does not matter that larger 
SMEs taken over contribute more to aggregate productivity, as the proportionate 
effect of takeovers is the same as the smallest businesses.
If  there is a size effect o f takeovers for SMEs; a2 ^  0, then ai will reflect the size 
invariant effect of takeovers but will not capture the full effect of takeovers on 
productivity. This is;
A ln(Prod) / AT = a i  + a 2E j t
To obtain the total impact, the marginal effect of takeovers on performance (Aln(Prod) 
/ AT) is estimated for every SME, providing a predicted effect that acquisition would 
have on its performance. Then, both the chances of takeover and its effect need to be 
weighted to reflect the fact that larger SMEs contribute more to the economy. In short, 
the aggregate effect from the targets of SME takeovers on performance is the 
individual firm’s chances o f takeover multiplied by the productivity impact of 
takeovers, times the firm’s weight (W) or contribution to aggregate productivity 
within the SME sector, summed across all firms;
n
X  Pr(T,)i .(A ln(Prod) / AT)it+j. WN (2)
/=1
153 The actual equation in chapter 9 includes interactions with productivity and location but these are 
ignored here to simplify the exposition. As the productivity-takeover interaction is significant, this is 
included in the estimation to obtain the performance effect o f  takeovers.
154 Note that this is not the amount with use o f  the levels but a proportionate effect as the method to 
estimate the performance effect uses difference-in-differences.
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where Pr(T), is the probability o f  takeover for each SME;
(A  ln(Prod) / A T ) j t+j is the individual effect that takeovers have on performance (here 
logarithm of productivity). This is found from equation 1;
Wjt-j is the weight o f each firm and is the SMEs’ share of total employment155 from 
the entire sample;
Ei/^Ei
10.2.2 The Effect of SME Takeover-Exits
The aggregate effect o f SME exits caused by takeover depends upon the probability of 
takeover and the marginal effect of takeovers on the probability of exit. As with the 
impact of takeover on performance, if  size affects the probability of takeover or the 
takeover-exit effect then it is not possible to estimate the aggregate effect using the 
sample means. Larger acquired SMEs have a greater impact on the aggregate than the 
average and the total effect must reflect their greater importance.
The probability o f takeover is the same as above. The effect of takeovers on exit can 
be calculated using equation 3. This is analogous to performance above; the inclusion 
o f takeover-size interactions can capture any possible size-varying effects156;
Pr(Xjt+j) = Pi Tu + p 2 Tjt.Ejt-j + P3Zit-j + Vi (3)
A X  /  A T  =  P i + P  2 . E it.j
Therefore the marginal effect o f takeovers on the probability o f exit should include 
p2.Eit.j if it varies by firm size (p 2 £  0 ) .  This marginal effect ( A X  /  A T ) j  will be positive 
(negative) if  takeovers increase (decrease) the chances of exit. This differentiates it 
from the probability o f exit and (or given) takeover as, by its nature, this latter value 
can only be positive as it is a probability. However, I need to be able to factor the
155 See appendix for an explanation on why employment, and not output weights, are most suitable.
156 The actual equation in chapter 8 includes interactions with productivity and location but these are 
ignored here to simplify the exposition. These are included when estimating the actual value.
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effect of takeovers either increasing or decreasing the chances of exit and not just 
capture the overall probability o f exit with takeover.
The marginal effect of takeover on exit also depends on the productivity o f firms 
relative to the (weighted) average level. I f  takeovers increase the chances of exit but 
they involve firms that are less productive than the average level, then their departure 
boosts the overall level o f productivity. Therefore a measure of the impact of SME 
closures consequent upon takeover needs to include their productivity relative to the 
(weighted) average level of productivity.
In summary, the effect of takeover-exits on aggregate productivity depends on a 
probability o f takeover, but also how this affects the probability of exit, the SME’s 
differential productivity and its share of employment. These effects need to be 
summed across all firms, as shown below;
Where P r ( T ) j t is the same as equation 2 and is the probability of takeover;
( A X  /  A T ) j  is the marginal effect o f takeover on exit for each firm;
Prod t-j is the (weighted) average of productivity across all firms at time t-j and;
The firm’s productivity relative to the aggregate level is captured in the third term of 
equation 4.
10.2.3 The total effect from the targets of SME acquisitions on aggregate 
productivity
The total effect (from targets) inclu4es the impact on performance and also the 
influence on the probability o f closure157. The impact of exits (equation 4) is 
subtracted from any performance effect (equation 2) of takeovers to get the aggregate 
effect;
157 The takeover-relocation effects are ignored here as they are found to be very small -  see chapter 8.
n
(4)
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Z  [(Pr(T)i. .(A ln(Prod) / AT)it+j ,Wit.j) -
/=1
(Pr(T)it .(AX / AT)it+j .((Prodit.j - Prod t.j) / T ^ d  t-j).Wit.j)] (5)
For simplicity, any indirect effect that may occur from a firm altering its weight after 
takeover is not measured here. Firms with increasing productivity may also expand 
and obtain a greater share from less productive enterprises or from those that 
ultimately fail. There are two possible indirect effects from a change in share. 
Takeovers might make SMEs larger by adding employment (but alternatively they 
may shed jobs) and more productive SMEs are likely to increase their market share 
(but again, takeovers can be mismanaged and market share lost).
The first effect I can test for in the period used for this analysis. Takeovers have a 
varying effect on a firm size (employment) in the period 2004 to 2007, depending on 
the SME’s prior employment. Therefore it is likely that takeover may change the 
relative weight of the firm but it is not clear which direction this might be. Therefore 
this dynamic is not included. Regarding the second effect, any positive (negative) 
changes to productivity are likely to result in an increased (decreased) market share. 
There is a trade-off between allowing the full effects of takeovers to work through and 
the increasing difficulty with the elapse of time of isolating these impacts. I have 
chosen to measure performance two years (2007) after takeover (2005) so that fewer 
extraneous factors can affect performance and the effect of takeovers is less likely to 
be confounded. Essentially the index used is base weighted (Laspeyres), and if the 
market works well, this method may understate the impact of takeovers.
The above methodology and the data do not allow for the effects of SME acquisitions 
to include those that may occur to the acquirers. It is therefore only possible to 
estimate a total effect on aggregate productivity that comes from the targets only. The 
engagement of firms as acquirers in the market for corporate control should be to try 
and increase the profits of their own firm, increasing productivity. Despite the 
controversy that still exists in the empirical literature on this issue, if a positive effect 
is assumed then any positive effect from the acquired is likely to be enhanced from 
the impact on acquirers. However, as it is not possible to tell where the acquirer 
operates (e.g. core or periphery) and what the relative magnitude is, it is not possible
230
to estimates whether in total SME acquisitions (including the effects from acquirers) 
increase or ameliorate the core-periphery productivity gap. However, it is possible to 
say whether the impact on regional productivity from the targets of SME acquisitions 
affect regional productivity and the core-periphery productivity gap.
10.3 Results
10.3.1 Total effect on aggregate productivity from the targets of SME takeovers
To quantify the total effect o f  takeovers from acquired firms, equation 5 is estimated 
on the 2004 sample, with performance measured over the period 2004 to 2007 and 
takeovers in 2005.1 only look at productivity performance as it is the main 
performance variable o f interest to measure the effects on regional productivity. Exits 
are also measured over the period 2004 to 2007158. To reduce any bias caused by 
errors in using a predicted probability o f takeover, such as one from the models used 
in chapter 7, the calculations assume each firm that is observed to have been acquired 
had a probability o f takeover o f  1 and others a probability o f zero. The results of this 
are shown in table 10.1
The two effects are shown: performance and exit, and the difference of this are the 
total effects. This is computed for Great Britain and the three locations: the core, mid­
periphery and periphery.
The results for Great Britain show that the effects from the targets of SME 
acquisitions have a positive effect on aggregate SME productivity. The effect of 
takeovers on performance increases productivity over the period 2004 to 2007 by 0.36 
percent. The effect o f takeover on exits is to decrease productivity by 0.09 percent. 
The resulting total effect for Great Britain is that takeovers increase aggregate SME 
productivity by 0.27 percent. The aggregate effect of takeovers is also positive for 
each of the three locations. The takeover-growth effect is largest for the core and 
smallest for the periphery; increasing productivity there by 0.25 percent.
158 This is one year later than those shown in chapter 8 (2004-6) but is consistent with the selection 
results from the Heckman equations shown in chapter 9. This difference o f one year makes very little 
difference to the resulting estim ates but allows the estimates to be across consistent years.
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Despite the marginal effect o f  takeovers being largest for SMEs in the core (see 
chapter 8), the exit effect is la rg est (more negative) in absolute terms for firms in the 
mid-periphery (0.115 percent) a n d  smallest (less negative) in absolute terms for the 
periphery (0.054 percent). This is  because the aggregate takeover-exit effect on 
productivity also depends on th e  productivity of the firm relative to the location’s 
(weighted) average (see equation  4).
The aggregate total effect on productivity from the targets of SME acquisitions in the 
core is greater than that o f  the periphery and mid-periphery. This indicates that despite 
takeovers improving aggregate productivity in all of these locations, the market 
reallocation of resources from  th e  effects on acquired SMEs contributes to the 
productivity gap between the c o re  and periphery.
This difference is likely to be d riv en  by the number of SME acquisitions that occur in 
each location. The performance effect, positive for all locations, is the dominating 
effect in aggregate but the re su lt o f  takeovers on SME productivity is the same across 
all locations (see chapter 9). Therefore the performance effect in aggregate varies 
across locations due to the percentage of takeovers in a given location. More 
acquisitions in a given region w il l  increase the aggregate performance effect and 
therefore increase the total aggregate impact.
Table 10.1 -  Effect on aggregate SME productivity 2004-7 from the targets of 
small firm acquisitions
Location
Aggregate SM E  
takeover- 
performance e f fe c t
Aggregate SME 
takeover-exit 
effect
Total aggregate productivity 
Effect from the targets of 
SME takeovers
Periphery +0.304% -0.054% +0.250%
Mid-periphery +0.332% -0.115% +0.217%
Gore +0.419% -0.061% +0.357%
Great Britain +0.356% -0.089% +0.267%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
10.3.2 Total effect on aggregate productivity from the targets of SME takeovers -  
bivariate probit results
The above estimation assumed th a t exits and takeovers are independent. However, the 
bivariate probit estimation o f th ese  two variables in chapter 8 shows that their errors 
are correlated (and statistically significant) and so perhaps it is more appropriate to
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use the results from the bivariate probit model instead of the separate probit for 
exit159. This will only affect the exit component shown, as it does not affect the 
performance part of the estimate160.
Consistent with the standard exit probit estimate results, all locations benefit in 
aggregate productivity from the targets of SME takeovers. The relative ranking across 
the regions is also consistent as before, with the core benefiting the most (increasing 
productivity by 0.341 percent). The exit effects are slightly larger and this results in 
the slightly smaller total effect with the bivariate probit method161. The total effect for 
Great Britain is now estimated to increase productivity by 0.257 percent (instead of 
0.267 percent).
Table 10.2 -  Effect on aggregate SME productivity 2004-7 from the targets of
small firm acquisitions: bivariate probit method
Location
Aggregate SME 
takeover- 
performance effect
Aggregate 
SME takeover- 
exit effect
Total aggregate productivity 
Effect from the targets of 
SME takeovers
Periphery +0.304% -0.056% +0.248%
Mid-periphery +0.332% -0.121% +0.211%
Core +0.419% -0.078% +0.341%
Great Britain +0.356% -0.099% +0.257%
Source: ONS, author’s own calculations
10.3.2 Total economy effect on aggregate productivity from the targets of SME 
takeovers
Using the results above, it is possible to apply a weighting factor based on SME 
employment share to make the results applicable to the entire (private) sector 
economy.
159 Consistent with above, the exit effects with the bivariate probit model are estimated over the period 
2004-7. The results o f  this differ very little to those presented in chapter 8 where the time period was 
2004-6.
160 In the case o f  the case o f  the bivariate probit model, it is possible to compute the probability o f  exit 
given takeover; Pr(X,+j| Tt); instead o f  using the marginal probability o f exit from takeover (AX / ATiH.j). 
However, for the method adopted here, the conditional probabilities are not needed but the marginal. 
The conditional probabilities do not provide information on whether a takeover increases the likelihood 
o f exit or not. The marginal probability does exactly this.
161 The aggregate effect o f  takeovers has not been repeated for just non-micro SMEs as this would 
make the calculations unnecessarily complex as a significant proportion o f  SME takeovers and its 
employment would have been omitted.
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Using the Small Business Service statistics (BIS 2006) on firms with employees 
between 1 and 249162 from 2005163, SME weights can be applied to the results on 
aggregate SME productivity for each location. This is shown in table 10.3. The 
economy wide effect from the targets of SME takeovers for Great Britain is estimated 
to increase productivity by 0.109 percent. Again the core has the largest effect, despite 
having the smallest SME share of employment. The effects on acquired SMEs here 
increase aggregate productivity by 0.127 percent. The next largest is the periphery, 
increasing productivity by 0.116 percent. For the mid-periphery, the effect increases 
aggregate productivity, economy wide, by 0.093 percent.
Therefore, even allowing for the relative importance of SMEs within each location’s 
economy, small firm takeovers in the periphery help to advance productivity growth, 
as it does in all regions. However, the core benefits the most and so its relative 
productivity advantage is maintained and strengthened by SME takeovers, at least 
from their effects on the targets o f such acquisitions. The contribution to the regional 
productivity gap is (0.127-0.116 =) 0.011 percentage points, albeit a small part.
The mid-periphery experiences a smaller boost to the economy from takeovers in 
2005 (0.093 percent) than either the core or periphery. This lesser effect is primarily 
caused by the greater (weighted) takeover-exit effect there, perhaps in part due to its 
proximity to the core. Proximity may make external takeovers from larger firms based 
in the core more likely in the mid-periphery if  information attenuates with distance. If 
so, the rate of moving the acquired assets to the core, deregistering target firms in the 
process, at least for a few larger SMEs (that matter substantially because the takeover- 
exit effect is weighted by employment).
162 This ignores firms that do not have any employment, which is more consistent with the sample used 
in the analysis.
163 Data for 2004 is not available at the regional level.
Table 10.3 — Economy wide effect on aggregate productivity 2004-7 from the 
targets o f  sm all firm acquisitions
Location
SME share of 
private sector  
employment
Economy wide 
effect on 
productivity
Periphery 46.9% 0.116%
Mid-periphery 44.1% 0.093%
Core - 37.3% 0.127%
Great Britain 42.5% 0.109%
Source: O N S, author’s own calculations 
NB Use of the bivariate probit estimates
The most plausible explanations for the different experiences of core and peripheiy, 
suggested by  NEG, must be related to the wealth and density of the two areas. Density 
of population and business in the core may mean greater competition, agglomeration 
economies o r  both, helping information to flow about possible targets and triggering 
more tak eo v er activity -  the likely cause for the differential aggregate effects. The 
greater w e a lth  could provide more significant profit opportunities or capital - if 
information flow s attenuate with distance - both of which would motivate 
acquisitions.
10.3.3 T h e  aggregate  effects of SME takeovers over time 
The positive effect from the targets of SME takeovers is driven by their impacts on 
performance. This effect was relatively consistent across the periods I have previously 
estimated (2001  to 2002 and 2001 to 2007) — see chapter 9. For most SMEs, takeovers 
results in a  positive change to productivity. However, the results for the other periods 
suggest th a t th e  performance effect might be lower in the other periods, perhaps due 
to the d iffe ren t phases o f the stock market. This also suggests that the aggregate effect 
for the o th er tim e  periods might be lower than the one estimated above. However, 
there is no  evidence to suggest that the ranking or relative magnitudes between 
regions an d  locations will change. The core will still have a higher effect and this is 
primarily d r iv e n  by the greater percentage of takeovers there, regardless of the year or 
phase o f th e  s to ck  market. This time invariance is also likely to be true for the effect 
of exits. T h e  takeover-location variables in the exit estimations164 do not indicate that 
acquisitions in  regions outside of the core have a higher chance of exit across any of
164 These are d o n e  in the Heckman selection models and actually report on the chances o f survival -  the 
inverse case . T h e s e  results to this can be found in chapter 9.
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the periods. Therefore the scale of the aggregate effect from the targets of SME 
acquisitions may change between different time periods but the location ranking will 
not.
10.4 Conclusions
The impact of SME acquisitions on regional economies, ignoring any consequences 
for the acquiring firm, depends on their incidence and their subsequent effect in terms 
of performance and relative chances o f exit on those firms that have been acquired. 
For takeover-exits, the firm’s productivity relative to the regional (weighted) average 
is also important. Factoring in all these effects, the total effect from  the targets of 
SME takeovers on aggregate productivity is positive for all locations. Once the 
relative size of the SME sector is considered, the economy wide effect of small firm 
acquisitions in 2005 is that they add 0.109 percent to aggregate productivity for Great 
Britain.
Despite being positive, the aggregate effect of SME acquisitions varies by location 
and it is highest for the core. This is driven by the higher rate o f  takeovers there. In 
turn more frequent acquisition is likely to be caused by the greater intensity o f 
competition and agglomeration economies in the core, creating m ore opportunities 
and information on possible targets. Therefore the effects from targets of SME 
acquisitions widen the gap of productivity between the core and periphery, not taking 
into account any possible gains to the acquiring firm. However, the relative gain to the 
core on an economy-wide basis is very small for takeovers in 2005; 0.011 percentage 
points of productivity. A caveat to this quantification is that it only refers to one 
year’s experience. It is well known that there are large fluctuations in annual 
takeovers of publicly quoted firms and so the same may be expected of SMEs.
Regional productivity gaps may be widened by the operation o f  the SME takeover 
market and more than the reported small core-periphery productivity gain difference. 
The above estimates do not include the effects that acquisitions have on acquirers.
The data source does not allow the acquirer to be identified and therefore its 
subsequent performance after acquiring an SME and its location cannot be used. 
Assuming rationally that on average acquisitions result in an improvement in
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performance for buyers, or at least no deterioration, then if all or most acquirers are 
located in the core then this will be an unmeasured reason for an increasing 
differential. However, if  acquirers are local, this will act to enhance the reported 
productivity effects for each location.
But the key finding that the core gains more from a process which should be common 
to the periphery as well, and is not dependent on the location of large firm 
headquarters, carries a lesson about the gap. Rather than regarding takeovers as 
harmful to periphery regions, policy makers should attempt to understand why 
takeovers are less frequent there, and should consider ways of improving the 
operation of this market for SMEs in these places.
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Appendix 
Appropriate weights
The appropriateness of employment weights with labour productivity can be shown 
below. There are two firms each with employment (e) and output (q).
P = Q/E where q i + q 2 = Q, e i + e 2 = E and pi = q ,/e j
Q/E = pi.(ei/(ei+e2)) + P2 .(e2/(ei+e2)) = (qi/ei).(ei/(ei+e2)) + (q2/e2 ).(e2/(ei+e2)) = 
(qi/(ei+e2)) + (q2/(eiH-e2)) = (qi+q2)/(ei+e2)
The inappropriateness of output weights can also be shown;
P = Q/E ^  ( q i / e i ) . ( q i / ( q i + q 2) )  +  ( q 2/ e 2) . ( q 2/ ( q i + q 2) )  =
(l/q)((q,2/e,) + (q22/e2))
Given that output weights to productivity do not aggregate appropriately, I 
recommend using only employment weights when labour productivity is used.
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Chapter 11 -  Conclusions
A lack of data has meant the operation of SMEs has received much less attention than 
large, particularly manufacturing, firms. In particular, the market for SME control is 
almost entirely unstudied. The effects of takeovers on SMEs have never been 
measured, at least on the present scale, and their resulting impact on regional 
productivity; from exit and performance, have never before been estimated. Yet SMEs 
account for half o f private sector output in Britain and a higher proportion of 
employment. In a peripheral region such as Wales, these businesses provide an even 
larger share of turnover and employment than they do in all other regions of Britain; 
there SMEs account for over three-quarters of employment (77 percent) (BIS 
2006)165.
Because the SME sector is so large, its productivity and growth are vitally important 
to the performance of the economy as a whole. While in most countries and regions 
SMEs are less productive than large firms, they are also often the source of important 
innovations, historically they are the origin o f some large long-lived enterprises and 
they make up significant proportions of regional and national output and employment. 
This suggests they may play a critical role in creating and maintaining the 
productivity lag of peripheral regions, such as Wales, behind the British average and 
particularly core areas.
This thesis has used a new data set (BSD) of nearly all British firms that allows an 
unprecedentedly detailed study o f SMEs in a spatial context, with particular attention 
to the market for SME control. Markets may operate, weakly or strongly, to offset 
regional disparities, or they may exacerbate them. For instance, low wage regions may 
attract labour-intensive firms and so increase the local demand for labour, in the 
(neoclassical) offsetting or ‘trickle down’ scenario. Or complementarities in 
production may mean that regions with agglomerations of human capital attract even 
more, and thereby increase their productivity advantage (endogenous growth and 
NEG).
165 The regional contribution o f  output by SMEs is similarly high as employment in Wales (62 percent) 
(BIS 2006).
239
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the operation of the market for ownership 
of SMEs in a spatial context. For the first time, this is linked to the impact on regional 
productivity. In this market, larger firms may attempt to compensate for a lack of 
internally generated innovation by acquiring dynamic small enterprises. Contrary to 
the existing evidence for large firms, the new findings presented in this thesis are 
consistent with this hypothesis; highly productive SMEs are more likely to be taken 
over, even when the effects of industry, size and location are controlled. However, 
this effect is found to be non-linear; a j-curve relationship exists between productivity 
and the likelihood of takeover. Consistent with evidence for large firms, less 
productive small businesses have a higher chance of being acquired than more 
averagely productive firms. However, the highest probability of acquisition is for the 
most productive, generating the overall positive relationship for the likelihood of 
takeover with productivity.
Within the framework that is used to analyse the market for small firms, the process 
of compensation for lack o f ‘intrapreneurship’ may have a spatial dimension because 
of readier access to finance in the ‘core’ regions, although there is little supporting 
empirical evidence. Alternatively, according to NEG models agglomeration of 
production in ‘core’ areas generates external economies and triggers more intense 
local competition. In the first case, large firms, typically headquartered in core 
regions, with better access to finance, may disproportionately buy up innovative 
SMEs in the periphery. In the second, more intense competition in the core may also 
stimulate a stronger demand for core SMEs than for those in periphery regions. 
Dividing the British economy into core and periphery locations according to their 
aggregate productivity (GVA per head, worker or per hour) the evidence presented in 
this thesis favours the second alternative; SMEs located outside the core are less likely 
to be bought out, regardless of their productivity. This is perhaps due to information 
problems on potential targets. If more acquirers are located in the core, then when 
information attenuates with distance, more acquisitions are likely to target firms there. 
However, the (annual) probability of small firm takeover is very small regardless of 
location (although the possible, cumulative, acquisition effects might not be small 
over the lifetime o f an acquired firm).
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Even if SMEs are not disproportionately taken over in the periphery, they may be 
subject to closure or relocation to a greater extent. Large firms may choose to exploit 
synergies by moving innovative assets o f the acquisition to the headquarters (core) 
region. New evidence in this thesis relating to SMEs shows that one year after being 
acquired, takeovers do raise the chance o f a small firm exiting by between 3 and 7 
percentage points. However, the regional bias is the opposite of that originally 
hypothesised; the core has a higher probability by around 3 percentage 
points. Takeovers also increase the probability o f relocation, again consistent with 
takeovers as a synergistic investment by the acquirer. This effect is greater for SMEs 
originally located in more peripheral regions relative to the core but the overall effect 
is very small and much lower than for exits.
Small business targets that are not closed or relocated may benefit from synergies. 
Larger, often publicly quoted, acquiring firms with readier access to finance, most 
apparently during booms when the stock market is rising, have greater opportunity to 
invest in their new purchases. It turns out that takeovers do indeed boost SME labour 
productivity, although less so for the most productive or relatively larger SMEs, 
during a period of a rising stock market. This latter result would be expected 
if  acquiring firms attempted to compensate for a lack of internally generated 
innovation, or searched for management or other assets that they could strip out of the 
target SMEs. However, during the same period, acquisitions may reduce small 
acquired firm’s employment, perhaps causing this rise in labour productivity, as 
resources are used more intensively to enhance productivity.
A hypothesis advanced in this thesis is that larger firms interested in buying SMEs 
may be less able to do so and less able to invest in them when financial conditions are 
not so buoyant. In these circumstances, expansion to utilise synergies would be 
extensive, increasing employment. In a period when the stock market fell, 2001 to 
2004 in the present study, takeovers increased the productivity of targets but reduced 
it for larger SMEs or those with relatively high productivity. Also during this period, 
takeovers proportionately increased SME employment by around 4 percent (on 
average) and even more so if they had higher initial productivity, consistent with the 
hypothesis.
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Overall, the effects on SME productivity from takeover are broadly consistent with 
the existing evidence for larger, lesser productive firms. Takeovers reallocate 
resources to be used more efficiently and improve the productivity of more poorly 
performing firms, similar to the Q-theory (and related theories) of mergers. Across all 
periods, after acquisition, takeovers do not raise labour productivity for the most 
productive and largest SMEs. This is consistent with acquirers renewing their vitality 
by absorbing the ideas and entrepreneurship of these high performing firms. However, 
location has no significant influence on the impact of takeovers on either productivity 
or employment. SME targets in the core and periphery perform equally well on 
average after takeover.
For the first time, in this thesis the aggregate productivity effect of takeovers on 
targeted small firms is estimated. The calculation requires the marginal effect of 
takeovers on productivity, the probability o f a firm being acquired and the exit effect 
of acquisitions. The resulting (net) effect on aggregate productivity from acquired 
SMEs in 2005, accounting for the relative size of the SME sector, was to raise labour 
productivity in Great Britain by 0.109 percent over the years 2004 to 2007. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the impact in the core region, at 0.127 percent, was slightly larger than in 
the periphery (0.116 percent), but very small for all locations (for one year’s worth of 
small firms takeovers). The higher impact for the core is the result of the higher rate 
of SME takeovers there.
A caveat to the quantification of this impact is that it only refers to one year’s 
experience. It is well known that there are large fluctuations in annual takeovers of 
publicly quoted firms and so the same may be expected of SMEs.
Regional productivity gaps may be widened by the operation of the SME takeover 
market more than this small core-periphery productivity gain difference. The above 
estimates do not include the possible effects that acquisitions have on acquirers. The 
data source does not allow the acquirer to be identified and therefore its subsequent 
performance after acquiring an SME and its location cannot be used. Assuming 
rationally that acquisitions result in an improvement in performance for buyers, then if 
all or most acquirers are located in the core then this will be an unmeasured reason for
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an increasing differential. However, if  acquirers are local, this will act to enhance the 
reported productivity effects for each location.
Another feature not captured here is the possible effect that selling-up has on the 
owners of small firms. The analysis allows for the effects of the target being closed 
down or moved out if the entrepreneur is not a serial one. But serial entrepreneurs 
may create a supply o f high performing, productive small firms. ‘Successful’ exits 
may provide entrepreneurs finance to enable further start-ups, as former business 
owners reinvest after selling-up, allowing the process to begin all over again. It is not 
possible to identify whether firms that are sold directly cause a start-up in the same 
region and the scale of serial entrepreneurship that successfully exit post-takeover is 
not known. The interaction o f SME takeovers and their relationship with subsequent 
start-ups is an interesting one but is beyond the scope of this thesis. It should be noted 
that in any case building up a new successful enterprise takes time; successful serial 
entrepreneurship will not be instantaneous. In the period during which a ‘successor’ 
enterprise is becoming established, a periphery zone experiencing closures after extra- 
regional takeover will experience job and skills loss, even if eventually another 
business eventually arises.
A key finding of this thesis is that overall small firm acquisitions benefit all locations 
due to the effect they have on productivity performance of the acquired. Therefore 
rather than regarding takeovers as harmful to periphery regions, policy makers should 
attempt to understand why takeovers are less frequent there, and should consider ways 
of improving the operation o f this market for SMEs in these places.
The thesis begins from a problem as perceived by policy makers (such as former MP 
Adam Price) not necessarily as perceived by neoclassical economists. The fact that 
takeovers improve performance is consistent with an absence of market failure. 
Takeovers are a mechanism that allows resources to be redistributed or moved - 
‘asset reshuffling’ (Hall 1988). However, there might still be some market failure, as 
suggested in the literature and the analysis. The literature suggests that small firms are 
likely to suffer from asymmetry of information problems, a potential source of market 
failure in the neoclassical sense, which may affect both their access to finance and 
also the chances of acquisition. Focusing on the latter, potential buyers may not be
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able to learn about the firm (especially young and small ones) from readily available 
sources of information. Acquirers may avoid private targets that have not adequately 
signalled the value of their resources. However, information problems may also work 
the other way, where profitable businesses that are keen to sell are unable to learn of 
suitable buyers. The results in this thesis show that SME takeovers occur less 
frequently in more peripheral locations. This might be because more firms, especially 
large ones, are more likely to be located in the core and according to NEG models, 
information flows may be better within core areas. In the periphery there might be 
fewer formal or informal networks in these areas, especially in relatively more 
deprived areas (Allinson et al. 2007). These can all hinder the gathering of 
information on potential buyers and sellers. Also, information may attenuate with 
distance, further hampering the rate of takeovers in the periphery, as it is likely there 
are fewer potential buyers locally. A degree of imperfect information may be a 
potential problem wherever small targets are located
Policies to facilitate SME takeovers could aim to improve formal or informal 
networks, or to increase information flows more generally about potential buyers and 
sellers, for instance with matching databases. This could help ease a possible cause of 
market failure that reduces the rate of takeovers, which are generally found to be 
positive -  at least for the targets, in all locations but especially in peripheral areas.
Additionally, policies that seek to increase collaborative agreements between large 
and small firms may be also beneficial (Shen and Reuer 2005). First, such policies 
could overcome the problems o f private information between buyers and sellers. 
Second, they may enable small firms to obtain the resources, external expertise and 
access specialised assets and competencies of other (larger) firms on offer to SMEs 
(Colombo et al. 2006). These resources may enable small businesses to improve their 
performance without necessarily requiring takeover. If so, peripheral region 
productivity would be boosted, perhaps even enabling these areas to catch-up with 
more productive locations.
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